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Full-Text Articles in Law

Incomplete Compensation For Takings, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2002

Incomplete Compensation For Takings, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

If a tribunal determines that a state actor has expropriated foreign investment property, or, under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), that a state actor has adopted a regulation that is "tantamount to" an expropriation of foreign investment property, then that tribunal must determine the amount of compensation owed. International law has developed methods to determine the size of a compensation award when a state formally expropriates property. But the notion, reflected in Chapter 11 of NAFTA, that states may be required to pay compensation to foreign investors for what are, in effect, regulatory takings, is …


The Birth, Death, And Rebirth Of The World Trade Center And The Fate Of New York, Michael B. Gerrard Jan 2002

The Birth, Death, And Rebirth Of The World Trade Center And The Fate Of New York, Michael B. Gerrard

Faculty Scholarship

The year in the title has finally arrived, and in Stanley Kubrick's classic film 2001: A Space Odyssey, the appearance of large monoliths marks important transitions in human civilization. In New York City, the construction, destruction and possible reconstruction of the twin monoliths of the World Trade Center also mark historical transitions. Among the things transformed with each event is our relationship to the physical environment.


Lipton And Rowe's Apologia For Delaware: A Short Reply, Ronald J. Gilson Jan 2002

Lipton And Rowe's Apologia For Delaware: A Short Reply, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

Three themes animate Martin Lipton and Paul Rowe's thoughtful response to my critical evaluation of Unocal's fifteen-year history. First, they maintain that affording shareholders a primary role in the governance of takeovers depends on a commitment to the stock market's informational efficiency. Second, they claim that allowing shareholders to amend or repeal a poison pill ignores empirical evidence that the existence of a poison pill is associated with higher takeover premiums. Third, they assert that the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) reflects an implicit mega-principle that assigns control over takeovers to managers. This short reply corrects Lipton and Rowe's …