Law Commons^™

A Comment On Democratic Constitutionalism, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Decisions And The Supreme Law, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

What status do Supreme Court decisions have for officials in the political branches of our government? Six months ago, Attorney General Edwin Meese III rekindled controversy over this enduring and troublesome question when he claimed in a widely reported lecture that Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution are not the supreme law of the land, and are properly subject to forms of opposition by other governmental officials. The general reaction to the speech was that it was meant to reduce the perceived authority of Supreme Court opinions, and a close reading of the speech certainly leaves this impression. Yet, even …

Constructing A Constitution: 'Orginal Intention' In The Slave Cases, James Boyd White

Other Publications

The question how our Constitution is to be interpreted is a living one for us today, both in the scholarly and in the political domains. Professors argue about "interpretivism" and "originalism" in law journals, they study hermeneutics and deconstruction to determine whether or not interpretation is possible at all, and if so on what premises, and they struggle to create theories that will tell us both what we do in fact and what we ought to do. Politicians and public figures (including Attorney General Edwin Meese) talk in the newspapers and elsewhere about the authority of the "original intention of …

Comment On Professor Van Alstyne's Paper, Henry P. Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

My major difficulty with Professor Van Alstyne's paper is its incomplete character. In the end, he makes only two points: first, judges are authorized to apply "this Constitution," not to do justice; and second, judges should not lie about what they are doing. The danger is that after a while the first point sounds somewhat empty, while the actual content of the second point seems entirely parasitic on the first.

The Role Of Strategic Reasoning In Constitutional Interpretation: In Defense Of The Pathological Perspective Comments, Vincent A. Blasi

Faculty Scholarship

I am indebted to Professor Christie, not only for noticing my work but also for challenging it in so forthright a manner. He has identified a feature of my thesis that deserves to be a focal point for additional debate. Any reader of my original article who was undecided whether to agree with it ought to be aided considerably in the task of critical evaluation by the exchange Professor Christie has initiated. I know my own understanding of the premises and implications of my thesis has been enhanced by the experience of working out a response to his challenge.

The …

Framers Intent: The Illegitimate Uses Of History, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

Book Review, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

Rules And Standards, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Intellectual Development Of The American Doctrine Of Judicial Review, Pnina Lahav

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

A Critique Of John Hart Ely's Quest For The Ultimate Constitutional Interpretivism Of Representative Democracy, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Contemporary constitutional theory, John Hart Ely argues in Democracy and Distrust, is dominated by a false dichotomy between "clause-bound interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism." Clausebound interpretivists, such as the late Justice Hugo Black, believe that "judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution" (p. 1). Noninterpretivists, such as the Supreme Court that produced the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade,2 contend that "courts should go beyond that set of references and enforce [substantive] norms that cannot be discovered within the four comers of the document" (p. 1). The genius of …

Constitutional Interpretation, Terrance Sandalow

Articles

"[We] must never forget," Chief Justice Marshall admonished us in a statement pregnant with more than one meaning, "that it is a constitution we are expounding."' Marshall meant that the Constitution should be read as a document "intended to endure for ages.to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."'2 But he meant also that the construction placed upon the document must have regard for its "great outlines" and "important objects."'3 Limits are implied by the very nature of the task. There is not the same freedom in construing the Constitution as in constructing a …

Treaties And Executive Agreements: Historical Development And Constitutional Interpretation, Wencelas J. Wagner

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The recent proposal to amend the Constitution known as the Bricker Amendment concerns a most vital matter for the nation: its relations with foreign states.

In order to estimate the merits and demerits of the Bricker Amendment it is necessary to get acquainted with the historical development and the constitutional interpretation in the field of international arrangements of the United States. The present observations aim at the presentation of this matter down to the Bricker Amendment. The Amendment itself and the discussion it aroused should be treated in a separate article.

Congressional Silence: A Tool Of Judicial Supremacy, Frank Edward Horack Jr.

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Referendum As Applied To Proposed Amendments Of The Federal Constitution, Ralph W. Aigler

Articles

That various aspects of the fight against the National Prohibition (the i8th) Amendment would result in litigation was to be expected. The attack at present seem& to be based on the use of the provisions for referendum found in a dozen or more of the states the votes of which went to make up the necessary three-fourths. Three very recent decisions or expressions of opinion by state courts of last resort are in this respect extremely interesting.

Sociological Interpretation Of Law, Joseph H. Drake

Articles

It is not the purpose of this paper to essay a definition of either of the formidable words in the title. The object is rather to call attention away from the metaphysical question, what is law? to the sociological question, how may we best attain justice in the administration of law? and, by the aid of some examples from history and comparative law, to justify as legal and constitutional the sociological method of interpretation. That such justification is necessary is evident from the fact that although the dictum of Mr. Justice. HOLMES in the dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New …

The Commodity Clause Of The Hepburn Act, Edwin C. Goddard

Articles

The Supreme Court of the United States has added another to the interesting line of cases construing the so-called "Commodity Clause" of the HEPBURN ACT of 1906. In United States v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co. and the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Coal Co., decided on June 21, 1915, 35 Sup. Ct. 873, the court reversed the decree of the District Court as reported in 213 Fed. 240, and found the relation and contract between the Railroad Company and the Coal Company to be in violation of the HEPBURN ACT and the SHERMAN ACT.

Presidential Inability, Thomas M. Cooley

Articles

The protracted illness of President Garfield led to much discussion and a variety of opinions as to what constitutes a disability in the Presidential office which will justify the Vice-president in assuming its duties.