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Articles 91 - 117 of 117
Full-Text Articles in Law
A Decision-Theoretic Rule Of Reason For Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, Thom Lambert
A Decision-Theoretic Rule Of Reason For Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, Thom Lambert
Faculty Publications
This article evaluates these approaches from the perspective of decision theory and, finding each lacking, proposes an alternative approach to structuring the rule of reason governing RPM. Part II sets forth the decision-theoretic perspective, which seeks to maximize the net benefits of liability rules by minimizing the sum of decision and error costs. Part III then evaluates, from the standpoint of decision theory, the proposed approaches to evaluating instances of RPM. Part IV proposes an alternative evaluative approach that is more consistent with decision theory’s insights.
Plurality Of Political Opinion And The Concentration Of Media In The United States, William B. Fisch
Plurality Of Political Opinion And The Concentration Of Media In The United States, William B. Fisch
Faculty Publications
This paper reviews regulatory efforts of the U.S. federal govern- ment to promote viewpoint diversity in broadcast media (radio, television, cable, and satellite) in the face of increasing concentration of ownership of such media, and the impact on such efforts of the free- doms of speech and press embodied in the First Amendment to the federal constitution. With respect to this issue, the regulatory work has been done overwhelmingly by the Federal Communications Commis- sion, operating under an act of Congress which has been amended from time to time to push the FCC in particular directions. The anti- trust laws …
One Trilogy That Should Go Without A Sequel: Why The Baseball Antitrust Exemption Should Be Repealed, Brittany Van Roo
One Trilogy That Should Go Without A Sequel: Why The Baseball Antitrust Exemption Should Be Repealed, Brittany Van Roo
Marquette Sports Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Law And Economics Of Monopolization Standards, Keith N. Hylton
The Law And Economics Of Monopolization Standards, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
Monopolization, the restriction of competition by a dominant firm, is regulated in roughly half of the world’s nations. The two most famous laws regulating monopolization are Section 2 of the Sherman Act, in the United States, and Article 82 of the European Community Treaty. Both laws have been understood as prohibiting ‘abuses’ of monopoly power.
When The Wto Works, And How It Fails, Anu Bradford
When The Wto Works, And How It Fails, Anu Bradford
Faculty Scholarship
This Article seeks to explain when an international legal framework like the WTO can facilitate international cooperation and when it fails to do so. Using an empirical inquiry into different agreements that the WTO has attempted to facilitate — specifically, intellectual property and antitrust regulation — it reveals more general principles about why the WTO can facilitate agreement in some situations and not in others. Comparing the successful conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement and the failed attempts to negotiate a WTO antitrust agreement indicates that international cooperation is likely to emerge when the interests of powerful states align and when …
Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane
Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Private litigation is the predominant means of antitrust enforcement in the United States. Other jurisdictions around the world are increasingly implementing private enforcement models. Private enforcement is usually justified on either compensation or deterrence grounds. While the choice between these two goals matters, private litigation is not very effective at advancing either one. Compensation fails because the true economic victims of most antitrust violations are usually downstream consumers who are too numerous and remote to locate and compensate. Deterrence is ineffective because the time lag between the planning of the violation and the legal judgment day is usually so long …
Introduction: Expansion And Contraction In Monopolization Law, Michael S. Gal, Spencer Weber Waller, Avishalom Tor
Introduction: Expansion And Contraction In Monopolization Law, Michael S. Gal, Spencer Weber Waller, Avishalom Tor
Journal Articles
This article introduces a special symposium issue of the Antitrust Law Journal based on a conference on monopolization. It argues that monopolization law has been experiencing simultaneous expansion and contraction processes that are not wholly contradictory but at least partly complementary. Specifically, the authors suggest that the contraction of monopolization law in the United States and the EU might serve to facilitate its expansion and increased importance worldwide, providing other antitrust regimes with more focused and effective tools to address the challenges involved in regulating dominant firms. Moreover, monopolization law's increased reach internationally also has made its refinement and rationalization …
Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions Of Dominance Or Monopoly Power, Avishalom Tor
Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions Of Dominance Or Monopoly Power, Avishalom Tor
Journal Articles
The prohibition of certain types of anticompetitive unilateral conduct by firms possessing a substantial degree of market power is a cornerstone of competition law regimes worldwide. Yet notwithstanding the social costs of monopoly modern legal regimes refrain from prohibiting it outright. Instead, competition laws prohibit monopolies or dominant firms from engaging in those types of anticompetitive conduct that amount to monopolizing or an abuse of dominant position. Importantly, anticompetitive conduct can take place both on the road to monopoly and, later on, once substantial market power has been achieved. Legal regimes nevertheless tend either to ignore or pay only limited …
Ip And Antitrust: Reformation And Harm, Christina Bohannan, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Ip And Antitrust: Reformation And Harm, Christina Bohannan, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust and intellectual property law both seek to improve economic welfare by facilitating competition and investment in innovation. At various times both antitrust and IP law have wandered off this course and have become more driven by special interests. Today, antitrust and IP are on very different roads to reform. Antitrust reform began in the late 1970s with a series of Supreme Court decisions that linked the plaintiff’s harm and right to obtain a remedy to the competition - furthering goals of antitrust policy. Today, patent law has begun its own reform journey, but it is in a much earlier …
The Pleading Problem In Antitrust Cases And Beyond, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Pleading Problem In Antitrust Cases And Beyond, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In its Twombly decision the Supreme Court held that an antitrust complaint failed because its allegations did not include enough “factual matter” to justify proceeding to discovery. Two years later the Court extended this new pleading standard to federal complaints generally. Twombly’s broad language has led to a broad rewriting of federal pleading doctrine.
Naked market division conspiracies such as the one pled in Twombly must be kept secret because antitrust enforcers will prosecute them when they are detected. This inherent secrecy, which the Supreme Court did not discuss, has dire consequences for pleading if too much factual specificity …
The Federal Trade Commission And The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Federal Trade Commission And The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The FTC has explicit antitrust authority to enforce the Clayton Act, although not the Sherman Act. More than a half century ago, however, the Supreme Court held that the FTC Act’s prohibition of “unfair methods of competition” reaches everything the Sherman Act reaches and also a “penumbra” of practices that are not technical Sherman Act violations. That view, which had fallen into disuse in recent decades, is now being revived.
This essay defends a limited version of that “penumbra” view and suggests several applications. First, while both Sherman Act provisions are open ended in their coverage, they have limitations. Section …
Harvard, Chicago And Transaction Cost Economics In Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Harvard, Chicago And Transaction Cost Economics In Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Since Oliver Williamson published Markets and Hierarchies in 1975 transaction cost economics (TCE) has claimed an important place in antitrust, avoiding the extreme positions of the two once reigning schools of antitrust policy. At one extreme was the “structural” school, which saw market structure as the principal determinant of poor economic performance. At the other extreme was the Chicago School, which also saw the economic landscape in terms of competition and monopoly, but found monopoly only infrequently and denied that a monopolist could “leverage” its power into related markets. Since the 1970s both the structural and Chicago positions have moved …
International Disparities Panel, Sean Flynn
International Disparities Panel, Sean Flynn
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
When A Monopolist Deceives, Maurice Stucke
When A Monopolist Deceives, Maurice Stucke
Scholarly Works
This essay uses one context - a monopolist’s deceptive advertising or product disparagement - to illustrate how competition authorities and courts should evaluate a monopolist’s deception under the federal antitrust laws. Competition authorities should target a monopolist’s anticompetitive deception, which courts should treat as a prima facie violation of the Sherman Act without requiring a full-blown rule of reason analysis or an arbitrary, multi-factor standard.
