Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 30 of 99

Full-Text Articles in Law

Recovering The Lost General Welfare Clause, David S. Schwartz Feb 2022

Recovering The Lost General Welfare Clause, David S. Schwartz

William & Mary Law Review

The General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution enumerates a power to “provide for the common defense and general welfare.” A literal interpretation of this clause (“the general welfare interpretation”) would authorize Congress to legislate for any national purpose, and therefore to address all national problems— for example, the COVID-19 pandemic—in ways that would be precluded under the prevailing understanding of limited enumerated powers. But conventional doctrine rejects the general welfare interpretation and construes the General Welfare Clause to confer the so-called “Spending Power,” a power only to spend, but not to regulate, for …


Congress, The Courts, And Party Polarization: Why Congress Rarely Checks The President And Why The Courts Should Not Take Congress’S Place, Neal Devins Jan 2018

Congress, The Courts, And Party Polarization: Why Congress Rarely Checks The President And Why The Courts Should Not Take Congress’S Place, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Standing, Politics, And Exhaustion: A Response To Legislative Exhaustion, Heather Elliott Apr 2017

Standing, Politics, And Exhaustion: A Response To Legislative Exhaustion, Heather Elliott

William & Mary Law Review Online

Professor Michael Sant’Ambrogio’s article, Legislative Exhaustion, usefully approaches the problem of “legislative standing” by abandoning the typical Article III standing analysis and making instead a separation-of-powers argument. His theory—that Congress may sue the President only when it has no legislative avenue for addressing its problems—provides both a workable account of and a limiting principle for suits by the legislative branch against the executive. His analysis, however, raises questions regarding the effect of legislative lawsuits on the constitutional balance of powers. This Essay suggests that these questions should be more fully explored before Professor Sant’Ambrogio’s approach can be adopted. It concludes …


Preemption As A Consistency Doctrine, Jesse Merriam Mar 2017

Preemption As A Consistency Doctrine, Jesse Merriam

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.


When States’ Legislation And Constitutions Collide With Angry Locals: Shale Oil And Gas Development And Its Many Masters, Heidi Gorovitz Robertson Nov 2016

When States’ Legislation And Constitutions Collide With Angry Locals: Shale Oil And Gas Development And Its Many Masters, Heidi Gorovitz Robertson

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

This Article explores the nationally common problem of tension and conflict among state oil and gas statutes, constitutional home rule, and local control by considering intersections and tensions among the Ohio Constitution’s home rule authority, the Ohio oil and gas law’s preemption provision, and the many regulatory efforts of Ohio’s local governments. It explores the scope of the Ohio Constitution’s home rule authority, in part, by evaluating courts’ statements on the validity of several types of local ordinances, as they confront home rule and a legislative attempt at preemption. Types of local ordinances evaluated include those that prohibit or ban …


Unstable Footing: Shelby County’S Misapplication Of The Equal Footing Doctrine, Austin Graham Oct 2014

Unstable Footing: Shelby County’S Misapplication Of The Equal Footing Doctrine, Austin Graham

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.


Congress's Treaty-Implementing Power In Historical Practice, Jean Galbraith Oct 2014

Congress's Treaty-Implementing Power In Historical Practice, Jean Galbraith

William & Mary Law Review

Historical practice strongly influences constitutional interpretation in foreign relations law, including most questions relating to the treaty power. Yet it is strikingly absent from the present debate over whether Congress can pass legislation implementing U.S. treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Drawing on previously unexplored sources, this Article considers the historical roots of Congress’s power to implement U.S. treaties between the Founding Era and the seminal case of Missouri v. Holland in 1920. It shows that time after time, members of Congress understood the Necessary and Proper Clause to provide a constitutional basis for a congressional power to implement …


Shelby County And The Illusion Of Minimalism, Richard L. Hasen Mar 2014

Shelby County And The Illusion Of Minimalism, Richard L. Hasen

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.


