Law Commons^™

Sexual Harassment And Corporate Law, Daniel Hemel, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

The #MeToo movement has shaken corporate America in recent months, leading to the departures of several high-profile executives as well as sharp stock price declines at a number of firms. Investors have taken notice and taken action: Shareholders at more than a half dozen publicly traded companies have filed lawsuits since the start of 2017 alleging that corporate fiduciaries breached state law duties or violated federal securities laws in connection with sexual harassment scandals. Additional suits are likely in the coming months.

This Article examines the role of corporate and securities law in regulating and remedying workplace sexual misconduct. We …

Unintended Agency Problems: How International Bureaucracies Are Built And Empowered, Anu Bradford, Stavros Gadinis, Katerina Linos

Faculty Scholarship

The ground underneath the entire liberal international order is rapidly shifting. Institutions as diverse as the European Union, International Monetary Fund, United Nations, and World Trade Organization are under major threat. These institutions reflect decades of political investments in a world order where institutionalized cooperation was considered an essential cornerstone for peace and prosperity. Going beyond the politics of the day, this Article argues that the seeds of today’s discontent with the international order were in fact sown back when these institutions were first created. We show how states initially design international institutions with features that later haunt them in …

Financing The Benefit Corporation, Dana Brakman Reiser, Steven Dean

Faculty Scholarship

The hybrid organizational forms designed with social enterprises in mind have proven to be hothouse flowers. Flourishing in state legislatures, even those with the most distinguished pedigrees-such as Delaware's public benefit corporation'-have so far failed to thrive in the marketplace. Fortunately, hybrid financial instruments offer a source of strength and stability that can help social enterprise to take root.

This Article examines the valuable role that financial instruments can play in providing social enterprises with the capital they need to grow. Debt with equity features and equity with debt characteristics constitute the lion's share of such financial tools. More exotic …

Moneys' Legal Hierarchy, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter discusses the way in which money is legally constructed and hierarchically structured. In financial markets, participants trade different forms of money, some of which is state-issued and some privately issued. A form of money is closer to the “apex” of the system the closer it is to entities that can issue liquid means or determine acceptable forms of payment, such as central banks and governments. During financial crises, market participants close to the “apex” are systematically advantaged. Various legal devices, e.g. property rights, collateral rights, or trust law, contribute to hierarchically structuring the financial system, by granting preferential …

Law And Corporate Governance, Robert P. Bartlett, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Pragmatic and effective research on corporate governance often turns critically on appreciating the legal institutions surrounding corporate entities – yet such nuances are often unfamiliar or poorly specified to economists and other social scientists without legal training. This chapter organizes and discusses key legal concepts of corporate governance, including statutes, regulations, and jurisprudential doctrines that “govern governance” in private and public companies, with concentration on the for-profit corporation. We review the literature concerning the nature and purpose of the corporation, the objects of fiduciary obligations, the means for decision making within the firm, as well as the overlay of state …

Family Law And Entrepreneurial Action, D. Gordon Smith

Faculty Scholarship

In "The Contractual Foundation of Family-Business Law," Benjamin Means aspires to lay the groundwork for a law of family businesses. In this brief response essay, I suggest that a workable family-business law along the lines suggested by Means is consistent with an overarching policy in the United States of promoting entrepreneurial action, and I evaluate the proposal against this policy goal, with particular attention to Means’s arguments in favor of “family-business defaults” and his concern over the potentially disruptive role of fiduciary law.

Economic Crisis And The Integration Of Law And Finance: The Impact Of Volatility Spikes, Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The 2008 financial crisis raised puzzles important for understanding how the capital market prices common stocks and in turn, for the intersection between law and finance. During the crisis, there was a dramatic fivefold spike, across all industries, in "idiosyncratic risk" – the volatility of individual-firm share prices after adjustment for movements in the market as a whole.

This phenomenon is not limited to the most recent financial crisis.This Article uses an empirical review to show that a dramatic spike in idiosyncratic risk has occurred with every major downturn from the 1920s through the recent financial crisis. It canvasses three …

If Corporations Are People, Why Can’T They Play Tag?, Cody Jacobs

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s decision in Burnham v. Superior Court — despite producing a splintered vote with no opinion garnering a majority of the Court — made one thing clear: an individual defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction simply by being served with process while he or she happens to be in a forum regardless of whether the defendant has any contacts with that forum. This method of acquiring personal jurisdiction is called transient or “tag” jurisdiction. Tag jurisdiction is older than minimum contacts jurisdiction, and used to be the primary method for determining whether an out of state defendant …

Corporate Control And Idiosyncratic Vision, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani

Faculty Scholarship

This Article offers a novel theory of corporate control. It does so by shedding new light on corporate-ownership structures and challenging the prevailing model of controlling shareholders as essentially opportunistic actors who seek to reap private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Our core claim is that entrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows them to pursue their vision (i.e., any business strategy that the entrepreneur genuinely believes will produce an above-market rate of return) in the manner they see fit. We call the subjective value an entrepreneur attaches to her vision the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic vision. Our framework identifies …

