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Articles 91 - 120 of 563
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, And The Antitrust Laws, Stephen Ross
The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, And The Antitrust Laws, Stephen Ross
Stephen F Ross
The baseball strike and the ongoing hostilities between the players' association and owners have evoked criticism and frustration among fans and others. Although the players successfully defeated the owners' most recent attempts to reduce major league competition, the threat of future imposition of competitive restraints by the owners remains. In this article Professor Stephen F. Ross argues that blanket restraints on the market for players affirmatively inhibit on-the-field competition and consequently offend the Sherman Act. The article begins with the proposition that monopsony - price-fixing behavior by buyers', rather than sellers' cartels - implicates the Sherman Act. Restraints on competition …
Sports And The Law: Text, Cases, And Problems, 5th, Stephen Ross, Paul Weiler, Gary Roberts, Roger Abrams
Sports And The Law: Text, Cases, And Problems, 5th, Stephen Ross, Paul Weiler, Gary Roberts, Roger Abrams
Stephen F Ross
This casebook introduces students to the fundamentals of labor, antitrust, and intellectual property law as applied in the professional and amateur sporting industries. It covers the unique office of the league commissioner and special concerns with the “best interests of sports”; the contract, antitrust, and labor law dimensions of the player-labor market; the peculiar institution of the player agent in a unionized industry; the economic and legal implications of agreements among league owners and responses to rival leagues; the system of commercialized college athletics governed by the NCAA and how law impacts individual sports like golf, tennis and boxing; as …
Reconsidering Flood V. Kuhn, Stephen Ross
Reconsidering Flood V. Kuhn, Stephen Ross
Stephen F Ross
Within the academia, two very different groups of legal scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to Flood v. Kuhn. Those specializing in sports law have either attached Flood as a ridiculous decision that improperly distinguished between baseball and other professional sports, or have praised it for waging guerrilla warfare on the idea that Section 1 of the Sherman Act should apply to intra-league arrangements by owners of the professional sports teams. Those viewing Flood through the lens of statutory interpretation perceive the decision as adhering rigidly to the principle of stare decisis; this rigidity has been both praised …
Reaganist Realism Comes To Detriot, Stephen Ross
Reaganist Realism Comes To Detriot, Stephen Ross
Stephen F Ross
Part I of this article discusses Detroit Newspapers and explains how in deferring to the Attorney General's interpretation of the Newspaper Preservation Act, Judge Silberman disregarded every applicable technique of statutory interpretation typically used to resolve the issue. Indeed, each of these techniques suggests that Attorney General Meese's interpretation of the Act was incorrect. This part of the article also demonstrates why deference to Meese was particularly inappropriate in light of the generally accepted justifications for judicial deference to administrative interpretations of statutes.
Part II explains that Detroit Newspapers is one of several opinions by conservative Reagan judicial appointees that …
An Antitrust Analysis Of Sports League Contracts With Cable Networks, Stephen Ross
An Antitrust Analysis Of Sports League Contracts With Cable Networks, Stephen Ross
Stephen F Ross
This Article discusses the proper antitrust treatment of package sales to cable. Part I considers whether the antitrust laws apply at all to such sales; it concludes that section one of the Sherman Act does apply and that neither the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 not baseball's historic exemption from the antitrust laws prevents antitrust scrutiny of these contracts. Part II explains why cable package sales should be analyzed under a rule of reason test focused on the effect of a sale on fan viewership. Finally, Part III responds to several possible objections to the rule of reason standard proposed …
Antitrust Options To Redress Anticompetitive Restraints And Monopolistic Practices By Professional Sports Leagues, Stephen Ross
Antitrust Options To Redress Anticompetitive Restraints And Monopolistic Practices By Professional Sports Leagues, Stephen Ross
Stephen F Ross
The hallmark of an antitrust violation is an agreement which has the effect of raising price, lowering output, or rendering output unresponsive to consumer demand. Owners of clubs comprising Major League Baseball, the National Football League, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League engage in a variety of exploitative activities that consumers cannot avoid by substituting rival products. The purpose of this Article is to analyze specific areas where these monopoly sports leagues harm a variety of groups, through the maintenance of a monopolistic structure that precludes competitive entry, or through specific restraints that have demonstrable anticompetitive effects. …
Accommodating Labor And Antitrust, Stephen Ross
Accommodating Labor And Antitrust, Stephen Ross
Stephen F Ross
In this article, the author comments on Professor Michael LeRoy's article "Federal Jurisdiction in Sports Labor Disputes" (2012 Utah L. Rev. 815) and explains why he disagrees with the claim that federal courts improperly invoke the Sherman Act in sports labor disputes.
