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Full-Text Articles in Law
Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting In Democratic Politics, Eric A. Posner, E. Glen Weyl
Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting In Democratic Politics, Eric A. Posner, E. Glen Weyl
Vanderbilt Law Review
Conventional democratic institutions aggregate preferences poorly. The norm of one-person-one-vote with majority rule treats people fairly by giving everyone an equal chance to influence outcomes but fails to give proportional weight to people whose interests in a social outcome are stronger than those of other people. This problem leads to the familiar phenomenon of tyranny of the majority. Various institutions that have been tried or proposed over the years to correct this problem-including supermajority rule, weighted voting, cumulative voting, "mixed constitutions," executive discretion, and judicially protected rights-all badly misfire in various ways, for example, by creating gridlock or corruption. This …
On Legal Interpretations Of The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Paul H. Edelman
On Legal Interpretations Of The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Paul H. Edelman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
There has been a spate of interest in the application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to issues in the law. This theorem holds that a majority vote among a suitably large body of voters, all of whom are more likely than not to vote correctly, will almost surely result in the correct outcome. Its uses have ranged from estimating the correct size of juries to justifying the voting of creditors in Chapter 11 reorganizations. While the mathematics is unassailable, the legal interpretation of the conclusion is dependent on the model of probability one uses when invoking the assumption that the …