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Articles 31 - 46 of 46

Full-Text Articles in Law

"Academic Challenge" Cases: Should Judicial Review Extend To Academic Evaluations Of Students?, Thomas A. Schweitzer Apr 2011

"Academic Challenge" Cases: Should Judicial Review Extend To Academic Evaluations Of Students?, Thomas A. Schweitzer

Thomas A. Schweitzer

No abstract provided.


Lee V. Weisman: Whither The Establishment Clause And The Lemon V. Kurtzman Three Pronged Test?, Thomas A. Schweitzer Apr 2011

Lee V. Weisman: Whither The Establishment Clause And The Lemon V. Kurtzman Three Pronged Test?, Thomas A. Schweitzer

Thomas A. Schweitzer

No abstract provided.


Judging Indian Law: What Factors Influence Individual Justice’S Votes On Indian Law In The Modern Era, Grant Christensen Mar 2011

Judging Indian Law: What Factors Influence Individual Justice’S Votes On Indian Law In The Modern Era, Grant Christensen

Grant Christensen

Abstract: Scholars of the Supreme Court often use a justice’s political ideology to predict their ultimate vote on Constitutional questions. While this approach may serve scholars well when questions involve hot button civil liberties issues that are the focus of confirmation hearings, ideology is in actuality a poor predictor of judicial behavior in other areas of law. This paper looks at one of the more complex – Federal Indian Law – and uses both descriptive statistics and more advanced quantitative analysis to go beyond the pure ideology and explain why individual Justices vote the way they do. Using the Fisher …


The Supreme Court, Self-Persuasion, And Ideological Drift, Molly Wilson Mar 2011

The Supreme Court, Self-Persuasion, And Ideological Drift, Molly Wilson

Molly J. Walker Wilson

Whether one conceives of judicial attitudes as culturally derived, emotive values, or ideology-based policy positions, the work of behavioral law theorists, political scientists, and legal realists has amply documented the influence of personal beliefs on judicial decision-making. However, there is evidence for a previously unexplored possibility; the possibility that judges may be systematically more vulnerable to ideological extremes than those outside of the judiciary. There is reason to suspect that specific features of a jurist’s job may lead him or her inevitably toward a greater commitment to his or her own worldviews. In particular, the requirement that judges draft opinions …


Justice Stevens, Religion, And Civil Society, Gregory P. Magarian Mar 2011

Justice Stevens, Religion, And Civil Society, Gregory P. Magarian

Gregory P. Magarian

Did Justice John Paul Stevens, who retired from the Supreme Court last year, harbor a bias against religion? During his 35 years on the Court, Justice Stevens showed little favor for religious claimants. In Establishment Clause cases he advocated a strong doctrine of separation between church and state. In the most contentious Free Exercise Clause cases, he flatly opposed exempting religious believers from laws that interfered with their religious exercise. This combination of positions, unique among the Justices of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts, has led commentators to charge Justice Stevens with disdain for religion. In this article, Professor …


A Political Question: Public Nuisance, Climate Change And The Courts, Richard O. Faulk, John S. Gray Mar 2011

A Political Question: Public Nuisance, Climate Change And The Courts, Richard O. Faulk, John S. Gray

Richard Faulk

When it comes to climate change regulation, one of the great discussions of our day is whether the political branches of government or the judiciary should lead the way. Is it appropriate or wise to use the crucible of the courtroom to forge standards regarding what emission levels are, and are not, acceptable? In other words, is the use of tort litigation in this context a legitimate judicial exercise, or does the judiciary overstep its bounds by reaching impermissibly into the political sphere? Although the poet’s imagination may dream of leaping to seize an otherwise inaccessible prize, wise jurists know …


Judging In A Vacuum, Or, Once More, Without Feeling: How Justice Scalia’S Jurisprudential Approach Repeats Errors Made In Plessy V. Ferguson, Chris Edelson Feb 2011

Judging In A Vacuum, Or, Once More, Without Feeling: How Justice Scalia’S Jurisprudential Approach Repeats Errors Made In Plessy V. Ferguson, Chris Edelson

Chris Edelson

Justice Antonin Scalia recently declared that the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause simply does not apply to discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation. Though Justice Scalia’s statement is not exactly news, as he had previously suggested as much in dissenting opinions in Romer v. Evans and United States v. Virginia, it does provide an opportunity to consider how he arrived at these conclusions. Justice Scalia argues that he is simply applying the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, deferring to tradition and the will of the people until and unless democratic action provides new instructions. This article argues …


Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions In The Supreme Court, John F. Davis, William L. Reynolds Feb 2011

Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions In The Supreme Court, John F. Davis, William L. Reynolds

William L. Reynolds

No abstract provided.


