Law Commons^™

Making Sense Of The Rule Of Reason: A New Standard For Section 1 Of The Sherman Act, Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.

Vanderbilt Law Review

For most of the twentieth century, the federal courts have assumed that they must choose between two extreme methods of analyzing conduct under Section 1 of the Sherman Act:' a per se rule that deems certain conduct illegal on its face; or, a rule of reason that inquires into all conceivable circumstances before determining the legality of a particular restraint. Until the 1970s, the courts were enamored of the clarity, simplicity, and deterrent effects of per se rules. As they have become more knowledgeable about economic theory in the last fifteen years, however, the courts have grown disillusioned with the …

Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return To The Cartelization Standard, Nolan E. Clark

Vanderbilt Law Review

Antitrust law has been with us since 1890, the year that Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act. In the course of this ex-tended period, antitrust law has achieved an exalted status in the pantheon of American jurisprudence.' Nevertheless, for decades,Sherman Act doctrines have been murky and confused. This confusion was not, however, historically inevitable. When enacted, the Sherman Act had a clear focus. Fortunately, as the Sherman Act approaches its centennial, the Supreme Court has given encouraging signs that it is once again returning to the original focus of the statute.

As originally conceived, the Sherman Act prohibited two related …

The Role Of Attempt To Monopolize In Antitrust Regulation: An Economic And Social Justification For A New Approach, Joel R. Tew

Vanderbilt Law Review

Attempt to monopolize is an elusive concept. The number of divergent views demonstrates the complexity the courts face in re-solving the controversy. The first step toward resolution requires are thinking of antitrust values. The many legal tangents have not produced a satisfactory result primarily because they are formulated on a value base that is incompatible with the functional requirements of the competitive process. While economic efficiency is a relevant goal of antitrust, it should not be and has not been the only goal. The evolving socioeconomic structure requires broadly based antitrust policy that acknowledges economic and noneconomic values and facilitates …

Recent Cases, Richard C. Stark, Gerard T. Nebel, Craig V. Gabbert, Jr., Mary E. Mann

Vanderbilt Law Review

Recent Cases

Administrative Law--Federal Trade Commission Act--Restitution Held Improper in Section Five Cease and Desist Order

Richard C. Stark

Congress enacted section five'° of the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914 to supplement" the antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act.'" The section declared unfair methods of competition illegal and placed the power to define and prohibit unfair methods in the hands of an independent regulatory commission, the FTC.' In conferring this power, Congress intended this body of experts to educate and guide the business community toward the goal of securing higher standards of business conduct.

Sherman Act, antitrust

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Constitutional …

A Decade Of The Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, Charles J. Steele

Vanderbilt Law Review

Corporations intent upon expanding via the acquisition route have had three statutory hurdles placed in their way by the Congress of the United States. As hurdles, the first two, the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914, were failures. A judiciary which refused to give effect either to the language or intent of the acts nullified completely their usefulness as anti-merger weapons.

The third hurdle, the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the Clayton Act, was enacted in 1950. Relatively few judicial opinions have interpreted this act, "new section 7," as it is called. It is clear, however, that it …

The Impact Of Antitrust, John P. Miller

Vanderbilt Law Review

The functions of the antitrust laws have never been well articulated. Some proponents of the law emphasize the economic benefits of competition, i.e., incentives to economic efficiency and growth. Others emphasize the political and social advantages of minimizing the concentration of economic power. A review of the history and present status of antitrust suggests that both these views play a part. The Sherman Act prohibitions of "restraint of trade" and "monopolizing" suggest concern that entry into an industry shall not be barred by arbitrary restraints and that decisions of various firms shall be arrived at independently. This is not the …

Exclusive Arrangements And Refusal To Deal Problems, Reynolds C. Seitz

Vanderbilt Law Review

Justification for including a discussion on exclusive dealing arrangements and on refusal to deal decisions in a symposium devoted to trade practices rests upon the practical consideration that there exists on the part of business management a considerable interest in the two commercial tools.

Business executives find appeal in the prospect of using a contract calling for exclusive dealing.' Those engaged in commerce have for a variety of purposes frequently employed as a lever the refusal to deal.

Possible antitrust implications in the use of the two devices has not always been understood by business. In recent years, however, the …

Senate Bill No. Ii And Antitrust Policy, Kenneth S. Carlston

Vanderbilt Law Review

The history of the judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act' is a history of the legislative process working through the mechanisms of the judicial process. Starting with an act phrased in the most general of terms, nearly seventy years of judicial administration have developed a system of interdependent postulates analogous to legislative norms. None of these postulates can be considered as prevailing over all others. But the binding thread of the Sherman Act is the proposition that the market shall be dynamic, manifesting sufficient energy through price competition by the organizations participating in the market to ensure that the advances …

Resale Price Maintenance, Stanley D. Rose

Vanderbilt Law Review

There was a tide in the affairs of men that was taken at its flood by the National Association of Retail Druggists--and it led on to fortune. For this band of little men the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act I was the end of a thirty years war. Enjoined in 1907 from attempting to force up retail price margins and maintain retail drug prices at a uniform level, this association joined with other groups desirous of achieving similar ends in an effort, year after year, to persuade Congress to permit the making of contracts between manufacturers and retailers that …