Law Commons^™

Integrating Doctrine & Diversity Speaker Series: Breaking Bias: A Conversation With Attorney Anu Gupta 9-10-2024, Roger Williams University School Of Law

School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events

No abstract provided.

Office Of Attorney General: Peter F. Neronha, Attorney General: Access To Public Records Act ; Open Meetings Act (Powerpoint Presentation), Office Of The Attorney General Of Rhode Island, Roger Williams University School Of Law

School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events

No abstract provided.

Law School News: Rwu Alumni Honored In Pbn's 2024 40 Under Forty Awards 7-16-2024, Triniti Brown, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Office Of Attorney General Peter F. Neronha, Attorney General: Access To Public Records Act, Open Meetings Act, Attorney General, State Of Rhode Island, Roger Williams University School Of Law

School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events

No abstract provided.

Startup Biases, Jennifer S. Fan

Articles

This Article provides an original descriptive account of bias in the startup context and explains why litigation is eschewed and what happens when it is used as a mechanism to combat bias in the venture capital ecosystem. Further, this Article identifies two particular phenomena in the startup context that exacerbate gender and racial bias. First, homophily—the idea that like attracts like—abounds and has been part of the DNA of venture capital since its inception. The thick networks that developed as venture capital made its way from the East Coast to the West Coast were limited to an elite group that …

International Law In The Boardroom, Kishanthi Parella

Scholarly Articles

Conventional wisdom expects that international law will proceed through a “state pathway” before regulating corporations: it binds national governments that then bind corporations. But recent corporate practices confound this story. American corporations complied with international laws even when the state pathway broke down. This unexpected compliance leads to three questions: How did corporations comply? Why did they do so? Who enforced international law? These questions are important for two reasons. First, many international laws depend on corporate cooperation in order to succeed. Second, the state pathway is not robust, then or now. It is therefore vital to identify alternatives to …

Sacred Corporate Law, Giancarlo Anello, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Mohamed Arafa

Faculty Works

This Article investigates the sacred origins of the corporate form. It sheds light on the sacred rituals performed to establish Ancient Roman cities as legal entities. It discusses the role of the Roman Catholic Church in developing the corporate form and in giving birth to a systemized set of rules regulating corporations, which we commonly call corporate law. It analyzes the limitations to the use of the corporate form in Islamic law as well as the streams of Islamic law jurisprudence that recognize legal capacity to specific entities with religious, social, or charitable purposes. It surveys the characteristics of two …

23rd Annual Open Government Summit: Access To Public Records Act, Open Meetings Act Powerpoint Presentation 07-30-2021, Office Of Attorney General State Of Rhode Island, Peter F. Neronha

School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events

No abstract provided.

Notice Risk And Registered Agency, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Articles

To sue a firm is to sue an artificial person, making the most reliable service method—physically handing papers to the defendant—unusable. This problem illustrates notice risk: if a plaintiff’s service obligations are loose, it is advantaged (because the defendant may never receive notice), whereas if they are strict, the defendant is advantaged (because the plaintiff may struggle to effect service). For litigation involving corporate defendants, civil procedure and corporate law mitigate this problem through a technology for managing notice risk: registered agency. A firm using this technology, because it cannot be served directly, appoints an agent who will accept papers …

Are Publicly Traded Corporations Disappearing?, Margaret Blair

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Corporate law scholars and economists have expressed concern recently about the fact that the number of publicly traded corporations in the United States has declined significantly since a peak in the late 1990s. In this Essay, in honor of the late Professor Lynn Stout, who devoted much of her career to the study of large publicly traded corporations, I show that despite a decline in the number of such corporations in the last two decades, they collectively account for about the same share of total economic activity as they have for the last six decades. While there has been turnover …

Law School News: Throw Out The Old Thinking 9-30-2019, Michael M. Bowden

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

The Professor Anthony J. Santoro Business Law Lecture Series Presents Becoming A Valued Business Lawyer, Roger Williams University School Of Law, Michael M. Bowden

School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events

No abstract provided.

Home Sweet Home: How New York Courts Have Dealt With Daimler's "At Home" Requirement For General Jurisdiction, Burton N. Lipshie

Faculty Articles

In this Article, we will first place the Daimler decision in its context, both historical and technological, in an attempt to understand the flow of Supreme Court jurisdiction jurisprudence, and how Daimler fits into that jurisprudence. Then, we will explore the issues in New York law that Daimler left open, and which, more than five years after it was decided, remain open, and, indeed, often confused.

