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Articles 31 - 36 of 36

Full-Text Articles in Law

Déjà-Vu All Over Again- Elliott's Critique Of Eyewitness Experts, Saul M. Kassin, Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Vicki L. Smith Jan 1994

Déjà-Vu All Over Again- Elliott's Critique Of Eyewitness Experts, Saul M. Kassin, Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Vicki L. Smith

Articles

Echoing McCloskey and Egeth (1983), and motivated by Kassin, Ellsworth, and Smith's (1989) survey of 63 eyewitness experts, Elliott (1993) recently attacked the use of psychological experts on eyewitness testimony. There are two principal shortcomings of this critique. First, it misrepresents the eyewitness literature and the experts who use it. Second, it merely parrots complaints of the past. The same old arguments are made about the lack of sufficient research evidence, the standards by which experts should conduct their affairs, and the impact of it all on the jury. Perhaps the field needs periodic prodding and consciousness-raising on this issue, …


Section 338 And Its Foolish Consistency Rules - The Hobgoblin Of Little Minds, Douglas A. Kahn Jan 1994

Section 338 And Its Foolish Consistency Rules - The Hobgoblin Of Little Minds, Douglas A. Kahn

Articles

The purposes of this Article are to examine whether there is any longer a reason for concern because a target corporation can choose selected assets for nonrecognition and to what extent the 1994 regulations properly deal with potentially abusive circumventions of tax goals. Before examining the current status of the consistency requirements, the historical background that led to the adoption of Section 338 and the operation of the section is discussed. The historical background includes: the judicially created Kimbell-Diamond rule, the codification and modification of that rule by the old version of Section 334(b)(2), the operation of the old version …


Democratic Credentials, Donald J. Herzog Jan 1994

Democratic Credentials, Donald J. Herzog

Articles

We've made a mistake, urges Bruce Ackerman. We've failed to notice, or have forgotten, that ours is a dualist democracy: ordinary representatives passing their statutes are in fact the democratic inferiors of We the People, who at rare junctures appear on the scene and affirm new constitutional principles. (Actually, he claims in passing that we have a three-track democracy.)' Dwelling lovingly on dualism, Ackerman doesn't quite forget to discuss democracy, but he comes close. I want to raise some questions about the democratic credentials of Ackerman's view. Not, perhaps, the ones he anticipates. So I don't mean to argue that …


'I Can Take A Hint': Social Ineptitude, Embarrassment, And The King Of Comedy, William I. Miller Jan 1994

'I Can Take A Hint': Social Ineptitude, Embarrassment, And The King Of Comedy, William I. Miller

Articles

The phrase "I can take a hint," when said seriously, contains its own denial. It reveals that the speaker has not been very adept at recognizing the hints already given, nor very graceful about not making a scene once he has recognized them. Its very utterance has the effect of punishing the hint-giver by making her hint fail as a hint. The truly successful hint works by gaining its end with no extra awkwardness added to the social encounter. The good hint should be barely perceived by the person toward whom it is directed. We could even say that it …


A Reaffirmation: The Authenticity Of The Roberts Memorandum, Or Felix The Non-Forger (Justices Felix Frankfurter And Owen J. Roberts), Richard D. Friedman Jan 1994

A Reaffirmation: The Authenticity Of The Roberts Memorandum, Or Felix The Non-Forger (Justices Felix Frankfurter And Owen J. Roberts), Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In the December 1955 issue of this Law Review, Justice Felix Frankfurter published a tribute to his late friend and colleague, Owen J. Roberts.' The tribute centered on what Frankfurter claimed was the text of a memorandum that Roberts wrote in 1945 to explain his conduct in the critical minimum wage cases of 1936 and 1937, Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo2 and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.' Scholars have often challenged the adequacy of Roberts's account of why he cast decisive votes for the conservatives in Tipaldo and for the liberals in West Coast Hotel.4 Until recently, …


Solving The Judgment-Proof Problem, Kyle D. Logue Jan 1994

Solving The Judgment-Proof Problem, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

A tortfeasor who cannot fully pay for the harms that it causes is said to be "judgment proof." Commentators have long recognized that the existence of judgment-proof tortfeasors seriously undermines the deterrence and insurance goals of tort law. The deterrence goal is undermined because, irrespective of the liability rule, judgment-proof tortfeasors will not fully internalize the costs of the accidents they cause. The insurance goal will be undermined to the extent that the judgment-proof tortfeasor will not be able to compensate fully its victims and that first-party insurance markets do not provide an adequate response. Liability insurance can ameliorate these …