Law Commons^™

The Constitution Outside The Courts, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In this Book Review, Professor Fleming examines Professor Tushnet's arguments against judicial supremacy and in support of making constitutional interpretation less court-centered to pursue a populist constitutional law. The review concedes that Professor Tushnet's arguments that the “thick Constitution”--in particular, its commitments to federalism, states' rights, and separation of powers--is self-enforcing through the political processes are compelling. But it contends that he fails to make the case that the “thin Constitution”--for example, its fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of expression, and liberty-- should be treated as similarly self-enforcing. Furthermore, Professor Fleming charges that Professor Tushnet does not adequately elaborate how …

The Canon And The Constitution Outside The Courts, Sotirios Barber, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

What would it mean for "the canon of constitutional law" if we were to take seriously "the Constitution outside the courts"? What would happen to the canon if we were to distinguish (as Cass Sunstein and Larry Sager do) between the partial, judicially enforceable Constitution and the Constitution that imposes higher obligations upon legislatures, executives, and citizens generally to Fursue constitutional ends or to secure constitutional rights? How would the canon be affected by "taking the Constitution away from the courts," as Mark Tushnet proposes,2 or by adopting what Sandy Levinson has called a "Protestant" rather than a court-centered "Catholic" …

Fidelity, Basic Liberties, And The Specter Of Lochner, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

I want to begin by frankly acknowledging that the group of scholars participating in the conference is more conservative than the crowd with whom I usually travel. Accordingly, at the outset, I want to say something ingratiating. Then, I will say something provocative. Here is the ingratiating part: economic liberties and property rights, like personal liberties, are fundamental rights secured by our Constitution. In fact, economic liberties and property rights are so fundamental in our constitutional scheme, and so sacred in our constitutional culture, that there is neither need nor good argument for aggressive judicial protection of them. Rather, such …

In Search Of A Substantive Republic, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

The publication of Michael J. Sandel's Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy is a long-awaited and important event in political and constitutional theory. In 1982, through his first book, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice,1 Sandel emerged as a leading communitarian or civic republican critic of liberalism. That book became prominent, not because its criticisms of liberalism were dispositive, but because it eloquently and elegantly captured discontent with liberalism and evoked yearnings for an alternative. Since then, Sandel has occupied a position on the American intellectual landscape as a placeholder for a *510 communitarian or civic …

On Reading Recipes -- And Constitutions, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Modem theories of constitutional interpretation typically make the truth of propositions about constitutional meaning depend, at least to some degree, on the extent to which those propositions (1) lead to politically legitimate results' and/or (2) cohere with modem constitutional practice.2 That is, such theories generally maintain that correct interpretations of the Constitution must provide normative grounds to apply those interpretations in real cases, must be consistent with at least a substantial amount of real-world constitutional decisionmaking, or both.

Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

What is the question of fidelity a question about? The topic of our Symposium, "Fidelity in Constitutional Theory," raises two fundamental questions: Fidelity to what? and What is fidelity? The short answer to the first-fidelity to the Constitution-poses a further question: What is the Constitution? For example, does the Fourteenth Amendment embody abstract moral principles or enact relatively concrete historical rules? And does the Constitution presuppose a political theory of majoritarian democracy or one of constitutional democracy? The short answer to the second-being faithful to the Constitution in interpreting it-leads to another question: How should the Constitution be interpreted?' Does …

The Executive Power Of Constitutional Interpretation, Gary S. Lawson, Christopher D. Moore

Faculty Scholarship

It is emphatically the province and duty of the President to say what the law is, including the law embodied in the Federal Constitution. In the mid-1980s, a claim of this sort would have been received by the legal intelligentsia with some combination of bemusement and outrage. One would have heard, loudly and often, that it is the special province of the federal courts to declare the meaning of the Constitution, -Lnd that any attempt to question the judiciary's supreme interpretative role, especially in favor of an interpretative role for the President, was an attack on the rule of law …

Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause And Cure, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Legal indeterminacy--the extent to which any particular legal theory cannot provide knowable answers to concrete problemsis one of the principal themes of modern jurisprudence. Indeterminacy plays an important role in debates concerning interpretation, the nature of legal obligation, and the character and possibilities of the rule of law.' Indeterminacy looms particularly large in debates concerning originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation. Some scholars insist that originalism resolves too few problems to be of much use,2 while others argue that originalism's indeterminacy is often overstated.'

We The Exceptional American People, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

I. INTRODUCTION: "AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM" There is an academic movement afoot-one with a long historical pedigree-to attribute the vitality of the American constitutional order to "American exceptionalism." The most prominent representative of this school of thought is Bruce Ackerman, whose We the People opens with a jeremiad against the "Europeanization" of American constitutional theory and urges us as Americans to "look inward" to rediscover our distinctive patterns, practices, and ideals.2 He maps the terrain of theory as being divided into monists ("Anglophiles"), rights foundationalists ("Germanophiles"), and dualists (red-blooded Americans).3 Only dualists have the "strength" to declare our American independence from British …

An Interpretivist Agenda, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

As I write these words, bevies of law clerks assigned to cases involving the Bill of Rights are dutifully editing their bench memos for publication in the national reporter system. Once printed, these bench memos will be solemnly treated by lawyers, scholars, other law clerks, and the occasional judge who runs across them as legally significant, or even binding, interpretations of the Constitution. Two features of this burgeoning mass of otherwise unpublishable law review comments bear mention. First, most of them are tedious, tendentious, pretentious, and badly reasoned when reasoned at all, just as one would expect from authors who …

Rethinking "Original Intent", David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Although Dred Scott v. Sandford is one of the Supreme Court's most controversial decisions, it is not often taught or read. But its approach to constitutional interpretation is by no means outdated, and its historical importance has not diminished. So it seems a good example to consider.

A Preface To Constitutional Theory, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

We have a plethora of theories about judicial review, including theories about theories, but their foundations require stricter scrutiny. This Essay presents some aspects of the problem through an examination of two important and familiar ideas about judicial review.

The controversy over "noninterpretive" review concerns the propriety of courts' deciding constitutional cases by using extraconstitutional norms. But the theoretical framework has not been well developed and appears to raise the wrong questions about judicial review. Thayer's doctrine of extreme judicial deference to the legislature has received much attention, but his reasoning has been given less careful notice. Thayer's rule rests …

The Intellectual Development Of The American Doctrine Of Judicial Review, Pnina Lahav

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

A Critique Of John Hart Ely's Quest For The Ultimate Constitutional Interpretivism Of Representative Democracy, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Contemporary constitutional theory, John Hart Ely argues in Democracy and Distrust, is dominated by a false dichotomy between "clause-bound interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism." Clausebound interpretivists, such as the late Justice Hugo Black, believe that "judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution" (p. 1). Noninterpretivists, such as the Supreme Court that produced the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade,2 contend that "courts should go beyond that set of references and enforce [substantive] norms that cannot be discovered within the four comers of the document" (p. 1). The genius of …