Law Commons^™

Frenemey Federalism, Scott P. Bloomberg

Faculty Publications

This article introduces the concept of Frenemy Federalism. The term “frenemy” is a portmanteau of “friend” and “enemy” that is defined as a person with whom one is friendly despite a fundamental dislike or rivalry. A frenemy relationship develops between the federal and state governments when the governments work together despite having conflicting objectives in an area of policy. In such situations, mutual incentives make cooperation between the governments conducive to achieving their respective goals, allowing what may otherwise be a contentious relationship to find stability. Amidst the growing body of federalism scholarship, I situate Frenemy Federalism as a point …

Uncooperative Environmental Federalism 2.0, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

Has the Trump Administration made good on its pledges to reinvigorate cooperative federalism and constrain environmental regulatory overreach by the federal government? Perhaps less than one would think. This paper, prepared for the Hastings Law Journal symposium, “Revolution of Evolution? Administrative Law in the Age of Trump,” provides a critical assessment of the Trump Administration’s approach to environmental federalism. Despite the Administration’s embrace of “cooperative federalism” rhetoric, environmental policy reforms have not consistently embodied a principled approach to environmental federalism in which the state and federal governments are each encouraged to focus resources on areas of comparative advantage.

Cooperation, Commandeering, Or Crowding Out? : Federal Intervention And State Choices In Health Care Policy, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) substantially alters the respective roles of the federal and state governments in health care policy. Beyond the individual mandate, the ACA presents many questions of federalism, both constitutional and policy-related. This paper, prepared for a symposium sponsored by the Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy, addresses some of these federalism issues. After outlining some of the policy considerations for determining the proper federal and state balance in health care policy, it identifies constitutional limitations on the federal government’s ability to direct or even influence state policy choices, before discussing how federal …

Reforming Our Wasteful Hazardous Waste Policy, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

Federal hazardous waste regulation and cleanup programs suffer from poor prioritization, insufficient flexibility, high costs, and questionable benefits. Many of these problems are a result of excessive regulatory centralization. With the enactment of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Comprehensive Emergency Response, Cleanup and Liability Act (CERCLA, aka "Superfund") Congress centralized environmental policy questions that are, in many respects, inherently local in nature. This produced a "mismatch" between those jurisdictions with regulatory primacy and the nature of the environmental problems at issue.

Contamination of soil and groundwater are site-specific, rarely crossing state lines. Due to the local nature …

When Is Two A Crowd: The Impact Of Federal Action On State Environmental Regulation, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

This article seeks to identify the ways in which federal actions can influence state regulatory choices in the context of environmental policy. The federal government may directly influence state policy choices by preempting state policies or by inducing state cooperation through the use of various incentives and penalties for state action. The federal government may indirectly, and perhaps unintentionally, influence state policy choices as well. Federal policies may encourage greater state regulation by reducing the costs of initiating regulatory action or by placing issues on state policy agendas. Federal regulation may also discourage or even "crowd-out" state-level regulatory action by …