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William & Mary Law School

Legislative Power

2006

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

How To Survive A Terrorist Attack: The Constitution's Majority Quorum Requirement And The Continuity Of Congress, John Bryan Williams Dec 2006

How To Survive A Terrorist Attack: The Constitution's Majority Quorum Requirement And The Continuity Of Congress, John Bryan Williams

William & Mary Law Review

Since their realization that United Airlines Flight 93 was headed toward the U.S. Capitol on the morning of September 11, 2001, legislators and policymakers have been debating how the legislative branch would continue functioning in the aftermath of a terrorist attack that killed or incapacitated large numbers of sehators or representatives. This Article reviews the current House and Senate "Continuity of Congress"plans, and argues they are both practically and constitutionally inadequate. Focusing particularly on the Constitution's majority quorum requirement in Article I, Section Five, Clause One, this Article argues that a House or Senate operating in accordance with the current …


Conflicting Commerce Clauses: How Raich And American Trucking Dishonor Their Doctrines, John W. Moorman Dec 2006

Conflicting Commerce Clauses: How Raich And American Trucking Dishonor Their Doctrines, John W. Moorman

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.


Democratizing The Administrative State, Richard J. Pierce Jr. Nov 2006

Democratizing The Administrative State, Richard J. Pierce Jr.

William & Mary Law Review

Scholars have long questioned the political and constitutional legitimacy of the administrative state. By 1980, a majority of Supreme Court Justices seemed poised to hold that large portions of the administrative state are unconstitutional. In 1984, the Court retreated from that abyss and took a major step toward legitimating and democratizing the administrative state. It instructed lower courts to defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute, basing this doctrine of deference on the superior political accountability of agencies. Henceforth, politically unaccountable judges were prohibited from substituting their policy preferences for those of politically accountable agencies. The …