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Full-Text Articles in Law

Racial Inclusion, Exclusion And Segregation In Constitutional Law, Michelle Adams Jan 2012

Racial Inclusion, Exclusion And Segregation In Constitutional Law, Michelle Adams

Articles

In Part I of the Article, I examine early cases in which the Court described segregation as a form of resource "lock-up." In several cases leading up to Brown, the Court detailed how racial segregation allows a more dominant group to hoard substantial societal resources. In these early cases, the Court's focus was on segregation as a mechanism for excluding individuals from valuable benefits on the basis of race; it did not speak explicitly to the harms associated with racial classification schemes. In this Part of the Article, I also return to Brown v. Board of Education and explore the …


Classroom Conversations About Race, Poverty And Social Status In The Aftermath Of Katrina, Homer C. La Rue, Lela P. Love Jan 2006

Classroom Conversations About Race, Poverty And Social Status In The Aftermath Of Katrina, Homer C. La Rue, Lela P. Love

Articles

This article addresses dialogue regarding issues of race, poverty and social inequalities in the wake of the New Orleans hurricane Katrina. Conversations were conducted in law school classrooms at Howard Law School and Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law regarding the intersection of law and race, class, and poverty. The objective was not to have an abstract dialogue, but to help students develop a personal understanding of each student’s connection or lack of connection to the issues of race, class and poverty and their own choices about becoming a lawyer as it might relate to those issues. The goal was …


Grutter V. Bollinger: This Generation's Brown V. Board Of Education, Michelle Adams Jan 2004

Grutter V. Bollinger: This Generation's Brown V. Board Of Education, Michelle Adams

Articles

At first blush, Grutter appears to be a deviation from the body of the Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence: it says "yes" where the other cases said "no." But it is not so clear that Grutter is a deviation from current law. Instead, it might be seen as consistent with it, in that the justification for the racial preference recognized in Grutter transcended the justifications offered in the previous cases, and the method used to achieve that end, "race as a factor," diffused rather than highlighted race. From this perspective, Grutter addressed several concerns that had troubled the Court for …