A Rapid Reaction To O'Bannon: The Need For Analytics In Applying The Sherman Act To Overly Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes, Stephen Ross, Wayne Desarbo
A Rapid Reaction To O'Bannon: The Need For Analytics In Applying The Sherman Act To Overly Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes, Stephen Ross, Wayne Desarbo
Stephen F Ross
This Article reviews the recent and highly publicized district court decision holding that NCAA rules, which bar student-athletes from any compensation for image rights, violated the Sherman Act, and that big-time athletic programs could lawfully agree among themselves to limit compensation to $5,000 annually in trust for each athlete upon leaving school. This Article briefly discusses why the decision correctly found the current rule to be illegal, but also details why, under settled antitrust law, the critical question of how much compensation would significantly harm consumer appeal for college football and basketball is a question better left to marketing science …
Improving Antitrust Sanctions, Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Improving Antitrust Sanctions, Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Daniel L. Rubinfeld
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Or Industrial Protectionism? Emerging International Issues In China's Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Efforts, Thomas J. Horton
Antitrust Or Industrial Protectionism? Emerging International Issues In China's Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Efforts, Thomas J. Horton
Thomas J. Horton
O Sherman Act E A Eponimia Das Leis, Victor J. Calvete
O Sherman Act E A Eponimia Das Leis, Victor J. Calvete
Victor J. Calvete
In the first session of the 51th Congress of the United States, two statutes were approved named after Senator John Sherman: the Sherman Silver Act and the Sherman Anti-trust Act. In his Mémoirs the Senator admits (and regrets) the eponimy in the first case, but does not aknowledge the second. It might have been a surprise to him to know that the Judiciary's Committee version that superseeded the Finance Committee's one - the one that he introduced in December 1889 as S. 1 - came to be graced with his name. The point is that trying to illuminate the 1890 …
Should Companies Always Fess Up To Corruption? Why It Can Be Strategically Wise Not To Self-Report Violations Of Anti-Corruption Laws, Peter R. Reilly
Should Companies Always Fess Up To Corruption? Why It Can Be Strategically Wise Not To Self-Report Violations Of Anti-Corruption Laws, Peter R. Reilly
Peter R. Reilly
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Balancing, Herbert Hovenkamp
Antitrust Balancing, Herbert Hovenkamp
Herbert Hovenkamp
Antitrust litigation often confronts situations where effects point in both directions. Judges sometimes describe the process of evaluating these factors as “balancing.” In its e-Books decision the Second Circuit believed that the need to balance is what justifies application of the rule of reason. In Microsoft the D.C. Circuit stated that “courts routinely apply a …balancing approach” under which “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm… outweighs the procompetitive benefit.” But then it decided the case without balancing anything.
