Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Legislation (138)
- Constitutional Law (62)
- Courts (61)
- Jurisprudence (51)
- Administrative Law (47)
-
- Supreme Court of the United States (47)
- Judges (34)
- Legal History (25)
- Law and Politics (15)
- Law and Society (15)
- Environmental Law (14)
- Public Law and Legal Theory (14)
- State and Local Government Law (13)
- Civil Procedure (12)
- Civil Rights and Discrimination (11)
- Legal Writing and Research (11)
- Litigation (11)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (10)
- Torts (10)
- Criminal Law (9)
- Jurisdiction (9)
- President/Executive Department (9)
- Tax Law (9)
- Legal Education (8)
- Common Law (7)
- Labor and Employment Law (7)
- Securities Law (7)
- Antitrust and Trade Regulation (6)
- Intellectual Property Law (6)
- Institution
-
- University of Michigan Law School (39)
- Maurer School of Law: Indiana University (23)
- Columbia Law School (20)
- Georgetown University Law Center (18)
- Notre Dame Law School (13)
-
- University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law (12)
- University of Colorado Law School (11)
- University of Georgia School of Law (11)
- Fordham Law School (10)
- Boston University School of Law (9)
- St. John's University School of Law (9)
- Cornell University Law School (8)
- University of Kentucky (8)
- University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School (8)
- University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law (7)
- George Washington University Law School (6)
- Penn State Law (6)
- University at Buffalo School of Law (6)
- Vanderbilt University Law School (5)
- William & Mary Law School (5)
- Florida State University College of Law (4)
- Northern Illinois University (4)
- Louisiana State University Law Center (3)
- St. Mary's University (3)
- UIdaho Law (3)
- University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law (3)
- University of Cincinnati College of Law (3)
- University of Miami Law School (3)
- University of Missouri School of Law (3)
- University of Pittsburgh School of Law (3)
- Publication Year
- Publication
-
- Faculty Scholarship (56)
- Articles (50)
- Journal Articles (28)
- Articles by Maurer Faculty (23)
- Faculty Publications (21)
-
- Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works (18)
- Scholarly Works (17)
- All Faculty Scholarship (12)
- Publications (11)
- Cornell Law Faculty Publications (8)
- Law Faculty Scholarly Articles (8)
- GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works (6)
- Faculty Articles (5)
- Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications (5)
- Nevada Supreme Court Summaries (4)
- Scholarly Publications (4)
- Faculty Articles and Other Publications (3)
- Northern Illinois Law Review Supplement (3)
- Popular Media (3)
- Articles & Chapters (2)
- Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press (2)
- Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications (2)
- Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters (2)
- Faculty Works (2)
- Law Faculty Articles and Essays (2)
- Law Faculty Publications (2)
- Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law (2)
- Scholarly Articles (2)
- All Faculty Publications (1)
- Amicus Briefs (1)
Articles 31 - 60 of 317
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Racial Politics Of Fair Use Fetishism, Anjali Vats
The Racial Politics Of Fair Use Fetishism, Anjali Vats
Articles
This short essay argues that the sometimes fetishistic desire on the part of progressive intellectual property scholars to defend fair use is at odds with racial justice. Through a rereading of landmark fair use cases using tools drawing from Critical Race Intellectual Property (“CRTIP”), it contends that scholars, lawyers, judges, practitioners, and activists would be well served by focusing on how fair use remains grounded in whiteness as (intellectual) property. It argues for doing so by rethinking the purpose of the Copyright Act of 1976 to be inclusive of Black, Brown, and Indigenous authors.
On Foxes And Hedgehogs, Roger P. Alford
On Foxes And Hedgehogs, Roger P. Alford
Journal Articles
This Article is about John Nagle’s many means to one great end. It will outline the many themes of his scholarship: (i) environmental law, (ii) statutory interpretation, (iii) constitutional law, (iv) nuisance and pollution, (v) election law and campaign finance, (vi) Christianity and the environment, and (vii) national parks. It will offer conclusions on how he used his scholarly interests as a means to pursue his overarching worldview.
