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Introduction: The Fifth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, William Michael Treanor Jan 2005

Introduction: The Fifth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Welcome and Introduction to the Fifth Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, November 9, 2004 at Fordham University School of Law.

Fordham Law School, with the support of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, inaugurated the A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture Series in the fall of 2000 with the timely insights of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (the "SEC" or the "Commission") then-Chair Arthur Leavitt. Since then, the Sommer Lecture has continued to bring to Fordham such heavyweights as Mary Schapiro, President of National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") Regulation, Inc., SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid, and …


Direct Vs. Indirect Obligations Of Corporations Under International Law, Carlos Manuel Vázquez Jan 2005

Direct Vs. Indirect Obligations Of Corporations Under International Law, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

International law today addresses the conduct of private corporations in a variety of areas. With very few exceptions, however, international law regulates corporate conduct indirectly--that is, by requiring states to enact and enforce regulations applicable to corporations and other non-state actors. Only a small number of international legal norms--primarily those relating to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and forced labor--apply directly to non-state actors. Scholars have argued forcefully that international law should move in the direction of directly imposing obligations on corporations. These arguments overlook important aspects of the problem. If international legal norms were extended to corporations and backed …


Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties In Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors And The Ideology Of Investor Sovereignty, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2005

Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties In Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors And The Ideology Of Investor Sovereignty, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article focuses on independent directors and the processes of mutual fund corporate governance. To be clear, I believe (and research shows) that disinterested directors do add value as a form of shareholder protection, and this fact justifies the SEC's efforts to strengthen their role. But they are far from a panacea. While that point alone is almost trite, exploring some of the unique features of mutual fund governance shows why judges and policymakers should not even try to reason by analogy to governance in other kinds of corporations. Yet that is exactly what Burks and its progeny have done. …


Teaching Enron, Milton C. Regan Jan 2005

Teaching Enron, Milton C. Regan

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What follows is a discussion of several transactions that the Examiner analyzed for the Enron bankruptcy court. These represent only a portion of the many transactions that the Examiner analyzed, but constitute a large number of the transactions with respect to which he focused on the conduct of attorneys. In most of these cases, the Examiner found that Enron's lawyers potentially could be liable to the company under various causes of action. In some instances, the Examiner did not find potential liability. These transactions are included in my discussion, however, because they can be used to explore certain ethical issues …


Gaming Delaware, William W. Bratton Jan 2004

Gaming Delaware, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Back in 2000, at the World Trade Center in Portland, Oregon, Time Belden and other Enron electricity traders carefully studied the regulations governing California's new electricity market. Belden thought that the complex rules were "prone to gaming." And game them he did. Under one strategy, Enron filed imaginary transmission schedules, creating nonexistent congestion, so as to draw on the rules' provision of payment to alleviate congestion. They called it "Death Star." Then there was "Ricochet," or megawatt laundering, under which Enron circumvented price caps by exporting power out of California, only to bring the power back later, when the State, …


Some Thoughts On Proposed Revisions To The Organizational Guidelines, Julie R. O'Sullivan Jan 2004

Some Thoughts On Proposed Revisions To The Organizational Guidelines, Julie R. O'Sullivan

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this article, Professor O'Sullivan, who served as the reporter for the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Ad Hoc Advisory Group for Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, reflects on that Group's work. She concludes that the potential impact of many of the policy fixes within the power of the Sentencing Commission is dwarfed by decisions that lie solely within the power of the Department of Justice or Congress. Specifically, Department of Justice decisions regarding what constitutes organizational "cooperation" may have a determinative impact on organizational incentives regarding compliance efforts and decisions to investigate, self-report, and cooperate in the remediation of organizational wrongdoing. Professor O'Sullivan …


Executive Compensation Reform And The Limits Of Tax Policy, Michael Doran Jan 2004

Executive Compensation Reform And The Limits Of Tax Policy, Michael Doran

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 includes a major attempt to reform the tax rules for deferred compensation arrangements covering corporate managers. This paper examines the tax policy and corporate-governance policy objectives of the reform effort, explores the shortcomings of the legislation, and outlines a different approach for future executive compensation reform.


Overcoming Resistance To Diversity In The Executive Suite: Grease, Grit, And The Corporate Tournament, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2004

Overcoming Resistance To Diversity In The Executive Suite: Grease, Grit, And The Corporate Tournament, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Once we open the corporate governance/human resources nexus to deeper inquiry, mutual scholarly interest in diversity and discrimination follows naturally. Firms have complex motives to take nondiscrimination and the promotion of diversity seriously. First, at least certain forms of discrimination are both unlawful and socially illegitimate and hence present threats of potential liability and injury to reputation. Second, human resources demands are such that attracting and motivating a diverse workforce is a competitive imperative. At the same time, however, offsetting economic forces may exist that favor subtle forms of discrimination and hostility to diversity, even if intentional and overt racial …


Technological Evolution And The Devolution Of Corporate Financial Reporting, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2004

Technological Evolution And The Devolution Of Corporate Financial Reporting, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

My claim is that the technology link to the recent disclosure scandals is no coincidence. To be sure, cheating tempts all who seek wealth, in whatever line of business they find themselves. I want to show, however, how the rapid pace of innovation at a number of levels offered motive, opportunity, and rationalization for a downshift in financial reporting norms, which in turn made outright fraud more probable.