The Corporate Personhood Two-Step, Carliss N. Chatman

Scholarly Articles

The corporation cannot exist without its founders complying explicitly with the requirements for incorporation provided by state statutes. The artificial entity theory acknowledges that the corporation cannot and will not exist until its founders comply explicitly with the requirements for corporate formation and in-corporation imposed by the state. A corporation is also, by design, a new and distinct entity divorced from its people. The real entity theory acknowledges that once a corporation is formed, it has rights that belong only to the corporation it-self, wholly separate from its founders. By merging the artificial entity and real entity theories, the Court …

Negligent Entrustment In Gun Industry Litigation: A Primer, Kate E. Britt

Law Librarian Scholarship

Deep pocket jurisprudence, where plaintiffs name corporations as codefendants of less wealthy individual tortfeasors, is not uncommon in tort litigation. When the plaintiffs are victims of gun violence and the corporate defendants are firearms manufacturers, however, these suits are particularly controversial. Instead of aiming to make the victims whole, these suits are opposed (or supported) as attempts to regulate the firearms industry on a widespread basis. This article explores some of the resources available to understand the recent history of suits against firearms manufacturers.

A Rule-Based Method For Comparing Corporate Laws, Lynn M. Lopucki

UF Law Faculty Publications

Part I explains the processes for specifying a Scenario. It introduces the Scenario that will serve as the illustration in the remainder of this Article—a comparison of the liability of directors for the exercise of poor judgment in a Delaware corporation with the corresponding liability in a United Kingdom public limited company. Part II explains and illustrates the necessity of selecting specific entity types for comparison. Part III describes and illustrates the method for resolving the Scenario in both jurisdictions. Part IV explains and illustrates the novel process for close comparison—the extraction, juxtaposition, and comparison of decisional rules from the …

Effects Of Veil Piercing, Alter Ego And Substantive Consolidation On Bankruptcy, Lauren Gross

Bankruptcy Research Library

(Excerpt)

At times, bankruptcy can seem like a game of cat and mouse between debtors and creditors. By filing for bankruptcy in the first place, debtors change the rules of the game with various bankruptcy mechanisms, such as the automatic stay provision set forth in section 361 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”). An important inquiry exists in what creditors can to do promote their interests in bankruptcy. An even more important inquiry lies in determining what doctrines may satisfy generally recognized principles of equity for all.

One option for creditors who deal with corporate entities is …

The Abstract Void In Practice: Has The Statutory Business Judgment Rule Changed The ‘Acoustic Separation’ Between Conduct And Decision Rules For Directors’ Duty Of Care?, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Jake Miyairi

Faculty Works

A recent outpouring of director sentiment claims that the stringency of directors’ duty of care is stifling entrepreneurial growth. This article explores whether the statutory business judgment rule has enhanced directors’ protection for legitimate commercial decisions, or clarified their liability for due care — the two express justifications behind its enactment. Directors’ protection for entrepreneurial decision-making cannot be amplified without broadening the pre-existing abstract void between the duty of care — as a conduct rule — and the general law ‘business judgment principle’ — as a decision rule. But Parliament’s desire to clarify and confirm the existing general law business …

Application Of The Automatic Stay To A Non-Debtor Corporation, Joanna Matuza

Bankruptcy Research Library

(Excerpt)

When a corporation files for bankruptcy, it is entitled to an automatic stay of any action that has been filed against it pursuant to section 362(a)(1) of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”). But today, litigation is often complex and involves more than one defendant. For example, I may commence an action against corporations X, Y and Z. Corporation X then files for bankruptcy and is entitled to an automatic stay. The question in these cases is whether the automatic stay applicable to the debtor corporation (Corporation X) also applies to the non-debtor corporations (Corporations …

Quarterback By Committee: A Response In Memory Of Dan Markel, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

In Catalyzing Fans, Dan Markel, Michael McCann and Howard Wasserman propose so-called “Fan Action Committees” (“FACs”), whereby fans would crowdfund a sum of money and then spend it to influence the personnel decisions of their favorite teams. This Response — dedicated to the memory of Dan Markel — suggests that an effective FAC could upset a team’s overall hiring and compensation system, thereby risking a downturn in team performance to the detriment of all concerned.

Corporate Legacy, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Many public companies have shed takeover defenses in recent years, on the theory that such defenses reduce share price. Yet new data presented here shows that practically all new public companies--those launching their initial public offering (IPO)--go public with powerful takeover defenses in place. This behavior is puzzling because the adoption of takeover defenses presumably lowers the price at which the pre-IPO shareholders can sell their own shares in and after the IPO. Why would founders and early investors engage in this seemingly counterproductive behavior? Building on prior attempts to solve this mystery, this Article claims that IPO firms adopt …

Chinese Companies And U.S. Class Actions: Securities Litigation And Product Liability, Geoffrey Sant, Charles M. Yablon, Stephen A. Radin, Kayvan Sadeghi, Christopher Seeger, Richard H. Silberberg

Faculty Articles

No abstract provided.