Democracy And Disenchantment, Ashraf Ahmed
Democracy And Disenchantment, Ashraf Ahmed
Faculty Scholarship
During the latter half of the Trump presidency, as it became increasingly clear that the Supreme Court would remain solidly conservative for the foreseeable future, Samuel Moyn and Ryan Doerfler declared war. In popular and scholarly venues, they have steadily built a case for curtailing the power of the nation’s highest court. Their arguments have been both pragmatic and principled. They have underlined, for instance, the risks the Roberts Court poses to progressive goals such as addressing climate change1 and granting student debt relief. More broadly, they object to a “supra-democratic court exercising its current, expansive legislative veto.” For Doerfler …
Textual Gerrymandering: The Eclipse Of Republican Government In An Era Of Statutory Populism, William N. Eskridge, Victoria Frances Nourse
Textual Gerrymandering: The Eclipse Of Republican Government In An Era Of Statutory Populism, William N. Eskridge, Victoria Frances Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
We have entered the era dominated by a dogmatic textualism—albeit one that is fracturing, as illustrated by the three warring original public meaning opinions in the blockbuster sexual orientation case, Bostock v. Clayton County. This Article provides conceptual tools that allow lawyers and students to understand the deep analytical problems faced and created by the new textualism advanced by Justice Scalia and his heirs. The key is to think about choice of text—why one piece of text rather than another—and choice of context—what materials are relevant to confirm or clarify textual meaning. Professors Eskridge and Nourse apply these concepts …
Antitrust Antitextualism, Daniel A. Crane
Antitrust Antitextualism, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Judges and scholars frequently describe antitrust as a common-law system predicated on open-textured statutes, but that description fails to capture a historically persistent phenomenon:judicial disregard of the plain meaning of the statutory texts and manifest purposes of Congress. This pattern of judicial nullification is not evenly distributed: when the courts have deviated from the plain meaning or congressional purpose, they have uniformly done so to limit the reach of antitrust liability or curtail the labor exemption to the benefit of industrial interests. This phenomenon cannot be explained solely or even primarily as a tug-of-war between a progressive Congress and conservative …
The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure
The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure
Scholarly Works
This article reports the findings of an empirical study of textualism as applied by federal judges interpreting the statute that permits removal of diversity cases from state to federal court. The “snap removal” provision in the statute is particularly interesting because its application forces judges into one of two interpretive camps—which are fairly extreme versions of textualism and purposivism, respectively. We studied characteristics of cases and judges to find predictors of textualist outcomes. In this article we offer a narrative discussion of key variables and we detail the results of our logistic regression analysis. The most salient predictive variable was …
The Mischief Rule, Samuel L. Bray
The Mischief Rule, Samuel L. Bray
Journal Articles
The mischief rule tells an interpreter to read a statute in light of the “mischief” or “evil”—the problem that prompted the statute. The mischief rule has been associated with Blackstone’s appeal to a statute’s “reason and spirit” and with Hart-and-Sacks-style purposivism. Justice Scalia rejected the mischief rule. But the rule is widely misunderstood, both by those inclined to love it and those inclined to hate it. This Article reconsiders the mischief rule. It shows that the rule has two enduringly useful functions: guiding an interpreter to a stopping point for statutory language that can be given a broader or narrower …
Causation In Civil Rights Legislation, Hillel J. Bavli
Causation In Civil Rights Legislation, Hillel J. Bavli
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
Employees are often left unprotected from discrimination because they are unable to satisfy the requirement of causation. Courts have made clear that to obtain legal redress for discrimination, it is generally insufficient to show that a protected characteristic such as race or sex was a “motivating factor” of an adverse employment decision. Rather, under Supreme Court precedent—including the Court’s Comcast and Babb decisions in the 2020 term—the antidiscrimination statutes generally require a showing of “but-for” causation. Consequently, many victims of discrimination will be unable to prevail because an employer can readily refute allegations of discrimination by asserting a legitimate purpose—true …
Cause And Effect In Antidiscrimination Law, Hillel J. Bavli
Cause And Effect In Antidiscrimination Law, Hillel J. Bavli
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
Standards of causation in antidiscrimination law, and disparate-treatment cases in particular, are deeply flawed. Their defects have caused an illogical, obscure, and unworkable proof scheme that requires an overhaul to curb the harm that it engenders and to allow the antidiscrimination statutes to serve their objectives effectively. This Article proposes a theory and method of causation that achieves this goal. The problem stems from the inadequacies associated with current standards of causation in disparate-treatment cases—the but-for test and the motivating-factor test. The proposed “factorial” approach introduces a causal standard that addresses these inadequacies. It entails three innovations over current causation …
Taking Appropriations Seriously, Gillian E. Metzger
Taking Appropriations Seriously, Gillian E. Metzger
Faculty Scholarship
Appropriations lie at the core of the administrative state and are becoming increasingly important as deep partisan divides have stymied substantive legislation. Both Congress and the President exploit appropriations to control government and advance their policy agendas, with the border wall battle being just one of several recent high-profile examples. Yet in public law doctrine, appropriations are ignored, pulled out for special legal treatment, or subjected to legal frameworks ill-suited for appropriations realities. This Article documents how appropriations are marginalized in a variety of public law contexts and assesses the reasons for this unjustified treatment. Appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization does not …
The Support-Or-Advocacy Clauses, Richard Primus, Cameron O. Kistler
The Support-Or-Advocacy Clauses, Richard Primus, Cameron O. Kistler
Articles
Two little known clauses of a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute are potentially powerful weapons for litigators seeking to protect the integrity of federal elections. For the clauses to achieve their potential, however, the courts will need to settle correctly a contested question of statutory interpretation: do the clauses create substantive rights, or do they merely create remedies for substantive rights specified elsewhere? The correct answer is that the clauses create substantive rights.
