Law Commons^™

Unilateral Refusals To Deal, Vertical Integration, And The Essential Facility Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Where it applies, the essential facility doctrine requires a monopolist to share its "essential facility." Since the only qualifying exclusionary practice is the refusal to share the facility itself, the doctrine comes about as close as antitrust ever does to condemning "no fault" monopolization. There is no independent justification for an essential facility doctrine separate and apart from general Section 2 doctrine governing the vertically integrated monopolist's refusal to deal. In its Trinko decision the Supreme Court placed that doctrine about where it should be. The Court did not categorically reject all unilateral refusal to deal claims, but it placed …

Better Competition Advocacy, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

Today's competition advocacy censures governmental restraints that diminish competition. But such advocacy glosses over four fundamental questions: First, what is competition? Second, what are the goals of a competition policy? Third, how does one achieve, if one can, the objectives of such desired competition? Fourth, how does one know if the economy is progressing toward these goals? This Article outlines the conventional wisdom underlying today's competition advocacy. It examines what is meant by competition, and what is being valued. It examines the goals of competition, as expressed by various governmental agencies, and the structural mechanisms that the government can provide …

The Antitrust Standard For Unlawful Exclusionary Conduct, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay considers the general definition of unlawful exclusionary practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act as acts that: (1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals; and (2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits claimed for them, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to any resulting benefits. An important purpose of this progression of queries is to permit the court to avoid balancing, although balancing certainly cannot be avoided in some close cases. The given definition is very …

Bank Merger Reform Takes An Extended Philadelphia National Bank Holiday, Edward Pekarek, Michela Huth

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis Of Forty Cases, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis

University of San Francisco Law Review

This Article provides an empirical basisfor assessing whether private enforcement of the antitrust laws serves its intended purposes and is in the public interest. It does this by assembling, aggregating, and analyzing information about forty of the largest recent successful private antitrust cases.

Reconsidering The D.C. Circuit’S Proximate Cause Standard For Extraterrotorial Jurisdiction: Precluding The “Globalization” Theory To Promote Global Enforcement, Michelle A. Wyant

Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business

As businesses expanded with the rise of globalization, so did the effects of anticompetitive activity and, in turn, the reach of the U.S. antitrust laws. Though Congress addressed the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S. antitrust laws with its implementation of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (“FTAIA”), the statute only created a three-way circuit split that led the Supreme Court to address the issue and determine that the foreign injury must arise from both foreign anticompetitive activity and the activity’s adverse effects on domestic commerce. The D.C. Circuit further clarified the issue on remand by requiring a proximate cause relationship …

The Antitrust Aspects Of Bank Mergers - Introduction, Carl Felsenfeld

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes And The Nondelegation Doctrine, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

The nondelegation doctrine is the subject of a vast and everexpanding body of scholarship. But nondelegation literature, like nondelegation law, focuses almost exclusively on delegations of power to administrative agencies. It ignores Congress's other delegate-the federal judiciary.

This Article brings courts into the delegation picture. It demonstrates that, just as agencies exercise a lawmaking function when they fill in the gaps left by broad statutory delegations of power, so too do courts. The nondelegation doctrine purports to limit the amount of lawmaking authority Congress can cede to another institution without violating the separation of powers. Although typically considered only with …