The term “balancing” is a very poor label for what courts actually do in these cases. Balancing requires that …
Judicial Treatment Of The Antitrust Treatise, Hillary Greene, D. Daniel Sokol
Judicial Treatment Of The Antitrust Treatise, Hillary Greene, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
This essay examines Herbert Hovenkamp's influence in antitrust law and policy in the courts. This essay focuses its attention primarily with the Treatise and primarily in the area of merger law – procedural with issues of antitrust injury and substantively with merger efficiencies. The essay provides a case count citation analysis of Hovenkamp's scholarship and compares Hovenkamp to other major figures in antitrust scholarship (Bork and Posner) and to the other antitrust treatises (Kintner and Sullivan) in the courts. Our meta-level findings show that Hovenkamp is far more cited than other treatise writers or scholars who have been recognized for …
Merger Control Under China's Anti-Monopoly Law, D. Daniel Sokol
Merger Control Under China's Anti-Monopoly Law, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
This essay explores the factors that drive merger outcomes under China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). While there are currently only a small number of published merger decisions, this paper overcomes that obstacle by utilizing a unique practitioner survey of antitrust lawyers across multiple jurisdictions. This survey captures transactions contemplated, but never undertaken (deterred by the merger regime), as well as mergers notified for approval under the AML. The survey allows for broader inferences to be drawn about the development of Chinese antitrust law, including: the welfare standard used in merger analysis, what industrial policy and other political factors may impact merger …
The Transformation Of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, The Rule Of Reason, And Per Se Legality, D. Daniel Sokol
The Transformation Of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, The Rule Of Reason, And Per Se Legality, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
Robert Bork probably had the single most lasting influence on antitrust law and policy of anyone in the past 50 years. To read the 1978 Antitrust Paradox today, one is struck by how closely contemporary case law tracks Bork's policy prescriptions. The speed at which the transformation in law and policy occurred in antitrust is perhaps unprecedented across any area of common law. In the 1970s, antitrust jurisprudence and enforcement policies were in tension with industrial organization economics. Bork created a unified goal for antitrust based on a “consumer welfare prescription” to shape the development of the case law. The …
Policing The Firm, D. Daniel Sokol
Policing The Firm, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
Criminal price fixing cartels are a serious problem for consumers. Cartels are hard both to find and punish. Research into other kinds of corporate wrongdoing suggests that enforcers should pay increased attention to incentives within the firm to deter wrongdoing. Thus far, antitrust scholarship and policy have ignored this insight in the cartel context. This Article suggests how to improve antitrust enforcement by focusing enforcement efforts on changing the incentives of internal firm compliance.
Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol
Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
The appropriate role of merger efficiencies remains unresolved in US antitrust law and policy. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has led to a significant shift in health care delivery. The ACA promises that increased integration and a shift from quantity of performance through increased competition will create a system in which quality will go up and prices will go down. Increasingly, due to the economic trends that respond to the ACA, including considerable consolidation both horizontally and vertically, it is imperative that the antitrust agencies provide an economically sound and administrable legal approach to efficiency enhancing mergers. …
Economic Authority And The Limits Of Expertise In Antitrust Cases, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
Economic Authority And The Limits Of Expertise In Antitrust Cases, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
William H. Page
In antitrust litigation, the factual complexity and economic nature of the issues involved require the presentation of economic expert testimony in all but a few cases. This dependence on economics has increased in recent years because of the courts' narrowing of per se rules of illegality and the courts' expansion of certain areas of factual inquiry. At the same time, however, courts have limited the scope of allowable expert testimony through the methodological strictures of Daubert and its progeny and through heightened sufficiency requirements. In this Article, Professors Page and Lopatka make four important points about these judicially imposed constraints …
Course Materials On East-West Trade Law, Julian Juergensmeyer, A. Burzynski
Course Materials On East-West Trade Law, Julian Juergensmeyer, A. Burzynski
Julian C. Juergensmeyer
No abstract provided.
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert Hovenkamp
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert Hovenkamp
Herbert Hovenkamp
Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition, which generally means a price increase resulting from a reduction in output. However, a merger that threatens competition may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve its product. Attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. We tolerate most mergers because of a background, highly generalized belief that most or at least many produce cost savings …
Promoting Innovation, Matthew Sag, Spencer Weber Waller
Promoting Innovation, Matthew Sag, Spencer Weber Waller
Spencer Weber Waller
No abstract provided.
Antitrust, Innovation, And Product Design In Platform Markets: Microsoft And Intel, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
Antitrust, Innovation, And Product Design In Platform Markets: Microsoft And Intel, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers
William H. Page
The Antitrust Division’s Microsoft case and the Federal Trade Commission’s Intel case both rested on claims that antitrust intervention was necessary to preserve innovation in technological platforms at the heart of the personal computer. Yet, because those very platforms support markets that are among the most innovative in the American economy, injudicious intervention might well have jeopardized the very innovation that antitrust should promote. In this article, we review the role of platforms in technological innovation and consider how antitrust standards should apply to them. We then examine how Microsoft resolved antitrust issues affecting platform design at various stages of …
Josh Wright’S “Chicago School Papers”: An Overview, William H. Page
Josh Wright’S “Chicago School Papers”: An Overview, William H. Page
William H. Page
In what follows, I consider three of FTC Commissioner Josh Wright's “Chicago School Papers.” In these papers, Commissioner Wright considers the past, present, and future role of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis in the shaping of law and policy, offering along the way some interesting insights into what his priorities at the FTC are likely to be. The papers discussed have common themes: the mischaracterization of the “Chicago School,” the scientific advantage of dispensing altogether with “School” labels, and a focus on empirical findings in shaping antitrust analysis.
