Law Commons^™

On The Role And Regulation Of Proxy Advisors, Paul Rose

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In anticipation of proxy season-the springtime ritual where companies prepare and deliver proxy statements in preparation for annual shareholder meetings-U.S. public companies typically reexamine their corporate governance structures and policies. Many corporate governance structures that were acceptable ten years ago are now considered outmoded or even evidence of managerial entrenchment. For example, consider the classified board of directors. In recent years, many companies have shifted from a classified board of directors to an annually elected board. A company might adopt an annually-elected board structure for a number of reasons. A classified board can serve as an entrenchment device, for instance, …

The Uneasy Case For The Inside Director, Lisa Fairfax

All Faculty Scholarship

In the wake of recent scandals and the economic meltdown, there is nearly universal support for the notion that corporations must have independent directors. Conventional wisdom insists that independent directors can more effectively monitor the corporation and prevent or otherwise better detect wrongdoing. As the movement to increase director independence has gained traction, inside directors have become an endangered species, relegated to holding a minimal number of seats on the corporate board. This Article questions the popular trend away from inside directors by critiquing the rationales in favor of director independence, and assessing the potential advantages of inside directors. This …

Is The Eu Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously? An Essay On The Impotence Of Shareholdership In Corporate Europe, Pavlos E. Masouros

Pavlos E. Masouros

This article critically analyzes the Shareholder Rights Directive ("SRD") (Directive 2007/36/EC). It is essentially an attempt to show that the deficit in the European corporate governance model with regard to the status of the shareholders persists even in the post-SRD era and that we still have a long distance to cover in order to truly empower shareholders in the EU. The SRD along with certain other Company Law Directives and the various European national corporate laws form a synthesis that falls short of providing shareholders with the full potential of getting their corporate governance voice through within listed corporations.

First …

The Equity Trustee, Kelli A. Alces

Scholarly Publications

As we reel from the effects of a recent financial disaster, it is apparent that there is a significant gap in corporate governance and accountability for management. One reason we have experienced this financial cataclysm is the inability of shareholders to do the "shareholderj ob. " Shareholders, as the putative owners of corporations, hold a venerated place in corporate governance. They are responsible for electing directors and monitoring management as well as valuing companies through trades in a vigorous market. The shareholder collective action problem and resulting rational apathy have kept shareholders from effectively fulfilling their role in corporate governance. …

The Checks And Balances Of Good Corporate Governance, John Lessing

John Lessing

Good corporate governance requires a range of regulatory checks and balances - or mechanisms - to be effective. If one mechanism fails, the system will fail like a chain with a weak link. This article provides an overview and brief explanation of the main checks and balances a country needs to have a good corporate governance system. It is of particular relevance to countries with transition economies. However, it is also important in developed countries as recent corporate collapses and failures in the financial system have illustrated.

Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

The Modern Corporation and Private Property highlighted the evolving separation of ownership and control in the public corporation and the effects of that separation on the allocation of power within the corporation. This essay explores the implications of intermediation for those themes. The article observes that intermediation, by decoupling economic ownership and decision-making authority within the shareholder, creates a second layer of agency issues beyond those identified by Berle and Means. These agency issues are an important consideration in the current debate over shareholder empowerment. The article concludes by considering the hypothetical shareholder construct implicit in the Berle and Means …

Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle Harner

Michelle M. Harner

“As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”** This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America. These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial sector. They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make implementing a meaningful risk culture and thereby mitigating the impact of future economic downturns a challenging proposition. The …

Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

“As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”** This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America. These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial sector. They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make implementing a meaningful risk culture and thereby mitigating the impact of future economic downturns a challenging proposition. The …

Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

“As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”** This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America. These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial sector. They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make implementing a meaningful risk culture and thereby mitigating the impact of future economic downturns a challenging proposition. The …

Corporate Governance In The Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, Jessica M. Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

Conventional wisdom is that shareholder derivative suits are dead. Yet this death knell is decidedly premature. The current conception of shareholder derivative suits is based on an empirical record limited to suits filed in Delaware or on behalf of Delaware corporations, leaving suits outside this sphere in the shadows of corporate law scholarship. This Article aims to fill this gap by presenting the first empirical examination of shareholder derivative suits in the federal courts. Using an original, hand-collected data set, my study reveals that shareholder derivative suits are far from dead. Shareholders file more shareholder derivative suits than securities class …

Power And Purpose In The "Anglo-American" Corporation, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Articles

The article discusses the impact of a shareholder-centric and market-oriented approach to corporate governance among public business firms in the U.S. and Great Britain. It mentions that both countries have more common similarities in terms of corporate governance systems and business cultures. It affirms that despite such similarities, both countries' corporate governance system differs on how they relate to external regulations that can affect their relationships among stakeholders.

Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle Harner

Michelle M. Harner

Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corporation. Courts historically have regulated this potential abuse by designating the board of directors and senior management as fiduciaries. In some instances, however, shareholders, creditors or others outside of corporate management may influence corporate decisions and, in the process, extract corporate value. Courts generally address this type of corporate damage in one of two ways: they designate controlling shareholders as corporate fiduciaries and they characterize creditors, customers and others as contract parties with no fiduciary duties. The traditional roles of corporate shareholders and creditors may …

Ignoring The Writing On The Wall: The Role Of Enterprise Risk Management In The Economic Crisis, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

Enterprise risk management (ERM) targets overall corporate strategy and, when implemented correctly, can manage a corporation’s risk appetite and exposure. When ignored or underutilized, it can contribute to a corporation’s demise. In fact, many commentators point to ERM failures as contributing to the severity of the 2008 economic crisis. This essay examines the different approaches to ERM adopted by financial institutions affected by the 2008 economic crisis and how ERM contributed to the survival or failure of those firms. It then considers ERM in the broader context of corporate governance generally. This discussion reflects on ERM techniques for corporate boards …

Risks And Hedges Of Providing Liquidity In Complex Securities: The Impact Of Insider Trading On Options Market Makers, Stanislav Dolgopolov

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle M. Harner

Faculty Scholarship

“As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”**

This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America. These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial sector. They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make implementing a meaningful risk culture and thereby mitigating the impact of future economic downturns a challenging proposition.

The …

You Can Come Under The Tarp, But First... The Bank Of America-Merrill Lynch Merger Was A Failure Of Corporate Governance, James K. Donaldson

Law Student Publications

In response to the financial credit crisis in the fall of 2008, Congress, the U.S. Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors took unprecedented action to prevent both large and small financial institutions from insolvency. Ultimately, the Troubled Asset Relief Program was created to inject various banks with the cash necessary to prevent the banks' insolvency and the threat that bank failures posed to the nation's economy. In the midst of that crisis, Bank of America agreed to acquire Merrill Lynch. Each institution, in their individual capacity, received TARP funds from the Treasury several weeks after entering into the …

Foreword: In Berle’S Footsteps, Charles R.T. O'Kelley

Seattle University Law Review

On the weekend of November 6–8, 2009, scholars from around the world gathered in Seattle for a symposium—In Berle’s Footsteps—celebrating the launch of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society. As founding director of the Berle Center, I described our undertaking: “It is with a profound sense of obligation to the legacy that has been entrusted to my care, that I announce the launching of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society. It is a privilege to follow in Berle’s footsteps.”

The Uncorporation's Domain, Larry E. Ribstein

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Opening Remarks, Chancellor William B. Chandler Iii

Seattle University Law Review

Law is, in many ways, a backwards-looking field. We litigate over facts that have already occurred, challenge deals that have already been signed, and apply rules of decision based on previously-established precedent or statutes already enacted. To the extent that this Center and the symposium reflect on Berle’s work, they too are an exercise in looking back. Indeed, some might say the establishment of a Center named in Berle’s honor is a monument to the past.

How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There In Corporate Law?, Julian Velasco

Journal Articles

Historically, there were two main fiduciary duties in corporate law, care and loyalty, and only the duty of loyalty was likely to lead to liability. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court breathed life into the duty of care, created a number of intermediate standards of review, elevated the duty of good faith to equal standing with care and loyalty, and announced a unified test for review of breaches of fiduciary duty. The law, which once seemed so straightforward, suddenly became elaborate and complex. In 2006, in the case of Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected …

The Birth Of Corporate Governance, Harwell Wells

Seattle University Law Review

Part I of this Article briefly examines the concept of “corporate governance” and argues for dating the concept’s origins to the debates of the 1920s. Part II then moves on to examine early scholarly and popular discussions of the separation of ownership and control. After surveying the historical developments that produced the recognizably modern corporate economy around the turn of the century, it examines early scholarly and popular discussions of the separation of ownership and control, focusing on three major thinkers, Louis D. Brandeis, Walter Lippmann, and Thorstein Veblen. It argues that, while each of these authors examined the separation …

The U.S. As Reluctant Shareholder: Government, Business And The Law, Barbara Black

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Despite the likelihood of future bailouts, the government articulated a consistent policy to deal with private enterprise failure, and there is no rule book for how the government should act This is not surprising; the philosophy of free market capitalism, so deeply engrained in the U.S. economic system, is difficult to reconcile with government's rescue of businesses that fail in that system. Unlike some other countries, the U.S. government does not invest surplus funds or engage in entrepreneurial activities for economic gain. The phrase "nationalizing private business" conveys serious negative connotations.