The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Leigh Grove May 2013

The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Leigh Grove

Faculty Publications

Scholars have long treated the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. This Article argues that scholars have overlooked an important function of the Clause. Congress has repeatedly used its broad “exceptions power” to facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. Drawing on insights from social science, this Article asserts that Congress has an incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to promote the Court’s role in settling disputed federal questions. Notably, this argument has considerable historical support. When the …


The Twin Aims Of Erie, Michael S. Green Apr 2013

The Twin Aims Of Erie, Michael S. Green

Faculty Publications

We all remember the twin aims of the Erie rule from first-year civil procedure. A federal court sitting in diversity must use forum state law if it is necessary to avoid 'forum shopping" and the "inequitable administration of the laws." This Article offers a reading of the twin aims and a systematic analysis of their proper role in federal and state court. I argue that the twin aims apply in diversity cases not because they protect state interests, but because they serve the federal purposes standing behind the diversity statute. So understood, they are about separation of powers, not federalism. …


Congressional Silence And The Statutory Interpretation Game, Paul Stancil Mar 2013

Congressional Silence And The Statutory Interpretation Game, Paul Stancil

William & Mary Law Review

This Article explores the circumstances under which the federal legislative apparatus may be unable to respond to a politically objectionable statutory interpretation from the Supreme Court. The Article builds upon existing economic models of statutory interpretation, incorporating transaction costs into the analysis for the first time. The Article concludes by identifying recent real-world disputes in which transaction costs likely constrained Congress and the President from overriding the Court.


Can Erie Survive As Federal Common Law?, Craig Green Feb 2013

Can Erie Survive As Federal Common Law?, Craig Green

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


General Law In Federal Court, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark Feb 2013

General Law In Federal Court, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


A General Theory Of Governance: Due Process And Lawmaking Power, Louise Weinberg Feb 2013

A General Theory Of Governance: Due Process And Lawmaking Power, Louise Weinberg

William & Mary Law Review

This Article proposes a general theory describing the nature and sources of law in American courts. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins is rejected for this purpose. Better, more general theory is available, flowing from the Due Process Clauses. At its narrowest, the proposed theory is consonant with Erie but generalizes it, embracing federal as well as state law and statutory as well as decisional law in both state and federal courts. More broadly, beyond this unification of systemic thinking, the interest-analytic methodology characteristic of due process extends to a range of substantive constitutional problems. These include problems concerning both the …


An Unusual Separation Of Power Episode: Samantar V. Yousuf And The Need For The Executive Branch To Assert Control Over Foreign Official Sovereign Immunity Determinations, Laura Manns Mar 2012

An Unusual Separation Of Power Episode: Samantar V. Yousuf And The Need For The Executive Branch To Assert Control Over Foreign Official Sovereign Immunity Determinations, Laura Manns

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.


Federalism Under Obama, Gillian E. Metzger Nov 2011

Federalism Under Obama, Gillian E. Metzger

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process Of Administrative Lawmaking, Evan J. Criddle Oct 2011

When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process Of Administrative Lawmaking, Evan J. Criddle

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Legislating Preemption, Jamelle C. Sharpe Oct 2011

Legislating Preemption, Jamelle C. Sharpe

William & Mary Law Review

Federal preemption is perhaps the most important public law issueof the day. The stakes in preemption cases are enormous, as preemption determines whether the federal government or the statescontrol regulatory policy in a host of politically controversial contexts. Congress clearly has primary constitutional authority insetting federal preemption policy, but, for numerous political and practical reasons, cannot be solely responsible for its implementation.Determining which organ of the federal government is best at implementing preemption policy has therefore become the central preoccupation of the academic literature. While this comparative institutional analysis is certainly important in allocating preemptionpolicy-making business, it has elided a …


Executive Branch Czars, Who Are They? Are They Needed? Can Congress Do Anything About Them?, Jonathan D. Puvak May 2011

Executive Branch Czars, Who Are They? Are They Needed? Can Congress Do Anything About Them?, Jonathan D. Puvak

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.


Federal Law In State Court: Judicial Federalism Through A Relational Lens, Charlton C. Copeland Mar 2011

Federal Law In State Court: Judicial Federalism Through A Relational Lens, Charlton C. Copeland

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Enforcing federalism is most commonly thought to involve the search for a
constitutional delegation of substantive power. Although in modern times the substantive power might be overlapping or shared authority, federalism enforcement proceeds from a determination about the site of substantive power. This conception of federalism enforcement preserves the Constitution’s commitment to fractionated authority by determining whether power is legitimately possessed. Thus we understand significant federalism disputes in our age as framed by whether Congress has the authority to enact comprehensive health care reform legislation, or whether Congress
has exceeded its authority in reenacting the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance requirements. …


Erisa Preemption Doctrine As Health Policy, Joshua P. Booth, Larry I. Palmer Oct 2010

Erisa Preemption Doctrine As Health Policy, Joshua P. Booth, Larry I. Palmer

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Burying The “Continuing Body” Theory Of The Senate, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl Jul 2010

Burying The “Continuing Body” Theory Of The Senate, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Faculty Publications

