Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Supreme Court of the United States (27)
- Courts (15)
- Constitutional Law (13)
- Jurisprudence (7)
- Judges (6)
-
- Civil Rights and Discrimination (5)
- Law and Race (4)
- Legal History (4)
- Legislation (4)
- State and Local Government Law (4)
- Criminal Procedure (3)
- Election Law (3)
- Environmental Law (3)
- Evidence (3)
- Intellectual Property Law (3)
- Administrative Law (2)
- First Amendment (2)
- Law and Politics (2)
- Military, War, and Peace (2)
- President/Executive Department (2)
- Rule of Law (2)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (2)
- Torts (2)
- American Politics (1)
- Business Organizations Law (1)
- Communications Law (1)
- Criminal Law (1)
- Cultural Heritage Law (1)
- Dispute Resolution and Arbitration (1)
- Institution
- Publication
-
- Articles (11)
- Supreme Court Preview (7)
- Michigan Law Review (6)
- Arthur G. LeFrancois (3)
- Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications (3)
-
- Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review (2)
- Michigan Journal of Race and Law (2)
- University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform (2)
- Articles by Maurer Faculty (1)
- Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works (1)
- Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications (1)
- Journal Articles (1)
- Law Faculty Scholarship (1)
- Michigan Law Review First Impressions (1)
- Northern Illinois University Law Review (1)
- Popular Media (1)
- Publications (1)
- St. Mary's Law Journal (1)
- Publication Type
Articles 31 - 46 of 46
Full-Text Articles in Law
Stoneridge Investment Partners V. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy Of Securities Class Action Reform, Adam C. Pritchard
Stoneridge Investment Partners V. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy Of Securities Class Action Reform, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
I begin in Part II by explaining the wrong turn that the Court took in Basic. The Basic Court misunderstood the function of the reliance element and its relation to the question of damages. As a result, the securities class action regime established in Basic threatens draconian sanctions with limited deterrent benefit. Part III then summarizes the cases leading up to Stoneridge and analyzes the Court's reasoning in that case. In Stoneridge, like the decisions interpreting the reliance requirement of Rule 10b-5 that came before it, the Court emphasized policy implications. Sometimes policy implications are invoked to broaden the reach …
Symposium: Stare Decisis And Nonjudicial Actors: Introduction, Amy Coney Barrett
Symposium: Stare Decisis And Nonjudicial Actors: Introduction, Amy Coney Barrett
Journal Articles
This essay is as an introduction to a symposium on stare decisis and nonjudicial actors. It frames the questions explored in the symposium by pausing to reflect upon the variety of ways in which nonjudicial actors have, over time, registered their disagreement with decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Both public officials and private citizens have battled the Court on any number of occasions since its inception, and historically, they have employed a diverse range of tactics in doing so. They have resisted Supreme Court judgments. They have denied the binding effect of Supreme Court opinions. They have sought …
Public Rights, Social Equality, And The Conceptual Roots Of The Plessy Challenge, Rebecca J. Scott
Public Rights, Social Equality, And The Conceptual Roots Of The Plessy Challenge, Rebecca J. Scott
Articles
This Article argues that the test case that gave rise to the 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson is best understood as part of a wellestablished, cosmopolitan tradition of anticaste activism in Louisiana rather than as a quixotic effort that contradicted nineteenth-century ideas of the boundaries of citizens' rights. By drawing a dividing line between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and social rights, on the other, the Supreme Court construed challenges to segregation as claims to a "social equality" that was beyond the scope of judicially cognizable rights. The Louisiana constitutional convention of 1867-68, however, had defined …
Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's Better Than It Looks, Theodore J. St. Antoine
Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's Better Than It Looks, Theodore J. St. Antoine
Articles
"Mandatory arbitration" as used here means that employees must agree as a condition of employment to arbitrate all legal disputes with their employer, including statutory claims, rather than take them to court. The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of such agreements on the grounds that they merely provide for a change of forum and not a loss of substantive rights. Opponents contend this wrongfully deprives employees of the right to a jury trial and other statutory procedural benefits. Various empirical studies indicate, however, that employees similarly situated do about as well in arbitration as in court actions, or even …
The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision And Agency Interpretation: A Response To Galle And Seidenfeld, Nina A. Mendelson
The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision And Agency Interpretation: A Response To Galle And Seidenfeld, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld add some important strands to the debate on agency preemption, particularly in their detailed documentation of the potential advantages agencies may possess in deliberating on preemption compared with Congress and the courts. As they note, the quality of agency deliberation matters to two different debates. First, should an agency interpretation of statutory language to preempt state law receive Chevron deference in the courts, as other agency interpretations may, or should some lesser form of deference be given? Second, should a general statutory authorization to an agency to administer a program and to issue rules …
Requiem For Section 1983, Paul D. Reingold
Requiem For Section 1983, Paul D. Reingold
Articles
Section 1983 no longer serves as a remedial statute for the people most in need of its protection. Those who have suffered a violation of their civil rights at the hands of state authorities, but who cannot afford a lawyer because they have only modest damages or seek only equitable remedies, are foreclosed from relief because lawyers shun their cases. Today civil rights plaintiffs are treated the same as ordinary tort plaintiffs by the private bar: without high damages, civil rights plaintiffs are denied access to the courts because no one will represent them. Congress understood that civil rights laws …
Does An Accused Forfeit The Confrontation Right By Murdering A Witness, Absent A Purpose To Render Her Unavailable?, Richard D. Friedman
Does An Accused Forfeit The Confrontation Right By Murdering A Witness, Absent A Purpose To Render Her Unavailable?, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
If an accused murdered a witness, should he be deemed to have forfeited the right under the Sixth Amendment "to be confronted with" the witness, absent proof that the accused committed the murder for the purpose of rendering her unavailable as a witness?