Transplanting Antitrust In China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, And State Control, Wentong Zheng
Transplanting Antitrust In China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, And State Control, Wentong Zheng
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article examines the compatibility of Western antitrust models as incorporated in China's first comprehensive antitrust law – the Antimonopoly Law ("AML") – with China's local conditions. It identifies three forces that shape competition law and policy in China: China's current transitional stage, China's market structures, and pervasive state control in China's economy. This Article discusses how these forces have limited the applicability of Western antitrust models to China in three major areas of antitrust: cartels, abuse of dominant market position, and merger review. Specifically, it details how these forces have prevented China from pursuing a rigorous anti-cartel policy, how …
Designing Antitrust Agencies For More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn From Restaurant Guides, D. Daniel Sokol
Designing Antitrust Agencies For More Effective Outcomes: What Antitrust Can Learn From Restaurant Guides, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
Antitrust policy should be concerned with the quality and effectiveness of the antitrust system. Some efforts at agency effectiveness include self-study of antitrust agencies to determine the factors that lead to improving agency quality. Such studies, however, often focus only on enforcement decisions and other agency initiatives such as competition advocacy. They do not reflect at least one other part of the equation: what do non-government users of the antitrust system think about the quality of antitrust agencies? This Symposium Essay advocates the use of a ratings guide by antitrust practitioners for antitrust agencies to add to the tools in …
Dr. Miles's Orphans: Vertical Conspiracy And Consignment In The Wake Of Leegin, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Dr. Miles's Orphans: Vertical Conspiracy And Consignment In The Wake Of Leegin, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
When the Supreme Court overturns a well-established case, the impact extends well beyond that ruling. Cases that have survived for extended periods of time typically spawn complementary cases. These complementary cases protect the ruling in the principal case from erosion by the imagination of business planners, lawyers, scholars, and judges. Or, these complementary cases may be the cases that narrow the rule in the principal case when the Court wants to temper the effect of—but not overrule—its prior decision. When the principal case is, however, overturned, both of these types of cases become orphans. Without the parent case, it is …
Lessons From The Financial Crisis, Maurice Stucke
Lessons From The Financial Crisis, Maurice Stucke
Scholarly Works
What lessons can we learn from the financial crisis concerning the issues of systemic risk, firms too big to fail, and the income inequality in the United States today?
In light of the public anger over the financial crisis and bailouts to firms deemed too big to fail, this Essay first addresses the issue of systemic risk posed by mergers generally and those in the financial services industries specifically. The federal government heard concerns in the 1990s about mega-mergers in the financial industry. The Department of Justice, for example, heard concerns that the Citibank-Travelers merger would create an institution too …
Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy & The Role Of Behavioral Economics, Maurice Stucke
Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy & The Role Of Behavioral Economics, Maurice Stucke
Scholarly Works
Although the behavioral economics and happiness economic literature are hot areas in legal and economic scholarship, the U.S. policymakers, until recently, have not embraced the literature. That is changing with the financial crisis. Policymakers are re-examining the assumptions underlying many neoclassical economic theories embedded in their policies.