Restoring The Historical Rule Of Lenity As A Canon, Shon Hopwood
Restoring The Historical Rule Of Lenity As A Canon, Shon Hopwood
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In criminal law, the venerated rule of lenity has been frequently, if not consistently, invoked as a canon of interpretation. Where criminal statutes are ambiguous, the rule of lenity generally posits that courts should interpret them narrowly, in favor of the defendant. But the rule is not always reliably used, and questions remain about its application. In this article, I will try to determine how the rule of lenity should apply and whether it should be given the status of a canon.
First, I argue that federal courts should apply the historical rule of lenity (also known as the rule …
Legitimacy And Agency Implementation Of Title Ix, Samuel R. Bagenstos
Legitimacy And Agency Implementation Of Title Ix, Samuel R. Bagenstos
Articles
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination by programs receiving federal education funding. Primary responsibility for administering that statute lies in the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Education (OCR). Because Title IX involves a subject that remains highly controversial in our polity (sex roles and interactions among the sexes more generally), and because it targets a highly sensitive area (education), OCR’s administration of the statute has long drawn criticism. The critics have not merely noted disagreements with the legal and policy decisions of the agency, however. Rather, they have attacked the agency’s decisions …
Chevron As Construction, Lawrence B. Solum, Cass R. Sunstein
Chevron As Construction, Lawrence B. Solum, Cass R. Sunstein
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In 1984, the Supreme Court declared that courts should uphold agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, so long as those interpretations are reasonable. The Chevron framework, as it is called, is now under serious pressure. Current debates can be both illuminated and softened with reference to an old distinction between interpretation on the one hand and construction on the other. In cases of interpretation, judges (or agencies) must ascertain the meaning of a statutory term. In cases of construction, judges (or agencies) must develop implementing principles or specify a statutory term. Chevron as construction is supported by powerful arguments; it …
Fee-Shifting Statutes And Compensation For Risk, Maureen S. Carroll
Fee-Shifting Statutes And Compensation For Risk, Maureen S. Carroll
Articles
A law firm that enters into a contingency arrangement provides the client with more than just its attorneys' labor. It also provides a form of financing, because the firm will be paid (if at all) only after the litigation ends; and insurance, because if the litigation results in a low recovery (or no recovery at all), the firm will absorb the direct and indirect costs of the litigation. Courts and markets routinely pay for these types of risk-bearing services through a range of mechanisms, including state fee shifting statutes, contingent percentage fees, common-fund awards, alternative fee arrangements, and third-party litigation …
The Ethical Tax Judge, Kim Brooks
The Ethical Tax Judge, Kim Brooks
Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press
This chapter advances the claim that judges have an ethical obligation of competence that requires them to enhance their knowledge about language (in the context of statutory interpretation) and income tax law design and policy. It articulates some of the foundational understandings that support that competence and provides a simple hierarchy of approaches to interpreting income tax law. It concludes by contending that greater competence is not only more ethical but also advances other important societal goals fulfilled by the imposition of income tax systems.
Snap Removal: Concept; Cause; Cacophony; And Cure, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thomas O. Main, David Mcclure
Snap Removal: Concept; Cause; Cacophony; And Cure, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thomas O. Main, David Mcclure
Scholarly Works
So-called “snap removal” – removal of a case from state to federal court prior to service on a forum state defendant – has divided federal trial courts for 20 years. Recently, panels of the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits have sided with those supporting the tactic even though it conflicts with the general prohibition on removal when the case includes a forum state defendant, a situation historically viewed as eliminating the need to protect the outsider defendant from possible state court hostility.
