Law Commons^™

Anonymous Companies, William J. Moon

Faculty Scholarship

Hardly a day goes by without hearing about nefarious activities facilitated by anonymous “shell” companies. Often described as menaces to the financial system, the creation of business entities with no real operations in sun-drenched offshore jurisdictions offering “zero percent” tax rates remains in vogue among business titans, pop stars, multimillionaires, and royals. The trending headlines and academic accounts, however, have paid insufficient attention to the legal uses of anonymous companies that are both ubiquitous and almost infinite in their variations.

This Article identifies privacy as a functional feature of modern business entities by documenting the hidden virtues of anonymous companies—business …

Delaware's Dominance, Wyoming's Dare: New Challenge, Same Outcome?, Pierluigi Matera

Faculty Scholarship

Despite increasing criticism, Delaware's dominance in corporate law has not experienced a significant decline: as of today, 67.8 percent of Fortune 500 companies are still incorporated in its jurisdiction. Nevada is known as Delaware's most important competitor, with an aggressive strategy that has overridden the efforts of any other jurisdiction. Yet, its success has been limited to a specific market segment: small firms with low institutional shareholding and high insider ownership.

Scholars suggest several explanations for both the rise and the staying power of Delaware. These explanations are essentially subsumed under the credible commitment theory and the network theory. According …

Delaware's Global Competitiveness, William J. Moon

Faculty Scholarship

For about a hundred years, Delaware has been the leading jurisdiction for corporate law in the United States. The state, which deliberately embarked on a mission to build a haven for corporate law in the early twentieth century, now supplies corporate charters to over two thirds of Fortune 500 companies and a growing share of closely held companies. But Delaware’s domestic dominance masks the important and yet underexamined issue of whether Delaware maintains its competitive edge globally.

This Article examines Delaware’s global competitiveness, documenting Delaware’s surprising weakness competing in the emerging international market for corporate charters. It does so principally …

Does Revlon Matter? A Empirical And Theoretical Study, Matthew D. Cain Ph. D., Sean J. Griffith, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Steven D. Solomon

Faculty Scholarship

We empirically examine whether and how the doctrine of enhanced judicial scrutiny that emerged from Revlon and its progeny actually affects M&A transactions. Combining hand-coding and machine-learning techniques, we assemble data from the proxy statements of publicly announced mergers between 2003 and 2017 into a dataset of 1,913 unique transactions. Of these, 1,167 transactions were subject to the Revlon standard, and 553 were not. After subjecting this sample to empirical analysis, our results show that Revlon does indeed matter for companies incorporated in Delaware. We find that in Delaware, Revlon deals are more intensely negotiated, involve more bidders, and result …

The Limited Effect Of “Maximum Effect”, Daniel S. Kleinberger, Douglas K. Moll

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Opportunity Makes A Thief: Corporate Opportunities As Legal Transplant And Convergence In Corporate Law, Martin Gelter, Geneviève Helleringer

Faculty Scholarship

The paper surveys the corporate opportunities doctrine in four jurisdictions: the US, the UK, Germany, and France. Our analysis enables us to trace the development of the doctrine, exposing the way in which certain models of dealing with a particular issue have arisen, and how these models have then spread. Fiduciary duties are often today held out as typical instruments of shareholder protection in the US and the UK, both of which are often held out as model jurisdictions in corporate governance internationally. However, fiduciary duties in these two jurisdictions often operate in strikingly different ways. While the US relies …

Delineating The Implied Covenant And Providing For “Good Faith”, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This column considers whether an operating or partnership agreement can delineate the implied contractual obligation, comparing ULLCA and the Delaware Act, and then warns of the dangers of carelessly imposing by contract an express requirement of "good faith."

Delaware’S Implied Contractual Covenant Of Good Faith And “Sibling Rivalry” Among Equity Holders, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

An obligation of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every common law contract and is codified in the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C”). The terminology differs: Some jurisdictions refer to an “implied covenant;” others to an “implied contractual obligation;” still others to an “implied duty.” But whatever the label, the concept is understood by the vast majority of U.S. lawyers as a matter of commercial rather than entity law. And, to the vast majority of corporate lawyers, “good faith” does not mean contract law but rather conjures up an important aspect of a corporate director’s duty of loyalty.

