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Articles 91 - 108 of 108
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Timing, Intensity, And Composition Of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis Of Structural Policy Windows In The States, John M. De Figueiredo
The Timing, Intensity, And Composition Of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis Of Structural Policy Windows In The States, John M. De Figueiredo
Faculty Scholarship
This is the first paper to statistically examine the timing of interest group lobbying. It introduces a theoretical framework based on recurring “structural policy windows” and argues that these types of windows should have a large effect on the intensity and timing of interest group activity. Using a new database of all lobbying expenditures in the U.S. states ranging up to 25 years, the paper shows interest group lobbying increases substantially during one of these structural windows in particular--the budgeting process. Spikes in lobbying during budgeting are driven primarily by business groups. Moreover, even groups relatively unaffected by budgets lobby …
Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis And The Pricing Of Fear And Anxiety, Matthew D. Adler
Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis And The Pricing Of Fear And Anxiety, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis And The Pricing Of Fear And Anxiety, Matthew D. Adler
Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis And The Pricing Of Fear And Anxiety, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
Risk assessment is now a common feature of regulatory practice, but fear assessment is not. In particular, environmental, health and safety agencies such as EPA, FDA, OSHA, NHTSA, and CPSC, commonly count death, illness and injury as costs for purposes of cost-benefit analysis, but almost never incorporate fear, anxiety or other welfare-reducing mental states into the analysis. This is puzzling, since fear and anxiety are welfare setbacks, and since the very hazards regulated by these agencies - air or water pollutants, toxic waste dumps, food additives and contaminants, workplace toxins and safety threats, automobiles, dangerous consumer products, radiation, and so …
Introduction To, Preferences And Rational Choice: New Perspectives And Legal Implications, Matthew D. Adler, Claire Finkelstein, Peter Huang
Introduction To, Preferences And Rational Choice: New Perspectives And Legal Implications, Matthew D. Adler, Claire Finkelstein, Peter Huang
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Puzzle Of Ex Ante Efficiency: Does Rational Approvability Have Moral Weight?, Matthew D. Adler
The Puzzle Of Ex Ante Efficiency: Does Rational Approvability Have Moral Weight?, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
A governmental decision is "ex ante efficient" if it maximizes the satisfaction of everyone's preferences ex ante, relative to other possible decisions. Equivalently, each affected person would be rational to approve the decision, given her preferences and beliefs at the time of the choice. Does this matter, morally speaking? Do governmental officials - legislators, judges, regulators - have a moral reason to make decisions that are ex ante efficient? The economist's answer is "yes." "Ex ante efficiency" is widely seen by welfare economists to have moral significance, and often appears within law-and-economics scholarship as a criterion for evaluating legal doctrines. …
Income Distribution Dynamics With Endogenous Fertility, Daniel L. Chen, Michael Kremer
Income Distribution Dynamics With Endogenous Fertility, Daniel L. Chen, Michael Kremer
Faculty Scholarship
Developing countries with highly unequal income distributions, such as Brazil or South Africa, face an uphill battle in reducing inequality. Educated workers in these countries have a much lower birth rate than uneducated workers. Assuming children of educated workers are more likely to become educated, this fertility differential increaases the proportion of unskilled workers, reducing their wages, and thus their opportunity cost of having children, creating a vicious cycle. A model incorporating this effect generates multiple stedy-state levels of inequality, suggesting that in some circumstances, temporarily increasing access to educational opportunities could permanently reduce inequality. Empirical evidence suggests that the …
The Positive Political Theory Of Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Comment On Johnston, Matthew D. Adler
The Positive Political Theory Of Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Comment On Johnston, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Lobbying And Information In Politics, John M. De Figueiredo
Lobbying And Information In Politics, John M. De Figueiredo
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Sovereign Bonds And The Collective Will, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati
Sovereign Bonds And The Collective Will, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Risk, Death And Time: A Comment On Judge Williams’ Defense Of Cost-Benefit Analysis, Matthew D. Adler
Risk, Death And Time: A Comment On Judge Williams’ Defense Of Cost-Benefit Analysis, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Introduction, To Cost-Benefit Analysis, Matthew D. Adler, Eric A. Posner
Introduction, To Cost-Benefit Analysis, Matthew D. Adler, Eric A. Posner
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Cruel, Mean, Or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination And Digital Intellectual Property, James Boyle
Cruel, Mean, Or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination And Digital Intellectual Property, James Boyle
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Beyond Efficiency And Procedure: A Welfarist Theory Of Regulation, Matthew D. Adler
Beyond Efficiency And Procedure: A Welfarist Theory Of Regulation, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
Normative scholarship about regulation has been dominated by two types of theories, which I term "Neoclassical" and "Proceduralist." A Neoclassical theory has the following features: it adopts a simple preference-based view of well-being, and it counts Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as one of the basic normative criteria relevant to the evaluation of regulatory programs. A Proceduralist theory is concerned, not solely with the quality of regulatory outcomes, but also with the governmental procedures that produce these outcomes: it gives intrinsic significance to the procedures that regulatory bodies follow. (One example of a Proceduralist theory is the civic republican theory of regulation advanced …
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, Matthew D. Adler, Eric A. Posner
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, Matthew D. Adler, Eric A. Posner
Faculty Scholarship
Cost-benefit analysis is routinely used by government agencies in order to evaluate projects, but it remains controversial among academics. This paper argues that cost-benefit analysis is best understood as a welfarist decision procedure and that use of cost-benefit analysis is more likely to maximize overall well-being than is use of alternative decision-procedures. The paper focuses on the problem of distorted preference. A person's preferences are distorted when his or her satisfaction does not enhance that person's well-being. Preferences typically thought to be distorted in this sense include disinterested preferences, uninformed preferences, adaptive preferences, and objectively bad preferences; further, preferences may …
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, Matthew D. Adler, Eric A. Posner
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, Matthew D. Adler, Eric A. Posner
Faculty Scholarship
This paper analyzes cost-benefit analysis from legal, economic, and philosophical perspectives. The traditional defense of cost-benefit analysis is that it maximizes a social welfare function that aggregates unweighted and unrestricted preferences. We follow many economists and philosophers who conclude that this defense is not persuasive. Cost-benefit analysis unavoidably depends on controversial distributive judgments; and the view that the government should maximize the satisfaction of unrestricted preferences is not plausible. However, we disagree with critics who argue that cost-benefit analysis produces morally irrelevant evaluations of projects and should be abandoned. On the contrary, cost-benefit analysis, suitably constrained, is consistent with a …
Book Review, Matthew D. Adler
Book Review, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
Reviewing, Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason (Ruth Chang ed., 1997)
Law And Incommensurability: Introduction, Matthew D. Adler
Law And Incommensurability: Introduction, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Incommensurability And Cost-Benefit Analysis, Matthew D. Adler
Incommensurability And Cost-Benefit Analysis, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.