Accordingly, how the government behaves when it is a …

Corporate Power In The Public Eye: Reassessing The Implications Of Berle’S Public Consensus Theory, Marc T. Moore, Antoine Rebérioux

Seattle University Law Review

We analyze Berle’s overall corporate governance project in accordance with what we see as its four core sub-themes: (A) the limitations of external market forces as a constraint on managerial decision-making power; (B) the desirability of internal (corporate) over external (market) actors in allocating corporate capital; (C) civil society and the public consensus as a continuous informal check on managerial decision-making power; and (D) shareholder democracy (as opposed to shareholder primacy or shareholder wealth maximization) as a socially instrumental institution. We seek to debunk the popular misconception that Berle’s early work was a defense of the orthodox shareholder primacy paradigm …

Virtual Shareholder Meetings Reconsidered, Lisa Fairfax

All Faculty Scholarship

In 2000 Delaware enacted a statute enabling corporations to host meetings solely by electronic means of communication rather than in a physical location. Since that time, several states have followed Delaware's lead, and the American Bar Association has proposed changing the Model Business Corporation Act to provide for some form of virtual shareholder meetings. Many states believed that such meetings would prove to be an important device for shareholders who desire to increase their voice within the corporation. Instead, very few companies have taken advantage of the ability to host such meetings. This Article provides some data on state statutes …

Iss Recommendations And Mutual Fund Voting On Proxy Proposals, James Cotter, Alan Palmiter, Randall Thomas

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Cult Of Efficiency In Corporate Law, Stephen E. Ellis, Grant M. Hayden

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This paper challenges a fundamental assumption of corporate law scholarship. Corporate law is heavily influenced by economics, and by normative economics in particular. Economic efficiency, for example, is seen as the primary goal of good corporate governance. But this dependence on standard notions of economic efficiency is unfortunate, as those notions are highly problematic. In economic theory, efficiency is spelled out in terms of individual preference satisfaction, which is an inadequate foundation for any sort of normative analysis. We argue that on any account of the good, people will sometimes prefer things that aren’t good for them on that account. …

Ignoring The Writing On The Wall: The Role Of Enterprise Risk Management In The Economic Crisis, Michelle M. Harner

Faculty Scholarship

Enterprise risk management (ERM) targets overall corporate strategy and, when implemented correctly, can manage a corporation’s risk appetite and exposure. When ignored or underutilized, it can contribute to a corporation’s demise. In fact, many commentators point to ERM failures as contributing to the severity of the 2008 economic crisis. This essay examines the different approaches to ERM adopted by financial institutions affected by the 2008 economic crisis and how ERM contributed to the survival or failure of those firms. It then considers ERM in the broader context of corporate governance generally. This discussion reflects on ERM techniques for corporate boards …

Corporate Control And The Need For Meaningful Board Accountability, Michelle M. Harner

Faculty Scholarship

Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corporation. Courts historically have regulated this potential abuse by designating the board of directors and senior management as fiduciaries. In some instances, however, shareholders, creditors or others outside of corporate management may influence corporate decisions and, in the process, extract corporate value. Courts generally address this type of corporate damage in one of two ways: they designate controlling shareholders as corporate fiduciaries and they characterize creditors, customers and others as contract parties with no fiduciary duties. The traditional roles of corporate shareholders and creditors may …

The Development Of Modern Corporate Governance In China And India, Nicholas C. Howson, Vikramaditya S. Khanna

Book Chapters

Corporate governance reform has become a topic of considerable debate both in the US and in many emerging markets. Indeed, the discussion is important because these reforms may have potentially long-standing effects upon the global allocation of capital, and in understanding the ways in which governance norms are communicated across markets and nations in an ever-globalizing world. In this chapter we examine the corporate governance reform efforts of the world's two biggest and fastest growing emerging markets, the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) and India. In the process we find that our understanding of how and why corporate …

Renegotiation Of Cash Flow Rights In The Sale Of Vc-Backed Firms, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Incomplete contracting theory suggests that VC cash flow rights - including liquidation preferences - may be subject to renegotiation. Using a hand-collected dataset of sales of Silicon Valley firms, we find common shareholders do sometimes receive payment before VCs' liquidation preferences are satisfied. However, such deviations tend to be small. We also find that renegotiation is more likely when governance arrangements, including the firm's choice of corporate law, give common shareholders power to impede the sale. Our study provides support for incomplete contracting theory, improves understanding of VC exits, and suggests that choice of corporate law matters in private firms.