Law Commons^™

Essay: I Choose, You Decide: Structural Tools For Supreme Court Legitimation, Jeremy N. Sheff

Faculty Publications

Efforts to rein in partisanship (or the perception thereof) on the Supreme Court tend to focus on reforms to the selection, appointment, or tenure of Justices. I propose a different (and perhaps complementary) reform, which would not require constitutional amendment. I propose that the selection of a case for the Court’s discretionary appellate docket should be performed by a different group of judicial officers than those who hear and decide that case. The proposal leverages the insight of the “I Cut, You Choose” procedure for ensuring fair division—only here, it manifests as “I Choose, You Decide.” This proposal, rather than …

Issue Preclusion In Complex Litigation, Edward D. Cavanagh

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

In an era of multiparty, multijurisdictional, multidistrict litigation, federal cases have grown increasingly complex. As judges struggle to manage complicated cases, a new litigation paradigm has emerged. Rather than attempting to try all cases in one action, federal judges are now breaking the litigation down into smaller pieces, using "fast tracks" or "bellwether" cases, hoping that resolution of one or two cases will lead to settlement of the rest. Inevitably, because the cases involve identical fact issues and identical defendants, the doctrine of prior adjudication comes into play. This Article identifies and analyzes significant issues that arise in the …