Devising A Microsoft Remedy That Serves Consumers, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
Devising A Microsoft Remedy That Serves Consumers, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
William H. Page
According to Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, Microsoft was a “predacious” monopolizer that did extensive “violence . . . to the competitive process.” Through a “single, well-coordinated course” of anticompetitive action, it suppressed competition from Netscape's Navigator, an Internet browser, and from Sun's Java programming language and related technologies. Microsoft “mounted a deliberate assault upon entrepreneurial efforts, . . . placed an oppressive thumb on the scale of competitive fortune, . . . and trammeled the competitive process.” Having colorfully concluded that Microsoft's offenses were extreme, Judge Jackson deferred to the government's demand for a drastic remedy. He ordered that Microsoft …
Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William Page, Seldon Childers
Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William Page, Seldon Childers
William H. Page
Section III.E of the final judgments in the American Microsoft case requires Microsoft to make available to software developers certain communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate with Microsoft's server operating systems. This provision has been by far the most difficult and costly to implement, primarily because of questions about the quality of Microsoft's documentation of the protocols. The plaintiffs' technical experts, in testing the documentation, have found numerous issues, which they have asked Microsoft to resolve. Because of accumulation of unresolved issues, the parties agreed in 2006 to extend Section III.E for up to five more …
Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/Rand And Antitrust Injury, William H. Page
Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/Rand And Antitrust Injury, William H. Page
William H. Page
In a 2013 opinion in Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge James Robart calculated “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” or RAND royalties that Motorola could lawfully charge Microsoft for licenses to use Motorola patents that were essential to two industry standards. Although the case involved only a claim for breach of contract, Judge Robart’s opinion regulated monopoly pricing, a task courts try to avoid in other contexts, claiming institutional incapacity. In this instance, however, Judge Robart identified standards that he believed adequately guided him in the task. He recognized that the economic purposes of the RAND commitment were to prevent owners of standards-essential patents …
A Neo-Chicago Approach To Concerted Action, William H. Page
A Neo-Chicago Approach To Concerted Action, William H. Page
William H. Page
In this article, I offer an approach to concerted action that builds on traditional Chicago School analyses of the issue, but adds a focus on the role of communication. Chicago scholars uniformly identify cartels as the primary target of antitrust enforcement. They have also established much of the framework within which courts and economists analyze concerted action. George Stigler’s seminal theory of oligopoly, which sought to identify the determinants of effective collusion, has spawned an enormous literature in game theory that models the pricing behavior of oligopolists. Richard Posner’s early analysis of tacit collusion - rivals’ coordination of noncompetitive pricing …
The Ftc's Procedural Advantage In Discovering Concerted Action, William H. Page
The Ftc's Procedural Advantage In Discovering Concerted Action, William H. Page
William H. Page
Scholars have long argued that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act can or should be interpreted to reach more conduct than Section 1 of Sherman Act - whether, in other words, there are gaps in the coverage of Section 1 that allow certain forms of anticompetitive conduct that Section 5 should condemn. Perhaps the most important issue in the interpretation of Section 1 concerns how courts should distinguish conscious parallelism from unlawful concerted action. In this paper, I argue that there is no substantive gap between the two antitrust statutes on this issue-both statutes prohibit (and permit) the …
Objective And Subjective Theories Of Concerted Action, William H. Page
Objective And Subjective Theories Of Concerted Action, William H. Page
William H. Page
Communication is useful and often necessary for rivals to coordinate price and output decisions. All would agree that evidence of communication on these issues is relevant to the issue of whether firms reached an illegal agreement or engaged in concerted action in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Most courts and commentators would go further and define agreement and concerted action to require communication of one kind or another. I call this view the objective theory of concerted action. Louis Kaplow has recently challenged this approach in three important articles, all of which argue that the focus on …