In the U.S. Senate, only one-third of the members stand for election every two years; the rest carry over from one congressional term to the next. In this regard the Senate differs from the House of Representatives, where all members stand for election every two-year cycle. That much is familiar, but what legal consequences flow from this structural difference? According to some legislators, courts, and commentators, this difference is very important in that it makes the Senate, but not the House, a "continuing body." The continuing-body idea is invoked to defend highly controversial aspects of Senate practice. By far the …


No Ambiguity Left Behind: A Discussion Of The Clear Statement Rule And The Unfunded Mandates Clause Of No Child Left Behind, Andrew G. Caffrey May 2010

No Ambiguity Left Behind: A Discussion Of The Clear Statement Rule And The Unfunded Mandates Clause Of No Child Left Behind, Andrew G. Caffrey

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.


"Relative Checks": Towards Optimal Control Of Administrative Power, David S. Rubenstein May 2010

"Relative Checks": Towards Optimal Control Of Administrative Power, David S. Rubenstein

William & Mary Law Review

Administrative agencies wield a necessary but dangerous power. Some control of that power is constitutionally required and normatively justified. Yet widely discordant views persist concerning the appropriate means of control. Scholars have proposed competing administrative control models that variably place the judiciary, the President, and Congress at the helm. Although these models offer critical insights into the institutional competencies of the respective branches, they tend to understate the limitations of those branches to check administrative power and ultimately marginalize the public interest costs occasioned by second-guessing administrative choice. The “relative checks” paradigm introduced here seeks to improve upon existing models …


The Vote From Beyond The Grave, Krysta R. Edwards Mar 2010

The Vote From Beyond The Grave, Krysta R. Edwards

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


Who Should Regulate? Federalism And Conflict In Regulation Of Green Buildings, Shari Shapiro Oct 2009

Who Should Regulate? Federalism And Conflict In Regulation Of Green Buildings, Shari Shapiro

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

No abstract provided.


Tort Experiments In The Laboratories Of Democracy, Alexandra B. Klass Apr 2009

Tort Experiments In The Laboratories Of Democracy, Alexandra B. Klass

William & Mary Law Review

This Article considers the broad range of "tort experiments" states have undertaken in recent years, as well as the changing attitudes of Congress and the Supreme Court toward state tort law. Notably, while states have limited tort rights and remedies in the products liability and personal injury areas in recent years, they have at the same time increased tort rights and remedies to address new societal problems associated with privacy, publicity, consumer protection, and environmental harm. At the same time, however, Congress has eliminated state tort law entirely in targeted areas without replacing it with corresponding federal remedies. The Supreme …


Presidential Unilateralism And Political Polarization: Why Today's Congress Lacks The Will And The Way To Stop Presidential Initiatives, Neal Devins Apr 2009

Presidential Unilateralism And Political Polarization: Why Today's Congress Lacks The Will And The Way To Stop Presidential Initiatives, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Interpreting The Fourteenth Amendment: Two Don'ts And Three Dos, Garrett Epps Dec 2007

Interpreting The Fourteenth Amendment: Two Don'ts And Three Dos, Garrett Epps

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

A sophisticated reading of the legislative record of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment can provide courts and scholars with some general interpretive principles to guide their application of the Amendment to current legal problems. The author argues that two common legal conceptions about the Amendment are, in fact, misconceptions. The first is that the Amendment was chiefly concerned with the immediate situation of freed slaves in the former slave states. Instead, he argues, the legislative record suggests that the framers were broadly concerned with the rights not only of freed slaves but also of foreign-born immigrants in the North …


Congress Has The Power To Enforce The Bill Of Rigths Against The Federal Government; Therefore Fisa Is Constitutional And The President's Terrorist Surveillance Program Is Illegal, Wilson R. Huhn Dec 2007

Congress Has The Power To Enforce The Bill Of Rigths Against The Federal Government; Therefore Fisa Is Constitutional And The President's Terrorist Surveillance Program Is Illegal, Wilson R. Huhn

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The principal point of this Article is that Congress has plenary authority to enforce the Bill of Rights against the federal government. Although this precept is a fundamental one, neither the Supreme Court nor legal scholars have articulated this point in clear, simple, and direct terms. The Supreme Court does not have a monopoly on the Bill of Rights. Congress, too, has constitutional authority to interpret our rights and to enforce or enlarge them as against the actions of the federal government. Congress exercised its power to protect the constitutional rights of American citizens when it enacted the Foreign Intelligence …