Nonetheless, …

Delaware Dissolves The Glue Of Capitalism: Exonerating From Claims Of Incompetence Those Who Manage Other People's Money, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

Delaware law is the leading source of non-federal law governing U.S. business organizations. Over the past 25 years that law has tilted further and further toward insulating individuals who manage business firms from any liability to the firms’ owners based on claims of misconduct. These developments have occurred both in corporate law and the law of unincorporated organizations.

Although often described as consistent with market principles, these developments actually undercut the proper functioning of a market system. Effective competition among firms does not require a “dog eat dog” mentality within firms. Managerial responsibility is a prerequisite to healthy firms, which …

Recent Developments Concerning Preferred Stockholder Rights Under Delaware Law, Marilyn Blumberg Cane, Joong-Sik Choi, Scott B. Gitterman

Faculty Scholarship

This is a timely article focusing on the conflicting duties owed to preferred and common stockholders. Delaware is the leading corporate law jurisdiction in the United States. Preferred stock is a key component in angel and venture capital transactions. Historically the Delaware courts have accepted as a general principle the proposition that since the preferred rights are contractual in nature, they must be expressly defined in the preferred stock contract in order for the preferred to successfully assert those rights. Accordingly, the directors owe correlative duties to the preferred to the extent that the rights are articulated in the contract. …

Seven Points To Explain Why The Law Ought Not Allow The Elimination Of Fiduciary Duty Within Closely Held Businesses: Cardozo Is Dead; We Have Killed Him., Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

Prepared as part of the author's work as co-reporter for the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, this essay argues against legislation that empowers private agreements to eliminate fiduciary duty within a business organization. The essay considers: (i) the venerable role of fiduciary duty within business organizations and the limited predictive powers of those urging radical reform; (ii) the absence of prescience in contract drafters; (iii) the strict construction function of fiduciary law; (iv) the inevitable and inappropriate pressure that elimination would put on the obligation of good faith and fair dealing; (v) the differences in remedy available for fiduciary …

Bring On 'Da Noise: The Sec's Proposals Concerning Professional Conduct For Attorneys Under Sarbanes-Oxley, Marilyn Blumberg Cane, Sarah Smith Kelleher

Faculty Scholarship

In the wake of Enron's and numerous other corporate scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) to establish rules of professional conduct for attorneys who appear before it. In November 2002, the Commission released a proposal where attorneys would be required to report perceived violations of corporate governance and Commission rules up-the-ladder. Additionally, if the company failed to make an appropriate response, the attorney would be required to make a noisy withdrawal. After an onslaught of comments against the proposal, the Commission issued an alternative proposal for comment.

Under the alternative rule, …

The Costs And Benefits Of Precommitment: An Appraisal Of Omnicare V. Ncs Healthcare, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

The Decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare raises concerns regarding the efficiency of Delaware law from the perspective of shareholder welfare maximization and engages the emerging literature on corporate precommitments. The clash between the majority and dissenting opinions offers competing visions of the basic corporate law separation of powers issue--that is, board versus shareholder primacy. This Article engages in a close analysis of the Omnicare opinion, focusing on its doctrinal foundations as well as its policy implications. After this introduction, Part II provides a brief overview of the relevant factual and legal background. Part III …

Deal Protection Provisions In The Last Period Of Play , Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

The ability to protect mergers is important to both targets and acquirors. A series of recent Chancery Court decisions, however, challenges the validity of deal protection provisions in merger agreements and threatens the stability of Delaware's established change of control paradigm. This article argues that last period concerns animate the Chancery Court's decisions and finds, in the last period problem, a theoretical principle capable of harmonizing these decisions with existing jurisprudence and providing a coherent approach to the practical problems raised by deal protection provisions.