Rules, Principles, And The Accounting Crisis In The United States, William W. Bratton Jan 2004

Rules, Principles, And The Accounting Crisis In The United States, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities Exchange Commission move too quickly when they prod the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the standard setter for US GAAP, to move immediately to a principles-based system. Priorities respecting reform of corporate reporting in the US need to be ordered more carefully. Incentive problems impairing audit performance should be solved first through institutional reform insulating the audit from the negative impact of rent-seeking and solving adverse selection problems otherwise affecting audit practice. So long as auditor independence and management incentives respecting accounting treatments remain suspect, the US reporting system holds out no actor plausibly positioned …


Ethics, Law Firms, And Legal Education, Milton C. Regan Jan 2003

Ethics, Law Firms, And Legal Education, Milton C. Regan

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A rash of recent corporate scandals has once again put professional ethics in the spotlight. It's hard to pick up the Wall Street Journal each day and not read that authorities have launched a new investigation or that additional indictments are imminent. Stories of financial fraud and outright looting have galvanized the public and shaken the economy. What ethical lessons can we draw from these events? Two explanations seem especially prominent. The first is a story of individuals without an adequate moral compass. Some people's greed and ambition were unchecked by any internal ethical constraints. For such deviants, no amount …


Foreword: Revisiting Gilson And Kraakman’S Efficiency Story, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2003

Foreword: Revisiting Gilson And Kraakman’S Efficiency Story, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Gilson and Kraakman's ‘Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’ is part of the canon of modem corporate law scholarship, one of a handful of articles that has profoundly influenced the way we think about the field. It is also enigmatic, warranting a fresh look by those who think they know what it says from some long-ago reading or second-hand references by other authors.


Shareholder Value And Auditor Independence, William W. Bratton Jan 2003

Shareholder Value And Auditor Independence, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article questions the practice of framing problems concerning auditors' professional responsibility inside a principal-agent paradigm. If professional independence is to be achieved, auditors cannot be enmeshed in agency relationships with the shareholders of their audit clients. As agents, the auditors by definition become subject to the principal's control and cannot act independently. For the same reason, auditors' duties should be neither articulated in the framework of corporate law fiduciary duty, nor conceived relationally at all. These assertions follow from an inquiry into the operative notion of the shareholder-beneficiary. The Article unpacks the notion of the shareholder and tells a …


Panel Presentation: Securities Regulation And Corporate Responsibility, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2003

Panel Presentation: Securities Regulation And Corporate Responsibility, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What I want to do is talk about the big picture, as John suggested, and consider the likely spillover effects of Sarbanes-Oxley. I want to do this in a discretely administrative law-oriented way, taking two themes that were very visible and driving forces behind the legislation. The first, as Mary suggested in her opening remarks, is a question about federalism. It has been common for the last twenty years, at least, to trot out - as John just did - a distinction between federal and state spheres of competency. The SEC is on the disclosure side, while the substance of …


The Organizational Psychology Of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility And The Lessons Of Enron, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2002

The Organizational Psychology Of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility And The Lessons Of Enron, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What I want to do here is first explain my fears and then explore the Enron story from the standpoint of both social psychology and organizational behavior. My sense going in, at least, is that the social forces and selfish norms that emerge fairly naturally in highly competitive settings such as these dominate as behavioral influences over anything but high-powered legal controls. The kind of firm that I want to concentrate on is the "new economy" sort that requires a high rate of creative productivity from a large number of key managers and employees. Thus, I will put to the …


Never Trust A Corporation, William W. Bratton Jan 2002

Never Trust A Corporation, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

I would like to start by noting multitudinous objections to assertions made in Larry Mitchell's Corporate Irresponsibility: America's Newest Export. But I waive these points for purposes of this Symposium. I would prefer to take the occasion to celebrate the book. So I will make two points on the subject of corporate social responsibility on which the book and I stand in complete accord.


Enron And The Dark Side Of Shareholder Value, William W. Bratton Jan 2002

Enron And The Dark Side Of Shareholder Value, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article addresses the implications that the Enron collapse holds out for the self-regulatory system of corporate governance. The case shows that the incentive structure that motivates actors in the system generates much less powerful checks against abuse than many observers have believed. Even as academics have proclaimed rising governance standards, some standards have declined, particularly those addressed to the numerology of shareholder value. The Article's inquiry begins with Enron's business plan. The Article asserts that there may be more to Enron's "virtual firm" strategy than meets the eye beholding a firm in collapse. The Article restates the strategy as …


When Lawyers And Law Firms Invest In Their Corporate Clients’ Stock, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2002

When Lawyers And Law Firms Invest In Their Corporate Clients’ Stock, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

