Law Commons^™

The Go-Shop “Lure”: Go-Shop V. No-Shop In Merger And Acquisition In Public Company, Yilei Zhou Dr.

Yilei Zhou Dr.

In March 2013, one of the world biggest PC retailers, Dell, announced its privatization plan, in which adopted the go-shop clause. Although used by many public companies in merger and acquisition, the go-shop clause in fact developed from Revlon duty, that board of director must act in good faith to maximize the shareholders’ interests in the deal. Generally speaking, since traditional no-shop clause without “fiduciary out” provision in merger agreement conflict with board’s Revlon duty, consequently, if running successfully, the go-shop clause is the best tool for shareholders to maximize their interests. However, court imputes many restrictions on the board …

Order On Defendant's Motion To Dismiss (Mary Ann Digan Et Al.), Elizabeth E. Long

Georgia Business Court Opinions

No abstract provided.

Order On Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (North Star Jefferson, Llc Et Al.), Elizabeth E. Long

Georgia Business Court Opinions

No abstract provided.

Unsettledness In Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, Lyman P. Q. Johnson

Lyman P. Q. Johnson

This Article revisits two fundamental issues in corporate law. One — the central role of the business judgment rule in fiduciary litigation — involves a great deal of seemingly settled law, while the other — is there a mandated corporate purpose — has very little law. Using the emergent question of whether the business judgment rule should be used in analyzing officer and controlling shareholder fiduciary duties, the latter issue having recently been addressed by Chancellor Strine in the widely-heralded MFW decision, this Article proposes a fundamental rethinking of the rule’s analytical preeminence. For a variety of reasons, it is …

Beyond The Inevitable And Inadequate Regulation Of Bankers, Lyman P. Q. Johnson

Lyman P. Q. Johnson

None available.

Order On Georgia-Pacific's Motion And Memorandum To Exclude Damages (Ezgreen Assoc. Llc), John J. Goger

Georgia Business Court Opinions

No abstract provided.

Representing The Failing Company Where The Irs Is "Knocking On The Door", Craig Bell, T. Fogg, George Gretes, Nina Olson

T. Keith Fogg

No abstract provided.

Business Associations, Crystal J. Clark

Mercer Law Review

This Article surveys notable cases in the areas of corporate, limited liability company, partnership, agency, and joint venture law decided between June 1, 2012 and May 31, 2013, by the Georgia Supreme Court, the Georgia Court of Appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the United States district courts located in Georgia.' This Article also discusses relevant legislation enacted during the survey period.

Valuación De Empresas Familiares En Crisis, Carlos Molina Sandoval

Carlos Molina Sandoval

La valuación de empresas se ocupa de determinar ese valor en función de los distintos interesados en la empresa (accionistas, directores, familiares, proveedores, clientes, empleados, fisco, etc.) y suele fundarse no sólo en estrictas pautas económicas o financieras sino también en apreciaciones razonables tomadas sobre las llamadas prácticas comerciales y la organización interna familiar. Las especiales características familiares de una empresa incidente significativamente en las pautas de valuación.

Order On Nov. 1, 2013 Hearing (Michael D. Sullivan), Elizabeth E. Long

Georgia Business Court Opinions

No abstract provided.

Order On Nov. 14, 2013 Hearing (United Community Bank), John J. Goger

Georgia Business Court Opinions

No abstract provided.

The Enduring Illegitimacy Of The Poison Pill, Julian Velasco

Julian Velasco

The poison pill is the ultimate defense against a hostile takeover. From management's perspective, it is almost too good to be true. Originally, the poison pill was seen as a way to guard against the worst of hostile takeover tactics. It has been successful; the poison pill has virtually eliminated these tactics from the repertoires of hostile bidders. However, the poison pill is extremely potent, capable of preventing all hostile takeovers, regardless of their underlying merit. Thus, the poison pill eventually became the means to employ a just say no defense of resisting hostile takeovers, regardless of the interests of …

Shareholder Ownership And Primacy, Julian Velasco

Julian Velasco

According to the traditional view, the shareholders own the corporation. Until relatively recently, this view enjoyed general acceptance. Today, however, there seems to be substantial agreement among legal scholars and others in the academy that shareholders do not own corporations. In fact, the claim that shareholders do own corporations often is dismissed as merely a “theory,” a “naked assertion,” or even a “myth.” And yet, outside of the academy, views on the corporation remain quite traditional. Most people - not just the public and the media, but also politicians, and even bureaucrats and the courts - seem to believe that …

Just Do It: An Antidote To The Poison Pill, Julian Velasco

Julian Velasco

The poison pill is the most powerful defense against hostile takeovers. It can render a company takeover-proof, or nearly so. Efforts at developing an antidote have focused largely on shareholder-adopted bylaws, but the legality of such proposals has been questioned by many. In any event, shareholder-adopted bylaws have not been very successful in eliminating poison pills thus far. In order to effect takeovers, hostile bidders cannot rely on the courts or the target company's shareholders; they can rely only on themselves. In this article, I propose a strategy for hostile bidders to counteract the poison pill and to consummate hostile …

Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, Julian Velasco

Julian Velasco

The great corporate scandals of the recent past and the resulting push for legal reform have revived the role of the shareholder in the corporation as a subject of great debate. Those who favor an expanded role for shareholders in corporate governance tend to focus on developing new legal rights for shareholders, and their critics respond with reasons why such rights are unnecessary and inappropriate. While these issues certainly are worthy of consideration, issues concerning existing shareholder rights are more fundamental. If existing rights are adequate or could be improved, then new rights may not be necessary; but if existing …

How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There In Corporate Law?, Julian Velasco

Julian Velasco

Historically, there were two main fiduciary duties in corporate law, care and loyalty, and only the duty of loyalty was likely to lead to liability. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court breathed life into the duty of care, created a number of intermediate standards of review, elevated the duty of good faith to equal standing with care and loyalty, and announced a unified test for review of breaches of fiduciary duty. The law, which once seemed so straightforward, suddenly became elaborate and complex. In 2006, in the case of Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected …

The Fundamental Rights Of The Shareholder, Julian Velasco

Julian Velasco

Shareholders have many legal rights, but they are not all of equal significance. This article will argue that two rights — the right to elect directors and the right to sell shares — are more important than any others, that these rights should be considered the fundamental rights of the shareholder, and that, as such, they deserve a great deal of respect and protection by law. The history of corporate law has been one of increasing flexibility for directors and decreasing rights for shareholders. Although the law seems to have coalesced around the norm of shareholder primacy, this is not …

The Role Of Aspiration In Corporate Fiduciary Duties, Julian Velasco

Julian Velasco

Corporate law is characterized by a pervasive divergence between standards of conduct and standards of review. Courts often opine on the relatively demanding standard of conduct, but their judgments must be based on the more forgiving standard of review. Commentators defend this state of affairs by insisting that it provides guidance to directors without imposing ruinous liability. However, the dichotomy can lead many, especially those who focus on the bottom line, to call into question the meaningfulness of standards of conduct. Of particular concern is the increasing popularity, in legal and scholarly circles, of the notion that fiduciary duty standards …

Fiduciary Duties And Fiduciary Outs, Julian Velasco

Julian Velasco

Fiduciary outs are virtually ubiquitous in acquisition agreements, but almost unheard of in other contexts. This is because the fiduciary out is an inherently problematic device. Although it is not intended to do so, it almost necessarily transforms an agreement into an option in the hands of one party. Nevertheless, fiduciary outs make sense in the context of acquisition agreements. This is because fiduciary outs are essentially contractual proxies for fiduciary duties. As such, they have the same purpose: to protect shareholders from abuse at the hands of directors. Fiduciary outs do this in the context of acquisition agreements by …

Shareholder Primacy In The Classroom After The Financial Crisis, David Millon

David K. Millon

No abstract provided.

Back To The Future: Rediscovering Equitable Discretion In Trademark Cases, Mark P. Mckenna

Mark P. McKenna

Courts in recent years have increasingly made blunt use of their equitable powers in trademark cases. Rather than limiting the scope of injunctive relief so as to protect the interests of a mark owner while respecting the legitimate interests of third parties and of consumers, courts in most cases have viewed injunctive relief in binary terms. This is unfortunate, because greater willingness to tailor injunctive relief could go a long way to mitigating some of the most pernicious effects of trademark law’s modern expansion. This Essay urges courts to reverse this trend towards crude injunctive relief, and to re-embrace their …

Law, Bubbles, And Financial Regulation, Erik F. Gerding

Erik F. Gerding

This introductory chapter of the book "Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation" outlines how financial regulation can fail when it is needed the most. The dynamics of asset price bubbles weaken financial regulation just as financial markets begin to overheat and the risk of crisis spikes. At the same time, the failure of financial regulations adds further fuel to a bubble.

This book examines the interaction of bubbles and financial regulation through over three centuries of history of financial crises. This perspective reveals that law is crucial to the story of bubbles and that the legal history of the current global …

I Want Out – Tax Considerations In Exiting A Partnership, James B. Sowell

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Partnership Current Developments, Robert J. Crnkovich, Steven M. Friedman

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Something Old, Something New: Structuring And Restructuring Deals In 2013 (And Beyond), Stephen L. Owen

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Compensating Owners And Key Employees Of Partnerships And Llc's, Elizabeth E. Drigotas, Steven R. Schneider

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Introduction To M&A Tax: S Corporations And Section 336(E), Robert G. Mcelroy, William M. Richardson

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Tax Due Diligence, Warranties And Indemnification In Connection With Business Acquisitions Of Private Companies: Selected Topics, Jerald David August

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

The Congressional Response To Corporate Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols And Substance In The Taxation Of Multinational Corporations, Michael Kirsch

Michael Kirsch

During the past few years, several high-profile U.S.-based multinational corporations have changed their tax residence from the United States to Bermuda or some other tax haven. They have accomplished these expatriations, and the resulting millions of dollars of annual tax savings, merely by changing the place of incorporation of their corporate parent, without the need to make any substantive changes to their business operations or their U.S.-based management structure. Congress and the media have focused significant attention on this phenomenon. Despite this attention, Congress initially enacted only a non-tax provision targeting corporate expatriations - a purported ban on expatriated companies …

A New Matrix: Do The Interests Of Shareholders, Employees, And Managers Conflict, Kent Greenfield

Kent Greenfield

No abstract provided.