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Articles 31 - 34 of 34
Full-Text Articles in Law
Virtual Shareholder Meetings Reconsidered, Lisa Fairfax
Virtual Shareholder Meetings Reconsidered, Lisa Fairfax
All Faculty Scholarship
In 2000 Delaware enacted a statute enabling corporations to host meetings solely by electronic means of communication rather than in a physical location. Since that time, several states have followed Delaware's lead, and the American Bar Association has proposed changing the Model Business Corporation Act to provide for some form of virtual shareholder meetings. Many states believed that such meetings would prove to be an important device for shareholders who desire to increase their voice within the corporation. Instead, very few companies have taken advantage of the ability to host such meetings. This Article provides some data on state statutes …
Supply Chains And Porous Boundaries: The Disaggregation Of Legal Services, Milton C. Regan, Palmer T. Heenan
Supply Chains And Porous Boundaries: The Disaggregation Of Legal Services, Milton C. Regan, Palmer T. Heenan
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The economic downturn has had significant effects on law firms, and is causing many of them to rethink some basic assumptions about how they operate. In important respects, however, the downturn has simply intensified the effects of some deeper trends that preceded it, which are likely to continue after any recovery that may occur.
This paper explores one of these trends, which is corporate client insistence that law firms “disaggregate” their services into discrete tasks that can be delegated to the least costly providers who can perform them. With advances in communications technology, there is increasing likelihood that some of …
Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards For Sustainable Corporate Governance, Robert Sprague
Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards For Sustainable Corporate Governance, Robert Sprague
Robert Sprague
This paper explores whether the modern corporate governance model is sustainable. For many, particularly large, corporations, there is a separation between ownership and management, with an emphasis by management on short-term gains at the expense of long-term sustainability. This paper explores the role of corporate directors, particularly vis-à-vis shareholders, from an interdisciplinary perspective, analyzing legal case law as well as legal, management, and finance literature. This paper then explores emerging trends in expanding notions of corporate governance that incorporate concerns beyond just shareholders, recognizing the interrelationship between business and society. It is suggested that in order to remain viable and …
Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle
Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle
Robert Sprague
There is a fundamental flaw in the law’s approach to corporate governance. While shareholder primacy is a well-established norm within U.S. corporate law, the business judgment rule essentially holds directors blameless when they fail to maximize shareholder wealth. During the past century, control of the corporation has passed from shareholders to managers. As a result, shareholders have little practical say in who runs the corporation, even though they cannot usually hold managers legally liable when those managers destroy shareholder wealth through incompetence. Despite a number of arguments asserting that shareholders do not deserve any additional management powers, this article concludes …