I will state my conclusion at the outset. I am not convinced that lawyers' investments in clients in lieu of fees are problematic enough from a conflicts standpoint that the rules of professional responsibility should treat them as presumptively inconsistent with the lawyer's fiduciary responsibility. Lawyers' investments in their clients do raise interesting and unsettling issues, but these issues are not qualitatively different from issues raised by many other norms or practices within the legal profession that also threaten lawyerly objectivity. Indeed, in contrast to some other practices, these fee arrangements can, in some respects, enhance objectivity, or at least …


Corporate Norms And Contemporary Law Firm Practice, Milton C. Regan Jan 2002

Corporate Norms And Contemporary Law Firm Practice, Milton C. Regan

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Larry Mitchell's book describes the movement toward share price maximization by corporate managers. More intensive market competition both domestically and abroad has led managers to believe that their corporations have little choice but to focus on short-term profits. This practice leads to greater instability for corporate workers and efforts to externalize other costs on third parties. It also intensifies the erosion of "local" cultural practices that are seen as impediments to profit maximization, whether they are associated with countries abroad, communities in the United States, or within the corporation itself. In this process, the norms of the market gain increasing …


Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton Jan 2002

Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article takes the occasion of the simultaneous collapse of the high technology stock market and the failure of the dot-coin startups, along with the subsequent retrenchment of the venture capital business, to examine the law and economics of downside arrangements in venture capital contracts. The subject matter implicates core concerns of legal and economic theory of the firm. Debates about the separation of ownership and control, relational investing, takeover policy, the law and economics of debt capitalization, and bankruptcy reform, all grapple with the downside problem of controlling and terminating unsuccessful managers for the benefit of outside debt and …


Seeking Sunlight In Santa Fe's Shadow: The Sec's Pursuit Of Managerial Accountability, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2001

Seeking Sunlight In Santa Fe's Shadow: The Sec's Pursuit Of Managerial Accountability, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

My aim in this paper is not to justify at length an expansive "new corporation law" perspective, though I do believe in it. Nor do I want to try to resolve a controversial question that the new learning admittedly leaves open: which jurisdictional body should set the disclosure and antifraud standards insofar as they are designed to promote better corporate governance? To say that corporate and securities law are largely unitary does not necessarily mean that centralization of authority in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) is the right choice. Perhaps the states, foreign countries, or stock exchanges …


Berle And Means Reconsidered At The Century's Turn, William W. Bratton Jan 2001

Berle And Means Reconsidered At The Century's Turn, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Part I places Berle and Means in the context of the legal theory of its day by comparing the work of Dewey on the theory of the firm and Douglas on corporate reorganization. This discussion highlights two progressive assumptions Berle and Means shared with these business law contemporaries-a confidence in the efficacy of judicial intervention to vindicate distributive policies and a distrust of the institution of contract. These assumptions would, in the long run, cause the book's prescription to land wide of the mark. After 1980, Berle and Means lost their paradigmatic status due to a combination of skepticism respecting …


Representing The Unrepresented In Class Action Settlements, Brian Wolfman Jan 1996

Representing The Unrepresented In Class Action Settlements, Brian Wolfman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Class actions are important and useful both to deter wrongful conduct and to provide compensation for injured plaintiffs. In complex cases, however, the existing class action structure falters. In this article, Messrs. Wolfman and Morrison argue that in "settlement class actions" the current class action rules do not adequately protect class members whose interests do not coincide with those of the class representatives and the class attorneys. Through a survey of recent, prominent settlement class actions, the authors show that the current system does not fairly treat subgroups in a class with respect to matters as diverse as future injury, …


Corporate Takeover Of Teaching Hospitals, Maxwell Gregg Bloche Jan 1992

Corporate Takeover Of Teaching Hospitals, Maxwell Gregg Bloche

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article explores the potential and the dangers of this novel form of collaboration between academic medicine and the for-profit world. The author focuses on those arrangements--purchases and leasing agreements--by which investor-owned corporations operate, for a profit, hospitals that serve as major medical teaching and research sites. He begins by reviewing how the evolving needs of academic medical centers and for-profit hospital chains have generated mutual interest in such arrangements. The author then considers some frequently expressed ethical, economic, and other public policy objections to the provision of hospital services by for-profit firms. Opponents of the acquisition and leasing of …


On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit, Brief Of The Federal Bar Association As Amicus Curiae, The Upjohn Company, Et Al. V. United States Of America, Et Al., Thomas G. Lilly, Alfred F. Belcuore, Paul F. Rothstein, Ronald L. Carlson Jan 1979

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit, Brief Of The Federal Bar Association As Amicus Curiae, The Upjohn Company, Et Al. V. United States Of America, Et Al., Thomas G. Lilly, Alfred F. Belcuore, Paul F. Rothstein, Ronald L. Carlson

U.S. Supreme Court Briefs

This case presents the question of whether communications between employees of a corporation and an attorney representing that corporation are entitled to the full protections of the attorney-client privilege only when the employees are those responsible for deciding and directing the corporation's response to the attorney's legal advice.