Appellate Jurisdiction Of The Supreme Court Of India, Mubashshir Sarshar Jan 2011

Appellate Jurisdiction Of The Supreme Court Of India, Mubashshir Sarshar

Mubashshir Sarshar

No abstract provided.


From Wards Cove To Ricci: Struggling Against The “Built In Headwinds” Of A Skeptical Court, Melissa R. Hart Jan 2011

From Wards Cove To Ricci: Struggling Against The “Built In Headwinds” Of A Skeptical Court, Melissa R. Hart

Melissa R Hart

No abstract provided.


Originalism As An Anchor For The Sixth Amendment, Jeffrey L. Fisher Jan 2011

Originalism As An Anchor For The Sixth Amendment, Jeffrey L. Fisher

Jeffrey L Fisher

Originalism is sometimes criticized as merely a means to justify conservative results. And cases do indeed exist in which the Supreme Court has divided along liberal-conservative lines, and conservatives have played originalism as a purported trump card. Last Term’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, interpreting the Second Amendment as including an individual right to bear arms, is a recent example.

When it comes to criminal procedure, however, things are not so simple. This Essay examines two lines of cases: first, those involving the Court's reinvigoration of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, and second, those involving the …


Common Law Constitutional Interpretation: A Critique, Brannon P. Denning Jan 2011

Common Law Constitutional Interpretation: A Critique, Brannon P. Denning

Brannon P. Denning

This is a review of David Strauss, The Living Constitution (2010). In it, I critique his claim that common law constitutional interpretation is a superior alternative to originalism.


Electing Our Judges And Judicial Independence: The Supreme Court's "Triple Whammy", Martin Belsky Jan 2011

Electing Our Judges And Judicial Independence: The Supreme Court's "Triple Whammy", Martin Belsky

Martin H. Belsky

In this article, Martin Belsky makes the case for judicial selection based on merit, as opposed to popular elections. Belsky cites Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company and the recent defeat of three Iowa supreme court justices because of their opinion in a controversial gay marriage case for the proposition that judicial elections can, and do, yield unjust results. Belsky asserts the need for judicial independence, but concludes that this goal is not achievable through elections because of the "triple whammy" of constitutional limitations: (1) the First Amendment protection of the right of judges and judicial candidates to give specific, …


Color Commentators Of The Bench, Adam Benforado Dec 2010

Color Commentators Of The Bench, Adam Benforado

Adam Benforado

Featuring prominently in the last four sets of Supreme Court confirmation hearings, the judge-as-umpire analogy has become the dominant frame for understanding the role of the Justice and may also now act as a significant constraint on judicial behavior. Strong criticisms from legal academics and journalists attacking the realism of the analogy have had little destabilizing effect. This Essay argues that the best hope for shifting the public conception of the work of a Justice is to offer a counter analogy that draws from an equally intuitive and familiar context, while also capturing the core essence of Supreme Court adjudication …


Revelation And Reaction: The Struggle To Shape American Arbitration, Thomas J. Stipanowich Dec 2010

Revelation And Reaction: The Struggle To Shape American Arbitration, Thomas J. Stipanowich

Thomas J. Stipanowich

In this article, Professor Stipanowich explores recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and the implications for the respective domains of courts of law and arbitration tribunals regarding so-called “gateway” determinations surrounding the enforcement of arbitration agreements and the contracts of which they are a part. The decisions address the complex interplay between federal substantive law focusing on questions of arbitrability, a body of law defined and expanded by the Court under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and the law of the states and bring into play competing judicial philosophies of contractual assent and contrasting views about the balance between …


Modern American Supreme Court Judicial Methodology And Its Origins: A Critical Analysis Of The Legal Thought Of Roscoe Pound, Beau James Brock Dec 2010

Modern American Supreme Court Judicial Methodology And Its Origins: A Critical Analysis Of The Legal Thought Of Roscoe Pound, Beau James Brock

Beau James Brock

The pragmatic philosophy of law espoused by Pound has come to be regarded as a textbook method of adjudication. The most telling commentators of all have been the judges themselves who utilize his balancing of social interests in their adjudication of cases. Finally, his pragmatism has been assimilated into mainstream legal thought producing innovative attempts to address the possibly unanswerable question of the proper valuation of competing interests.