Tax And Corporate Governance: The Influence Of Tax On Managerial Agency Costs, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter examines the influence of tax on managerial agency costs, with particular emphasis on public companies in the United States. Focusing on “C-corporations,” this chapter first considers why tax is an imperfect vehicle for mitigating managerial agency costs. It then discusses how tax influences the compensation of managers, both in ways policy makers intended, and in ways they did not. The chapter also considers how tax affects management decisions about capital structure, hedging, and acquisitions. In addition, this chapter explores the tax system’s influence on the ability and incentives of shareholders to monitor management. This chapter then concludes with …

Convergence And Persistence In Corporate Law And Governance, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter discusses the question of “convergence or persistence” in corporate law and governance. It first considers efforts to measure convergence directly by focusing on the evolution of law-on-the-books governance provisions before analyzing capital market evidence on convergence, with particular emphasis on capital market indicators such as the decline in “cross-listings” onto US stock exchanges by firms from jurisdictions with weaker investor protection and the increase in initial public offerings (IPOs) on emerging market stock markets. The chapter proceeds by reviewing evidence of divergence, especially “divergence within convergence,” and the failure of the European Union to produce more convergent corporate …

Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied: We Must End Our Failed Experiment In Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, Peter Reilly

Faculty Scholarship

According to the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), deferred prosecution agreements are said to occupy an “important middle ground” between declining to prosecute on the one hand, and trials or guilty pleas on the other. A top DOJ official has declared that, over the last decade, the agreements have become a “mainstay” of white collar criminal law enforcement; a prominent criminal law professor calls their increased use part of the “biggest change in corporate law enforcement policy in the last ten years.”

However, despite deferred prosecution’s apparent rise in popularity among law enforcement officials, the article sets forth the argument …

The Role Of Unfair Competition In The Common Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Gideon Parchomovsky

Faculty Scholarship

Does the idea of “unfair competition” present the law with a viable alternative to thinking about the regulation of information and informational resources, independent of the traditional categories of the common law (e.g., property/tort) and the assumptions that these categories entail? In this chapter, we argue that, although the answer to that question is no, unfair competition nevertheless plays an important role in complementing the categories of property and torts as they apply to competitive settings. Specifically, unfair competition allows courts to both broaden and narrow the traditional notions of property and torts – especially as they apply to the …

Delaware Court Of Chancery: Change, Continuity – And Competition, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

For Delaware, it is the best of times and the worst of times. The institutional prestige of the Delaware Court of Chancery has never been higher. Under the leadership of Chancellors Allen, Chandler and Strine, the court has converted many (and possibly most) of the academics, who once tended to be skeptical of Delaware. Academics and practitioners alike have been impressed by both the depth and thoughtfulness of the court of chancery's decisions and the hardworking style of its vice chancellors (who regularly seem able to turn out lengthy decisions in days that would take many federal circuit courts months …

Federalizing Fiduciary Duty: The Altered Scope Of Officer Fiduciary Duty Following Orderly Liquidation Under Dodd-Frank, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

The financial crisis of 2008 ushered in a new era of regulatory reform in the United States. The failure of several large banks prompted Congressional scrutiny ofthe U.S. bank regulatory system. Many critics highlighted the government's failure to intervene to prevent Lehman Brothers' insolvency, which resulted in economic turmoil not yet resolved. Against this backdrop, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank") in July 2010.

Dodd-Frank mandates institutional changes to minimize economic instability and establishes regulatory processes to guide the government's response to future bank failures. At the heart of the regulation is the Orderly …

To Be Or Not To Be Both Ceo And Board Chair, Thuy-Nga T. Vo

Faculty Scholarship

Part I of this article discusses the management and monitoring responsibilities of the board of directors. Part II explores the duality governance structure and its prevalence in corporate America. In Part III, the article examines and weighs the theoretical arguments for and against duality. Based on these arguments, this part assesses the impact of combined or separate CEO and Chair positions on the board’s performance of its management and monitoring responsibilities. Part IV turns to the empirical data on the effect of combined, rather than separate, CEO-Chair roles on corporate performance. Part V explains the views of corporate stakeholders on …

Promoting Innovation: The Law Of Publicly Traded Corporations, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

Improving economic welfare requires that society’s scarce savings be allocated among proposed real investment projects in a way that appreciates the prospects of promising new innovations. Corporate and securities law help structure important elements of this process of allocation. This article sketches out an approach based upon a seemingly paradoxical analogy of a market economy’s overall finance process to the way a hierarchical organization gathers and processes relevant bits of information dispersed among many individuals in order to make decisions. It thereby takes advantage of important thinking in communications and organizational theory about how to make organizations sensitive to the …

A Short History Of Tontines, Kent Mckeever

Faculty Scholarship

A tontine is an investment scheme through which shareholders derive some form of profit or benefit while they are living, but the value of each share devolves to the other participants and not the shareholder's heirs on the death of each shareholder. The tontine is usually brought to an end through a dissolution and distribution of assets to the living shareholders when the number of shareholders reaches an agreed small number.

