Law Commons^™

Horizontal Agreements: Concept And Proof, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

It is well established that, absent some very special circumstances, agreements on price or certain other terms of trade by otherwise competing entities (i.e., "horizontal agreements") are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act. In practical effect, once the fact of the horizontal agreement has been established, an adverse impact on competition is presumed, and therefore that the plaintiff is spared the burden of proving such an impact. The principal task for plaintiffs in such cases, therefore, is establishing the existence of an agreement.

In the ideal world (from plaintiffs' perspective), there would be "hard" evidence of a "formal" agreement. …

The Meaning Of "Agreement" Under The Sherman Act: Thoughts From The "Facilitating Practices" Experience, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

While the Economic Policy Office was involved in a number of interesting and important matters during the six years I was Director (1973–1979), for the most part my involvement in individual investigations and cases was vicarious, i.e., supervising, supporting, and advising the staff economists assigned to the particular matter. The one major exception – a matter in which I became personally involved in an intensive way – was the General Electric (GE)-Westinghouse price signaling matter. In what follows, I provide a brief summary of what transpired in the GE-Westinghouse matter and then trace through some of the longer term consequences …

Innovations In Antitrust Enforcement, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Each antitrust administration, both at the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, has its theme—one or a few areas of antitrust enforcement that it wants to pay particular attention to and in that way be identified with. And, as part of this emphasis, administrations often seek to innovate in some way or another, to do something different, or in a different way than previous administrations.

One factor stimulating innovation in antitrust enforcement is simply that new people with new ideas come into a new job. Sometimes those new people bring with them ideas that they had been developing …

Is The Glass Half-Empty Or Half-Full?: Reflections On The Kodak Case, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Market Power In Antitrust, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The concept of market power is at the core of antitrust. Philosophically, antitrust policy is aimed primarily at preventing firms from achieving, retaining, or abusing market power. Operationally, assessing whether a firm or firms have market power or any reasonable prospect for achieving it is often the first (and sometimes, the only) step in performing an antitrust analysis.

Few would dispute that market power should play a prominent role in antitrust analysis. Nevertheless, important questions remain. Some of these questions quite naturally focus on the precise degree of importance given to market power. Is it an essential ingredient in antitrust …

Predatory Pricing, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Anti-Trust And Economic Theory: Some Observations From The Us Experience, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Recent developments in US anti-trust can be characterised as reflecting the uneasy interaction of two quite separate phenomena: first, the increased emphasis on economic analysis as the overriding organising principle of anti-trust policy and on economic efficiency as the primary (perhaps only) relevant goal for anti-trust; second, the long-standing reluctance of the federal judiciary to involve itself in any substantive economic analysis, and the preference, instead, for simple rules of thumb or ‘pigeon holes’ to sort out lawful from unlawful conduct. The result has been that while economics has played a major role, it has not influenced American anti-trust as …

The Ftc And Pricing: Of Predation And Signaling, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This paper summarizes and comments on two recent FTC cases. The first case involved accusations of predatory pricing against Borden, the manufacturer of ReaLemon, the dominant brand of reconstituted lemon juice. The second involved price-signaling and other so-called facilitating practices by the four makers of lead-based antiknock compounds.

Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, And Antitrust Law, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Antidumping Law: Repeal It Or Revise It, John J. Barceló Iii

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.