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Full-Text Articles in Law

Differentiating Regulation Of Public And Private Institutions: A Preliminary Inquiry, Jonathan G.S. Koppell Jan 1998

Differentiating Regulation Of Public And Private Institutions: A Preliminary Inquiry, Jonathan G.S. Koppell

Publications from President Jonathan G.S. Koppell

Twenty years ago, James Q. Wilson and Patricia Rachal argued that government cannot regulate itself. In an era of revived federalism, increased reliance on contractors, and proliferation of quasi-public organizations, the importance of government self-regulation is greater than ever. This paper tests an underlying assumption of Wilson and Rachal's claim: that regulation of public and private organizations can be differentiated. Employing a meta-research design, this pilot study uses existing regulatory case studies to create "regulatory relationship profiles" for public and private organizations. These profiles include information on the structure of the regulator, the intent of the regulation, the enforcement tools …


Bankruptcy Judges And Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts On Delaware, David A. Skeel Jr. Jan 1998

Bankruptcy Judges And Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts On Delaware, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


"Not Just For The Fun Of It!" Governmental Restraints On Black Leisure, Social Inequality, And The Privatization Of Public Space, Regina Austin Jan 1998

"Not Just For The Fun Of It!" Governmental Restraints On Black Leisure, Social Inequality, And The Privatization Of Public Space, Regina Austin

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


"Public Use" And The Independent Judiciary: Condemnation In An Interest-Group Perspective, Donald J. Kochan Dec 1997

"Public Use" And The Independent Judiciary: Condemnation In An Interest-Group Perspective, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

This Article reexamines the doctrine of public use under the Takings Clause and its ability to impede takings for private use through an application of public choice theory. It argues that the judicial validation of interest-group capture of the condemnation power through a relaxed public use standard in Takings Clause review can be explained by interest group politics and public choice theory and by institutional tendencies inherent in the independent judiciary. Legislators can sell the eminent domain power to special interests for almost any use, promising durability in the deal given the low probability that the judiciary will invalidate it …