Delaware Law As Lingua Franca: Theory And Evidence, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried, Darian Ibrahim

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Why would a firm incorporate in Delaware rather than in its home state? Prior explanations have focused on the inherent features of Delaware corporate law, as well as the positive network externalities created by so many other firms domiciling in Delaware. We offer an additional explanation: a firm may choose Delaware simply because its law is nationally known and thus can serve as a “lingua franca” for in-state and out-of-state investors. Analyzing the incorporation decisions of 1,850 VC-backed startups, we find evidence consistent with this lingua-franca explanation. Indeed, the lingua-franca effect appears to be more important than other factors that …

The Role Of The Ombuds In A Knowledge-Intensive Corporation: A Partner For Conflict Prevention And Mitigation, David P. Clark

Working Papers

No abstract provided.

Where Corporations Are: Why Casual Visits To New York Are Bad For Business, Jeanne L. Schroeder, David G. Carlson

Faculty Articles

In this article, we examine the recent case of Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor (2010), from the New York Court of Appeals. In this case, New York’s highest court held that LLCs are “present” in New York for jurisdictional purposes when the president of the LLC has submitted to New York jurisdiction in an unrelated law suit against him personally, and where the president came to New York for a deposition in that action. This, we claim, was unconstitutional. In addition, the New York Court of Appeals pronounced itself obliged by the United States Constitution to change the …

The Perpetual Corporation, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Courts and commentators take for granted that the ultimate objective of a business corporation is long-run profitability, not immediate profits. But a corporation is a creature of statute, so a statutory source for this rule must be found--or it is not really a rule. Yet prior literature has not identified any such legal basis, leaving a gap in corporate theory. This Article fills that gap by showing that the modern corporation is obliged to act with a long-term view because it has "perpetual existence" under the law. This Article then explains that because they must plan for a perpetual future, …

Veil Piercing To Non-Owners: A Practical And Theoretical Inquiry, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

In the typical veil piercing case, the plaintiff seeks to hold the owners of an entity liable for the entity’s obligations. Recently, however, plaintiffs have sought to hold managers of an entity liable for the entity’s obligations even if the manager is not an owner. This article considers this phenomenon in light of the underlying theory of veil piercing and in the context of both corporate law and the law of limited liability companies. In brief, the theory of veil piercing in its traditional application – to shareholders of a corporation – is weak, and it is weaker still when …

Discourse Norms As Default Rules: Structuring Corporate Speech To Multiple Stakeholders, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

This Article analyzes corporate speech problems through the framework of corporate law. The focus here is on the "discourse norms" that regulate corporate speech to various corporate stakehold-ers, including shareholders, workers, and consumers. I argue that these "discourse norms" should be understood as default terms in the "nexus-of-contracts" that comprises the corporation. Having reviewed the failure of corporate law as it bears on the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders such as workers and consumers, I urge the adoption of prescriptive discourse norms as an approach to reforming corporate governance in a socially useful manner.

The Firm As Cartel Manager, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Christopher R. Leslie

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust law is the primary legal obstacle to price fixing, which is condemned by Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Firms that engage in price fixing may try to reduce their probability of antitrust liability in a number of ways. First, members of a price-fixing conspiracy go to great lengths to conceal their illegal activities from antitrust enforcers. Second, because Section 1 condemns only concerted action, firms may structure their relationship to appear to be the action of a single entity that is beyond the reach of Section One.

In its American Needle decision the Supreme Court held that the …

Normative Justifications For Lax (Or No) Corporate Fiduciary Duties: A Tale Of Problematic Principles, Imagined Facts And Inefficient Outcomes, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Corporate fiduciary duty standards are at an all-time low in this country. Ironically, the deterioration in standards has come to full maturity during the last two decades, a period of significant and notorious corporate managerial failures.

The deterioration in the standards by which we measure the appropriateness of the actions of corporate managers has been fueled by influential judges' and scholars' ("Advocates"'), who vigorously-and seemingly quite effectively-argue in favor of a lax fiduciary duty regime for corporate managers.

Normative justifications for lax corporate fiduciary duty standards, however, are weak. The justifications fail to provide a persuasive reason to abandon the …