Law Commons^™

Taking Justification Seriously: Proportionality, Strict Scrutiny, And The Substance Of Religious Liberty, Stephanie H. Barclay, Justin Collings

Journal Articles

Last term, five Justices on the Supreme Court flirted with the possibility of revisiting the Court’s First Amendment test for when governments must provide an exemption to a religious objector. But Justice Barrett raised an obvious, yet all-important question: If the received test were to be revised, what new test should take its place? The competing interests behind this question have be-come even more acute in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. In a moment rife with lofty rhetoric about religious liberty but riven by fierce debates about what it means in practice, this Article revisits a fundamental question common to …

Moral Truth And Constitutional Conservatism, Gerard V. Bradley

Journal Articles

Conservative constitutionalism is committed to "originalism," that is, to interpreting the Constitution according to its original public understanding. This defining commitment of constitutional interpretation is sound. For decades, however, constitutional conservatives have diluted it with a methodology of restraint, a normative approach to the judicial task marked by an overriding aversion to critical moral reasoning. In any event, the methodology eclipsed originalism and the partnership with moral truth that originalism actually entails. Conservative constitutionalism is presently a melange of mostly unsound arguments against the worst depredations of Casey's Mystery Passage.

The reason for the methodological moral reticence is easy to …

Wait, Who Are We Talking About Here? Searching For A Consistent Approach To Applying Rfra To Corporations, Steven J. Harrison

Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy

There is perhaps no idea in contemporary American law that is more publicly contentious than that of “corporate personhood.” Of all of the Supreme Court cases dealing with corporations and the corporate entity, few probably thought that a decision could surpass Citizens United in public controversy and divisiveness produced by the decision, which brought the legal fiction of the “corporate person” to the forefront of popular debate and discussion. Then came Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., which not only addressed whether corporations could “act” in a manner that seemed only a possibility for “real” or “natural” persons, which recalled …

The Equivalence Of Religion And Conscience, Lucien J. Dhooge

Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy

This Article examines issues posed by the equation of religious liberty with secular conscience, utilizing federal law and the law in those states which have adopted religious freedom restoration acts (RFRAs). The Article initially addresses the definition of religion through an examination of applicable literature and federal and state case law. The same approach is utilized to define conscience. The Article then examines similarities between the two concepts and the implications of their equivalence. The Article concludes that religion and conscience are moral equivalents that require equal legal treatment. However, equal treatment should proceed with caution in order to address …

If Religious Liberty Does Not Mean Exemptions, What Might It Mean? The Founders’ Constitutionalism Of The Inalienable Rights Of Religious Liberty, Vincent Phillip Munoz

Notre Dame Law Review

The Article is divided into three Parts. Part I documents the Founders’ shared understanding that religious liberty is a natural right possessed by all individuals. Part II explains what the Founders meant when they labeled aspects of religious liberty an “unalienable” natural right. The inalienable character of the core of religious liberty reveals what the Founders found special about religion. It also accounts for religion’s special constitutional status, which for the Founders primarily meant specific jurisdictional limits on state sovereignty rather than exemptions. Part III further clarifies the Founders’ constitutionalism of religious freedom by explaining how the Founders understood natural …

Of Human Dignities, Mark L. Movsesian

Notre Dame Law Review

I proceed as follows. In Part I, I discuss the conflict between objective and subjective conceptions of human dignity, particularly in the context of same-sex marriage and “traditional values” resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council. In Part II, I discuss the conflict between individualist and corporate conceptions, focusing on proselytism and the right to convert. In Part III, I conclude with some observations on the implications of the disagreements I have identified.

The Unconscionable War On Moral Conscience, Michael Stokes Paulsen

Notre Dame Law Review

My thesis in this review builds on and is inspired in part by George’s book: Where, or to the extent that, a conflict between conscience and authority reduces to a pure stand on principle by each side—sincere conscience for its sake versus authority for its—in a free society conscience should almost always win. The only time that claims of government authority should triumph over genuine claims of religious conscience is when religiously motivated conduct would produce essentially intolerable harm to others—harm of a kind and degree that would lead one to conclude (in effect, not literally) that it is inconceivable …

Religious Accommodations And – And Among – Civil Rights: Separation, Toleration, And Accommodation, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

This paper expands on a presentation at a recent conference, held at Harvard Law School, on the topic of “Religious Accommodations in the Age of Civil Rights.” In it, I emphasize that the right to religious freedom is a basic civil right, the increased appreciation of which is said to characterize our “age.” Accordingly, I push back against scholars’ and commentators’ increasing tendency to regard and present religious accommodations and exemptions as obstacles to the civil-rights enterprise and ask instead if our religious-accommodation practices are all that they should be. Are accommodations and exemptions being extended prudently but generously, in …

'The Freedom Of The Church': (Towards) An Exposition, Translation, And Defense, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

This Article was presented at a conference, and is part of a symposium, on the topic of "Freedom of the Church in the Modern Era." In addition to summarizing and re-stating claims made by the author in earlier work – claims having to do with, among other things, church-state separation, the no-establishment rule, legal and social pluralism, and the structural role played by religious and other institutions – the Article attempts to strengthen the argument that the idea of “the freedom of the church” (or something like it) is not a relic or anachronism but instead remains a crucial component …

Religious Liberties: The International Religious Freedom Act, Richard W. Garnett, Thomas F. Farr, T. Jeremy Gunn, William L. Saunders

Journal Articles

MR. SAUNDERS: Welcome to this panel, put on by the Religious Liberties Practice Group. Any of you who would like to join that Practice Group, you are cordially invited to do so. Welcome to the Federalist Society Annual Convention. My name is Bill Saunders. I am a Senior Fellow at the Family Research Council, and I am the Chairman of the Religious Liberties Practice Group at the Federalist Society.

Our aim today is: to talk about religious freedom, to talk about whether it should be an aspect of U.S. foreign policy, how best to make it so if you believe …

Judicial Enforcement Of The Establishment Clause, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

This paper is the author’s contribution to a roundtable conference, held in October of 2008 at Notre Dame Law School, devoted to Prof. Kent Greenawalt’s book, Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and Fairness. It is suggested that Greenawalt’s admirably context-sensitive approach to church-and-state questions might lead us to think that the best course for judges is to find (somehow) some bright-line, on-off “rules” and “tests”, constructed to identify and forbid the most obvious violations of the Religion Clause’s core (whatever that is), and to give up on -- or, perhaps, “underenforce” -- the rest.

Religion And State: Some Main Issues And Sources, John M. Finnis

Journal Articles

Public reason's default position is not atheism or agnosticism about the dependence of everything on a transcendent Creator. On the contrary, there is good reason to judge that there is such a transcendent cause, capable of communicating with intelligent creatures, that one of the world's religions may be essentially true and others substantially truer than atheism, and that there is a human or natural right to immunity from coercion in religious inquiry, belief (or unbelief, precisely as such), and practice so far as is compatible with public order, that is with the rights of others, public peace and public morality. …