This article addresses one cornerstone of neoclassical economic theory, namely that rational consumers pursue their economic self-interests. It is commonly associated with Adam Smith’s famous statement: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own …
The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The American Experience, Edward D. Cavanagh
The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The American Experience, Edward D. Cavanagh
Faculty Publications
(Excerpt)
The treble damage remedy has been a centerpiece of private antitrust enforcement since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890. Aware that government resources were limited, Congress created the private right of action as a complement to public enforcement to assure the detection and prosecution of antitrust offenders. The private right of action has proven to be a very potent weapon in the civil enforcement arsenal. It is the very potency of the private remedy, however, that has made the private right of action a target of criticism by defendants and, more recently, the courts. Indeed, in the …
Monitoring Managers Through Corporate Compliance Programs, Charles Angelucci, Martijn Han
Monitoring Managers Through Corporate Compliance Programs, Charles Angelucci, Martijn Han
Martijn A. Han
Compliance programs entail monitoring of employees' behavior with the claimed objective of fighting corporate crime. (Competition) Authorities promote such intra-firm monitoring. In a three-tier hierarchy model, authority-shareholder-manager, we study the impact of monitoring through a compliance program on contracting within the firm and the authority's optimal sanctions and leniency policy. We find that compliance programs are beneficial in the fight against corporate crime if and only if the managerial sanction is low. Moreover, when the shareholder blows the whistle, the authority optimally grants partial corporate leniency, while not granting individual leniency to the involved employees. Conversely, when the employee blows …
Expansion And Contraction In Monopolization Law, Michal Gal, Spencer Waller Weber, Avishalom Tor
Expansion And Contraction In Monopolization Law, Michal Gal, Spencer Waller Weber, Avishalom Tor
Avishalom Tor
This article introduces a special symposium issue of the Antitrust Law Journal based on a conference on monopolization. It argues that monopolization law has been experiencing simultaneous expansion and contraction processes that are not wholly contradictory but at least partly complementary. Specifically, the authors suggest that the contraction of monopolization law in the United States and the EU might serve to facilitate its expansion and increased importance worldwide, providing other antitrust regimes with more focused and effective tools to address the challenges involved in regulating dominant firms. Moreover, monopolization law's increased reach internationally also has made its refinement and rationalization …
The Cfi Microsoft Judgment And Trips Competition Flexibilities, Hans Henrik Lidgard, Tu T. Nguyen
The Cfi Microsoft Judgment And Trips Competition Flexibilities, Hans Henrik Lidgard, Tu T. Nguyen
Hans Henrik Lidgard
The CFI Microsoft judgment is a first by any court of a WTO Member, disregarding the competition rules in the TRIPS Agreement to justify the application of domestic competition law to the exercise of IPRs. TRIPS allow WTO Members to enact and apply national competition law to IPR-related anti-competitive practices. The position of the CFI finds support in this fact. Still, it is regretted that the CFI did not invoke the TRIPS competition rules in justifying the Commission’s decision to force Microsoft to supply interoperability information. The article considers the consequences of the European position and the effects of TRIPS …
The Amended Google Books Settlement Is Still Exclusive, James Grimmelmann
The Amended Google Books Settlement Is Still Exclusive, James Grimmelmann
James Grimmelmann
This brief essay argues that the proposed settlement in the Google Books case, although formally non-exclusive, would have the practical effect of giving Google an exclusive license to a large number of books. The settlement itself does not create mechanisms for Google's competitors to obtain licenses to orphan books and competitors are unlikely to be able to obtain similar settlements of their own. Recent amendments to the settlement do not change this conclusion.
Fixing Merger Litigation "Fixes": Reforming The Litigation Of Proposed Merger Remedies Under Section 7 Of The Clayton Act, Thomas J. Horton
Fixing Merger Litigation "Fixes": Reforming The Litigation Of Proposed Merger Remedies Under Section 7 Of The Clayton Act, Thomas J. Horton
Thomas J. Horton
No abstract provided.
El Control De Concentraciones Económicas Y Fusiones En El Régimen Competitivo Argentino, Carlos Molina Sandoval
El Control De Concentraciones Económicas Y Fusiones En El Régimen Competitivo Argentino, Carlos Molina Sandoval
Carlos Molina Sandoval
El régimen competitivo no prohíbe la formación de poderes económicos (de hecho, la misma ley permite gozar de posición dominante -arts. 4 y 5, LDC-), sino que busca controlar mediante una notificación la estructuración del poder económico en el mercado, sancionando sólo aquellos que puedan afectar el interés económico general (art. 7, LDC). Este ensayo analiza el control de concentraciones económicas en el régimen argentino.
Framing Franchise In Antitrust Litigation-The Legacy Of Kodak And Queen City Pizza.Pdf, Randy D. Gordon