If people know about tontines at all, they tend to visualize the most extreme form – a joint investment whose heritable ownership ends up with the last living shareholder. …

The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my recent paper - Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Governance. I begin by reiterating my basic thesis - that state competition should be understood to have little consequence for corporate governance, if (as charter competition's advocates assume) capital-market-driven managerial competition is also at work. I then consider some of the thoughtful critiques of this claim, before suggesting ways in which the comments highlight just the kind of comparative institutional analysis my paper counsels. Rather than a stark choice …

Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …

The Dystopian Potential Of Corporate Law, D. Gordon Smith

Faculty Scholarship

The community of corporate law scholars in the United States is fragmented. One group, heavily influenced by economic analysis of corporations, is exploring the merits of increasing shareholder power vis-a-vis directors. Another group, animated by concern for social justice, is challenging the traditional, shareholder-centric view of corporate law, arguing instead for a model of stakeholder governance. The current disagreement within corporate law is as fundamental as in any area of law, and the debate is more heated than at any time since the New Deal. This paper is part of a debate on the audacious question, Can Corporate Law Save …

The Criminalization Of Corporate Law, Lisa M. Fairfax

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Structural Reform Prosecution, Brandon L. Garrett

Faculty Scholarship

In what I call a structural reform prosecution, prosecutors secure the cooperation of an organization in adopting internal reforms. No scholars have considered the problem of prosecutors seeking structural reform remedies, perhaps because until recently organizational prosecutions were themselves infrequent. In the past few years, however, federal prosecutors adopted a bold new prosecutorial strategy under which dozens of leading corporations entered into demanding settlements, including AIG, American Online, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Computer Associates, HealthSouth, KPMG, MCI, Merrill Lynch & Co, Monsanto, and Time Warner. To situate the DOJ's latest strategy, I frame alternatives to the pursuit of structural reform remedies …

Before Competition: Origins Of The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Frederick Tung

Faculty Scholarship

To the modern corporate scholar and lawyer, the internal affairs doctrine seems in the natural order ofthings. Corporate law is state law. Each corporation is formed under the law of its chosen state ofincorporation. To ensure consistency and predictability, that law must govern the corporation's internalaffairs. Yet the origin of such a doctrine is puzzling. Respecting the firm's choice of corporate law, thedoctrine forces state legislatures into competition to attract incorporations. But how did legislatures come to concede their traditional territorial regulatory authority, and instead agree to compete? This Article solves this puzzle, offering the first account of the doctrine's …

Using Sarbanes-Oxley Act To Reward Honest Corporations, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act offers an opportunity to reward truthful corporations and their management, offering them a competitive advantage by relieving them from some of the Act's provisions. Corporate culture plays an important role in a corporation's honest behavior One size does not fit all in matters of organizational integrity. The provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that apply the same internal controls and governance rules on all public corporations impose unnecessary costs on honest corporations by requiring them to change one set of good habits that are part of the corporate culture for another mandated by law. This essay suggests that …

What Default Rules Teach Us About Corporations; What Understanding Corporations Teaches Us About Default Rules, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

This Article addresses corporate law's default rules, which allow corporations to waive their directors' liability for damages based on a breach of their fiduciary duty of care. Most large publicly held corporations have adopted such a waiver in their articles of association. This Article suggests that courts should limit the range of the waivers to the circumstances that existed when the voters voted and to the information they received before they voted. This Article distinguishes between public contracts (legislation) and private contracts (commercial transactions) and the default rules that apply to each. The Article shows that courts view corporations and …

The Essential Role Of Securities Regulation, Zohar Goshen, Gideon Parchomovsky

Faculty Scholarship

This Article posits that the essential role of securities regulation is to create a competitive market for sophisticated professional investors and analysts (information traders). The Article advances two related theses – one descriptive and the other normative. Descriptively, the Article demonstrates that securities regulation is specifically designed to facilitate and protect the work of information traders. Securities regulation may be divided into three broad categories: (i) disclosure duties; (ii) restrictions on fraud and manipulation; and (iii) restrictions on insider trading – each of which contributes to the creation of a vibrant market for information traders. Disclosure duties reduce information traders’ …

Clark's Treatise On Corporate Law: Filling Manning's Empty Towers, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

Almost 45 years ago, in an elegantly depressive account of the then current state of corporate law scholarship, Bayless Manning announced the death of corporation law "as a field of intellectual effort." Manning left us with an affecting image of a once grand field long past its prime, rigid with formalism and empty of content:

When American law ceased to take the "corporation" seriously, the entire body of law that had been built upon that intellectual construct slowly perforated and rotted away. We have nothing left but our great empty corporate statutes towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together …

Legal Ground Rules In Coordinated And Liberal Market Economies, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter seeks to explain the affinity between the nature of economic systems: coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs) on the one hand, and legal origin (civil vs common law systems) on the other. It starts with the simple observation that LMEs tend to be common law jurisdictions, and CMEs civil law jurisdictions. It proposes that the affinity between economic and legal system offers important insights into the foundations of different types of market economies and, in particular, differences in the scope of the state vs the powers of the individual. The main argument is that the …

From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.

Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing …