Law Commons^™

Dispute Settlement In The Wto: Mind Over Matter, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

The basic point I advocate in this paper is that the WTO Dispute Settlement System aims to curb unilateralism. No sanctions can be imposed, unless if the arbitration process is through, the purpose of which is to ensure that reciprocal commitments entered should not be unilaterally undone through the commission of illegalities. There are good reasons though, to doubt whether practice guarantees full reciprocity. The insistence on calculating remedies prospectively, and not as of the date when an illegality has been committed, and the ensuing losses for everybody that could or could not be symmetric, lend support to the claim …

Private Standards And The Wto: Reclusive No More, Petros C. Mavroidis, Robert Wolfe

Faculty Scholarship

Private standards are increasing in number, and they affect trade, but their status in the WTO remains problematic. Standards-takers are typically countries with little bargaining power, who cannot affect their terms of trade and thus, even if they possess domestic antitrust laws, will find it hard to persuade standard-setters to take account of their interests. Our concern is to bring more of these standards within the normative framework of the trade regime – that is, we worry that these private forms of social order can conflict with the fundamental norms of transparency and non-discrimination. The WTO membership has consumed itself …

The Wto Dispute Settlement System 1995-2016: A Data Set And Its Descriptive Statistics, Louise Johannesson, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

In this paper, we provide some descriptive statistics of the first twenty years of the WTO (World Trade Organization) dispute settlement that we have extracted from the data set that we have put together, and made publicly available.

The statistical information that we present here is divided into three thematic units: the statutory and de facto duration of each stage of the process, paying particular attention to the eventual conclusion of litigation; the identity and participation in the process of the various institutional players, that is, not only complainants and defendants, but also third parties, as well as the WTO …

Mfn Clubs And Scheduling Additional Commitments In The Gatt: Learning From The Gats, Bernard Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

Scheduling additional commitments for policies affecting trade in goods in the GATT has been plagued by two sources of ambiguity: the treatment of changes introduced unilaterally by members subsequent to an initial commitment, and the treatment of new commitments by WTO members pertaining to nontariff policy measures affecting trade in goods. This is not the case for trade in services, as the GATS makes explicit provision for additional commitments to be scheduled. Neither secondary law, in the form of decisions formally adopted by the WTO membership, nor case law has clarified the situation for trade in goods. This matter is …

Global Value Chains And Resource Corridors: The Nexus Is Regional Integration, Perrine Toledano

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

To be more involved in the global value chains, sub-Saharan African countries should intensify their regional integration efforts. A first step in this direction can be implementing cross-border resource-based development corridors.

Tpp Would Let Foreign Investors Bypass The Canadian Public Interest, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In early October, prime ministerial candidate Justin Trudeau promised Canadians “a full and open public debate” on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. With 30 chapters that would bind Canada to sweeping agreements on everything from services to intellectual property to the environment to procurement, there is much to debate.

The Tpp’S Investment Chapter: Entrenching, Rather Than Reforming, A Flawed System, Lise Johnson, Lisa E. Sachs

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

During the negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, many stakeholders raised strong concerns about the Investment Chapter of the TPP, and in particular, the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS). The US Trade Representative (USTR) and other representatives of the negotiating partners assured the stakeholders that the TPP’s investment chapter would respond to the legitimate concerns about expansive investor protections and ISDS. The actual text, however, when made public, showed the opposite: a further evisceration of the role of domestic policy, institutions, and constituents. In their current form, the TPP’s substantive investment protections and ISDS pose significant potential costs to …

Next Generation Treaty – India’S New Model Bit Makes It Clear That Its Goal Is To Accomplish More Than Investor Protection, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise Johnson, Sudhanshu Roy

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

The April release of India’s draft model bilateral investment treaty 1(BIT), which is expected to be approved by the cabinet soon, has generated a rich public debate on its international investment regime. There are important questions about the purpose and content of investment treaties, both in India and other countries. However, some reactions – like Augusts Law Commission report suggesting that the model BIT was not sufficiently investor-friendly – frame the discussion too narrowly, ignoring key questions and objectives behind India’s transitioning investment policy regime.

Wrong Direction On Climate, Trade And Development, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In pushing for Trade Promotion Authority, the Obama administration argues that the agreements it is negotiating (including TPP and TTIP) are true 21st century agreements that correct the failings of past agreements and will promote trade and investment that can both re-launch America as the key economic player and promote broad-based sustainable development at home and abroad.

Why Fast Track Is A Dangerous Gift To Corporate Lobbies, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

The Obama Administration is now on track to get "fast track" legislation through the Senate, heading towards a close vote in the House. The end goal is to conclude two major business treaties: the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). The House Democrats are right to withhold their support until key treaty positions favored by the White House are dropped.

Not So Fast, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

President Barack Obama and the Republican leadership in Congress are trying to pass "fast track" legislation in order to push through major economic agreements with eleven countries of the Pacific region (the Trans-Pacific Partnership) and Europe (the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) without the possibility for Congressional amendments. Both are being sold generally as "trade agreements," yet they involve key areas of business law and regulation far beyond trade. Before Congress approves fast track, these agreements need to be made public and exposed to thorough public scrutiny.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest And U.S. Domestic Law, Lise Johnson, Lisa E. Sachs, Jeffrey D. Sachs

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

As negotiations are ongoing in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), CCSI staff and Jeffrey Sachs discuss the implications of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) for domestic law and policy, focusing on effects within the US. The paper concludes that the risks ISDS poses for domestic law are significant and unjustified, and that there are preferable policy alternatives to pursue as a means of protecting the rights of investors operating overseas.

Eyes Wide Shut On Isds, Lisa E. Sachs, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

Recent agreement among congressional leaders on a “fast-track” bill may have been a victory for the Obama administration’s trade agenda. However, members of congress should take a look at the recent Bilcon case, decided by a NAFTA tribunal, to understand what they are signing up for.

Ripe For Refinement: The State’S Role In Interpretation Of Fet, Mfn, And Shareholder Rights, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

Over recent years, many states have taken steps to refine and modernize their investment treaties. These reforms, however, are typically only included in newer treaties or model agreements. States continue to be exposed to claims, litigation, and potential damages under older “old-style” agreements. These risks are particularly acute given that tribunals have often permitted investors to “treaty shop” to obtain more favorable protections, and have also permitted investors to use the most-favored nation (MFN) provision to “import” more investor-friendly (or at least less clear) provisions from other treaties.

This working paper discusses one strategy states can use to try to …

New Weaknesses: Despite A Major Win, Arbitration Decisions In 2014 Increase The Us’S Future Exposure To Litigation And Liability, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In 2014, the US continued its overall record of success in defending investment treaty claims. But it did suffer losses on a number of important issues, and those losses will render the US (and its treaty parties) vulnerable to future claims, litigation expense, and liability. The US’s recent losses, which have thus far been largely ignored in commentary on the US’s experiences in investment arbitration, are highlighted in this briefing note.

Competition Policy And Free Trade: Antitrust Provisions In Ptas, Anu Bradford, Tim Büthe

Faculty Scholarship

Trade agreements increasingly contain provisions concerning ‘behind-the-border’ barriers to trade, often beyond current World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments (Dur, Baccini and Elsig 2014). Today’s preferential trade agreements (PTAs) may include, for instance, rules regarding ‘technical’ barriers to trade that go beyond the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), accelerating the replacement of differing national product safety standards with common international standards and thus reducing the trade-inhibiting effect of regulatory measures (Buthe and Mattli 2011; World Trade Organization 2012). Today’s PTAs may also go beyond WTO rules in prohibiting preferences for domestic producers in government procurement (Arrowsmith and …

Taking Care Of Business: The Legal Affairs Division From The Gatt To The Wto, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

The WTO is usually referred to as a ‘member-driven organisation’. This term aims to capture the idea that it is states and customs territories, the members of the WTO, that have the initiative to decide on the direction of the institution. The WTO Secretariat is more or less what the term denotes: staff hired in order to help the members realise their aspirations. This is as true today as it was yesterday. Actually, over the years the Secretariat has for various reasons accumulated extra responsibilities, always with the tacit acquiescence or explicit acknowledgement of the members. In short, the members …

A Technical Barriers To Trade Agreement For Services?, Bernard Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

Services are regulated for a variety of reasons. Regulation is typically influenced by political economy forces and may thus at times reflect protectionist motivations. Similar considerations arise for goods, but the potential for protectionist capture may be greater in services as many sectors are self-regulated by domestic industry. There are specific disciplines on regulation of goods (product standards) in the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). This encourages the use of international standards and requires that norms restrict trade only to the extent necessary to achieve the regulatory objective. WTO disciplines on domestic regulation of services are weaker …

Black Cat, White Cat: The Identity Of The Wto Judges, Louise Johannesson, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

WTO judges are proposed by the WTO Secretariat and elected to act as ‘judges’ if either approved by the parties to a dispute, or by the WTO Director-General in case no agreement between the parties has been possible. They are typically ‘Geneva crowd’, that is, they are either current or former delegates representing their country before the WTO. This observation holds for both first- as well as second-instance WTO judges (e.g. Panelists and members of the Appellate Body). In that, the WTO evidences an attitude strikingly similar to the GATT. Whereas the legal regime has been heavily ‘legalized’, the people …

The Mauritius Convention On Transparency: Comments On The Rreaty And Its Role In Increasing Transparency Of Investor-State Arbitration, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In July 2014, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted the Mauritius Convention on Transparency that, if widely adopted, will do much to increase the transparency of investor-state arbitrations conducted under thousands of existing investment treaties and under any set of arbitration rules. This Policy Paper introduces the background and objectives of the Transparency Convention, provides commentary on each of its specific articles, and explains how the Transparency Convention can accomplish broad reform.

New Uncitral Arbitration Rules On Transparency: Application, Content And Next Steps, Lise Johnson, Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In July 2013, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted a package of rules aiming to ensure transparency in investor-State arbitration (the “Rules on Transparency”), ratifying the work done by delegations to UNCITRAL – comprised of 55 Member States, additional observer States and observer organizations – over the course of nearly three years of negotiations.