Pharma's Nonobvious Problem, Rebecca S. Eisenberg
Pharma's Nonobvious Problem, Rebecca S. Eisenberg
Articles
This Article considers the effect of the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. on the nonobviousness standard for patentability as applied to pharmaceutical patents. By calling for an expansive and flexible analysis and disapproving of the use of rigid formulas in evaluating an invention for obviousness, KSR may appear to make it easier for generic competitors to challenge the validity of drug patents. But an examination of the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence in the context of such challenges reveals that the Federal Circuit has been employing all along the sort of flexible …
Scrutiny Land, Randy E. Barnett
Scrutiny Land, Randy E. Barnett
Michigan Law Review
Scrutiny Land is the place where government needs to justify to a court its restrictions on the liberties of the people. In the 1930s, the Supreme Court began limiting access to Scrutiny Land. While the New Deal Court merely shifted the burden to those challenging a law to show that a restriction of liberty is irrational, the Warren Court made the presumption of constitutionality effectively irrebuttable. After this, only one road to Scrutiny Land remained: showing that the liberty being restricted was a fundamental right. The Glucksberg Two-Step, however, limited the doctrine of fundamental rights to those (1) narrowly defined …
Limiting A Constitutional Tort Without Probably Cause: First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest After Hartman, Colin P. Watson
Limiting A Constitutional Tort Without Probably Cause: First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest After Hartman, Colin P. Watson
Michigan Law Review
Federal law provides a cause of action for individuals who are the target of adverse state action taken in retaliation for their exercise of First Amendment rights. Because these constitutional torts are "easy to allege and hard to disprove," they raise difficult questions concerning the proper balance between allowing meaningful access to the courts and protecting government agents from frivolous and vexatious litigation. In its recent decision in Hartman v. Moore, the U.S. Supreme Court tipped the scales in favor of the state in one subset of First Amendment retaliation actions by holding that plaintiffs in actions for retaliatory …
A Call For The End Of The Doctrine Of Realignment, Jacob S. Sherkow
A Call For The End Of The Doctrine Of Realignment, Jacob S. Sherkow
Michigan Law Review
In Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 1941, the Supreme Court established the doctrine of realignment, requiring federal courts to examine the issues in dispute and realign each party as plaintiff or defendant if necessary. Due to the complete diversity requirement, realignment gave the federal courts the ability to both create and destroy diversity jurisdiction. Since 1941, the federal courts have struggled to interpret the central holding in Indianapolis, and have created several competing "tests" for realignment. This confusion has made the doctrine of realignment unworkable. Realignment along with each of the present tests-encourages jurisdictional abuses by forcing the federal …
Judicial Compensation And The Definition Of Judicial Power In The Early Republic, James E. Pfander
Judicial Compensation And The Definition Of Judicial Power In The Early Republic, James E. Pfander
Michigan Law Review
Article III's provision for the compensation of federal judges has been much celebrated for the no-diminution provision that forecloses judicial pay cuts. But other features of Article Ill's compensation provision have largely escaped notice. In particular, little attention has been paid to the framers' apparent expectation that Congress would compensate federal judges with salaries alone, payable from the treasury at stated times. Article III's presumption in favor of salary-based compensation may rule out fee-based compensation, which was a common form of judicial compensation in England and the colonies but had grown controversial by the time of the framing. Among other …
Climate Change In The Supreme Court, Lisa Heinzerling
Climate Change In The Supreme Court, Lisa Heinzerling
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of climate change for the first time. The Court held that the Clean Air Act gives the Environmental Protection Agency the authority to regulate greenhouse gases and that the agency may not decline to exercise this authority based either on factors not present in the statute or inconclusive gestures toward uncertainty in the science of climate change. I had the privilege of serving as the lead author of the winning briefs in this case. This Article provides an insider's perspective on the choices that went into bringing and …
Lyons V. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944), Arthur Lefrancois
Lyons V. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944), Arthur Lefrancois
Arthur G. LeFrancois
No abstract provided.
Skinner V. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), Arthur Lefrancois
Skinner V. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), Arthur Lefrancois
Arthur G. LeFrancois
No abstract provided.
Judicial Pragmatism, Arthur Lefrancois