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Articles 61 - 67 of 67
Full-Text Articles in Law
Equality Revisited, Christopher J. Peters
Equality Revisited, Christopher J. Peters
All Faculty Scholarship
In legal, political, and philosophical discourse, and indeed in everyday life, equality often plays the role of a normatively significant prescriptive principle, a principle that provides reasons for action. Professor Peters, however, joins Peter Westen and others who argue that the traditional statement of prescriptive equality-equals are entitled to equal treatment--is normatively empty because it is a tautology. Like Professor Westen, Professor Peters notes that this traditional principle translates into a statement of simple redundancy: people entitled to equal treatment are entitled to equal treatment. Unlike Professor Westen, however, Professor Peters discerns a nontautological principle of equality, which claims that …
Ideas Of The Marketplace: A Guide To The 1996 Telecommunications Act,, Michael I. Meyerson
Ideas Of The Marketplace: A Guide To The 1996 Telecommunications Act,, Michael I. Meyerson
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 represented an enormous experimental step towards deregulating the telecommunications marketplace while opening it up to competition. With an eye towards breaking up the telecommunications monopolies held by local telephone service providers, the Act created regulations that forced local carriers to share their market and their resources with other telecommunications providers. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 itself is extremely complex. This article is a "guided tour" through the major provisions of the Act.
The first step in understanding the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to understand how the telecommunications industry operates. Part two of this article …
Creating Competition Policy For Transition Economies: Introduction, Robert H. Lande
Creating Competition Policy For Transition Economies: Introduction, Robert H. Lande
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This is an introduction to a symposium on Creating Competition for Transition Economies. This article provides an overview of the topic, and also briefly introduces the authors of the articles in the symposium; William Kovacic, Eleanor Fox, Spencer Weber Waller, Malcolm Coate, and Armando Rodriguez.
Black And White Thinking In The Gray Areas Of Antitrust: The Dismantling Of Vertical Restraints Regulation, Barbara Ann White
Black And White Thinking In The Gray Areas Of Antitrust: The Dismantling Of Vertical Restraints Regulation, Barbara Ann White
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In this Article I present a two-pronged analysis of vertical restraints, one in law and one in economics. By tracing the checkered legal history of vertical restraints, I show the marked changes recent antitrust decisions have wrought, in particular, by comparing the legal standards expressed by the Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. with those in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp and Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) v. USA Petroleum Co. If through the latter two cases the Court has, for all practical purposes, created a category of per se legality for vertical price restraints, which …
The Rise And (Coming) Fall Of Efficiency As The Ruler Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande
The Rise And (Coming) Fall Of Efficiency As The Ruler Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande
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The debate over the legitimate goals of antitrust is ceaseless and its practical resolution influenced by politics. The answer often given in the past, and particularly during the Warren Court era when a heavy emphasis was placed on social and political factors, contrasts sharply with the consensus view during the Reagan Administration that only economic efficiency counts. Since antitrust moves in cycles, a natural question arises—will antitrust continue to stand upon a foundation of efficiency, return to the old social and political perspective, or embrace some third view of its proper direction?
Reducing Unions' Monopoly Power: Costs And Benefits, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
Reducing Unions' Monopoly Power: Costs And Benefits, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
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There is a fundamental conflict between labor law and antitrust law. The antitrust laws reflect the powerful idea that competition should usually dictate the way our economy is organized, to the benefit of the economy as a whole, including workers. But the labor exemption to the antitrust laws suggests a different policy: workers should have the right to eliminate competition for wages, hours, and working conditions.
Wealth Transfers As The Original And Primary Concern Of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, Robert H. Lande
Wealth Transfers As The Original And Primary Concern Of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, Robert H. Lande
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Chicago School antitrust policy rests upon the premise that the sole purpose of antitrust is to promote economic efficiency. This article shows that this foundation is flawed. The fundamental purpose of antitrust is to protect consumers. To protect purchasers from paying supracompetitive prices when they buy goods or services. This is the "wealth transfer," "theft", "consumer welfare" or "purchaser protection" explanation for antitrust.
The article shows that the efficiency view originated in a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Sherman Act undertaken by Robert Bork. Bork purported to show that Congress only cared about enhancing economic efficiency.
To …