Under previous versions of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, disputes between investors and States were often not made public, even where important public policies were involved or illegal or corrupt business practices were uncovered. In contrast, the new rules, which will officially come …

State Control Over Interpretation Of Investment Treaties, Lise Johnson, Merim Razbaevea

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

Many critiques of investment treaties relate to concerns that tribunals’ interpretations of these agreements depart from states’ understandings of the texts, and do so in unpredictable ways leading to expensive litigation and unforeseen liability. States, however, can take steps to make their intentions regarding the texts clearer, and reduce the risk of uncertain outcomes.

This policy paper discusses these possible steps, and the legal rules supporting them, providing guidance to states, attorneys, and tribunals regarding the important role of states in clarifying vague standards in and managing liability under existing investment treaties. A second paper, published by the Global …

Trading Away Human Rights, Kaitlin Y. Cordes, Olivier De Schutter

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

Trade negotiators in Singapore recently failed to finalize a deal on the long-awaited Trans-Pacific Partnership; they will soon have another chance to complete what would be the world’s largest regional free-trade agreement. But, given serious concerns that the TPP will fail to consider important human-rights implications, that is no cause for celebration.

Reaching Out For Green Policies: National Environmental Policies In The Wto Legal Order, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

The WTO does not squarely address the issue of jurisdictional ambit of national policies (affecting trade). And yet, absent some agreement as to what trading nations can and cannot do, the WTO loses much of its effectiveness. In the absence of explicit regulation of the issue in the WTO contract, one would reasonably expect WTO Members to behave in line with the postulates governing allocation of jurisdiction embedded in public international law. WTO practice evidences neither an explicit acceptance nor a refusal of these rules.

A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy And Renewable Energy: The Case For Redrafting The Subsidies Agreement Of The Wto, Aaron Cosbey, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

Canada-Renewable Energy presented the WTO Panel and Appellate Body (AB) with a novel issue: at the heart of the dispute was a measure adopted by the province of Ontario whereby producers of renewable energy would be paid a premium relative to conventional power producers. Some WTO Members complained that the measure was a prohibited subsidy because payments were conditional upon using Canadian equipment for the production of renewable energy. The AB gave them right only in part: it found that a local content requirement had indeed been imposed, but also found that it lacked evidence to determine whether a subsidy …

Mobil V. Canada – Ratcheting Down The Scope Of Treaty Reservations, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

As part of States’ efforts to strike a balance in their international investment agreements (IIAs) between the obligations they assume and the rights and policy space they wish to retain, some adjoin annexes to their treaties to protect their ability to take “Non-Conforming Measures” (NCMs). States have generally: used such annexes to make exceptions to non-discrimination obligations, market access restrictions and performance requirements; have included the ability to grandfather in NCMs existing at the time an IIA enters into force; and have provided for the ability to maintain, amend, and enact new NCMs in specifically identified sectors, sub-sectors, activities, or …

Why The Extractive Industry Should Support Mandatory Transparency: A Shared Value Approach, Julien Topal, Perrine Toledano

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

The Transparency Amendment, included in the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, can be an important tool in curtailing the resource curse that so heavily burdens resource‐rich developing countries by shedding light on opaque payments between the extractive sector and host countries. From the get‐go, however, extractive industry companies have fiercely opposed the new mandatory disclosure requirements as set out in this regulation. The corporate opposition is for the largest part motivated by the fear of a competitive disadvantage that derives from the fact that the amendment is housed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and thus …

New Uncitral Arbitration Rules On Transparency: Application, Content And Next Steps, Lise Johnson

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

This paper discusses the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, which were adopted in August of 2013 and went into effect on April 1, 2014. It draws on negotiating history to elaborate on the content of and purpose of each of the Rules’ provisions, and identifies options for and barriers to applying these Rules in future arbitrations.

In The Shadow Of The Dsu: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns In The Wto Sps And Tbt Committees, Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, Erik Wijkström

Faculty Scholarship

The paper argues that focusing only on disputes formally raised in the WTO Dispute Settlement system underestimates the extent of trade conflict resolution within the WTO. Both the SPS and TBT Committees address a significant number of ‘specific trade concerns’ (STCs) that in the overwhelming majority of cases do not become formal disputes. The STCs address differences between Members concerning the conformity of national measures in the SPS and TBT areas with these agreements. It appears as if Committee work on STCs significantly helps defuse potential trade frictions concerning national policies in the covered areas.

Multilateral Environmental Agreements In The Wto: Silence Speaks Volumes, Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis

Faculty Scholarship

This study contributes to the debate concerning the appropriate role of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) in in WTO dispute settlement. Its distinguishing feature is that it seeks to address this relationship in light of the reason why the parties have chosen to separate their obligations into two bodies of law without providing an explicit nexus between them. The basic conclusion is that legislators’ silence concerning this relationship should speak volumes to WTO adjudicating bodies: MEAs should not be automatically understood as imposing legally binding obligations on WTO Members, but could be used as sources of factual information.