Consistent with the public policy underlying diversity jurisdiction – availability of a federal forum to protect against defending …
Rules, Tricks And Emancipation, Jessie Allen
Rules, Tricks And Emancipation, Jessie Allen
Book Chapters
Rules and tricks are generally seen as different things. Rules produce order and control; tricks produce chaos. Rules help us predict how things will work out. Tricks are deceptive and transgressive, built to surprise us and confound our expectations in ways that can be entertaining or devastating. But rules can be tricky. General prohibitions and prescriptions generate surprising results in particular contexts. In some situations, a rule produces results that seem far from what the rule makers expected and antagonistic to the interests the rule is understood to promote. This contradictory aspect of rules is usually framed as a downside …
Avoidance Creep, Charlotte Garden
Avoidance Creep, Charlotte Garden
Faculty Articles
At first glance, constitutional avoidance—the principle that courts construe statutes so as to avoid conflict with the Constitution whenever possible—appears both unremarkable and benign. But when courts engage in constitutional avoidance, they frequently construe statutory language in a manner contrary to both its plain meaning and to the underlying congressional intent. Then, successive decisions often magnify the problems of avoidance—a phenomenon I call “avoidance creep.” When a court distorts a statute in service of constitutional avoidance, a later court may amplify the distortion, incrementally changing both statutory and constitutional doctrine in ways that are unsupported by any existing rationale for …
Statutory Realism: The Jurisprudential Ambivalence Of Interpretive Theory, Abigail R. Moncrieff
Statutory Realism: The Jurisprudential Ambivalence Of Interpretive Theory, Abigail R. Moncrieff
Law Faculty Articles and Essays
In the renaissance of statutory interpretation theory, a division has emerged between "new purposivists," who argue that statutes should be interpreted dynamically, and "new textualists," who argue that statutes should be interpreted according to their ordinary semantic meanings. Both camps, however, rest their theories on jurisprudentially ambivalent commitments. Purposivists are jurisprudential realists when they make arguments about statutory meaning, but they are jurisprudential formalists in their views of the judicial power to engage in dynamic interpretation. Textualists are the inverse; they are formalistic in their understandings of statutory meaning but realistic in their arguments about judicial power. The relative triumph …
Fun With Reverse Ejusdem Generis, Jay D. Wexler
Fun With Reverse Ejusdem Generis, Jay D. Wexler
Faculty Scholarship
In the canon of statutory construction canons, perhaps no canon is more canonical than the canon known as ejusdem generis. This canon, which translates as “of the same kind,” states that when a statute includes a list of terms and a catch-all phrase, the set of items covered by the catch-all phrase is limited to the same kind or type of items that are in the list. The canon of ejusdem generis has a long and storied history in the law, has been used by judges in countless cases, and has been the subject of a large body of scholarly …
Feminist Statutory Interpretation, Kim Brooks
Feminist Statutory Interpretation, Kim Brooks
Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press
Leading Canadian scholar Ruth Sullivan describes the act of statutory interpretation as a mix of art and archaeology. The collection, Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, affirms her assessment. If the act of statutory interpretation requires us to deploy our interdisciplinary talents, at least somewhat unmoored from the constraints of formal expressions of legal doctrine, why haven’t feminists been more inclined to write about statutory interpretation? Put another way, some scholars acknowledge that judges “are subtly influenced by preconceptions, endemic privilegings and power hierarchies, and prevailing social norms and ‘conventional’ wisdom.” Those influences become the background for how judges read legislation. …
Neglecting Nationalism, Gil Seinfeld
Neglecting Nationalism, Gil Seinfeld
Articles
Federalism is a system of government that calls for the division of power between a central authority and member states. It is designed to secure benefits that flow from centralization and from devolution, as well as benefits that accrue from a simultaneous commitment to both. A student of modern American federalism, however, might have a very different impression, for significant swaths of the case law and scholarly commentary on the subject neglect the centralizing, nationalist side of the federal balance. This claim may come as a surprise, since it is obviously the case that our national government has become immensely …
Agency Statutory Abnegation In The Deregulatory Playbook, William W. Buzbee
Agency Statutory Abnegation In The Deregulatory Playbook, William W. Buzbee
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
If an agency newly declares that it lacks statutory power previously claimed, how should such a move—what this article calls agency statutory abnegation—be reviewed? Given the array of strategies an agency might use to make a policy change or move the law in a deregulatory direction, why might statutory abnegation be chosen? After all, it is always a perilous and likely doctrinally disadvantageous strategy for agencies. Nonetheless, agencies from time to time have utilized statutory abnegation claims as part of their justification for deregulatory shifts. Actions by agencies during 2017 and 2018, under the administration of President Donald J. Trump, …
Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, And The Law Of Stare Decisis, Randy J. Kozel
Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, And The Law Of Stare Decisis, Randy J. Kozel
Journal Articles
This Article examines three facets of the relationship between statutory interpretation and the law of stare decisis: judicial interpretation, administrative interpretation, and interpretive methodology. In analyzing these issues, I emphasize the role of stare decisis in pursuing balance between past and present. That role admits of no distinction between statutory and constitutional decisions, calling into question the practice of giving superstrong deference to judicial interpretations of statutes. The pursuit of balance also suggests that one Supreme Court cannot bind future Justices to a wide-ranging interpretive methodology. As for rules requiring deference to administrative interpretations of statutes and regulations, they are …
Justice Gorsuch's Views On Precedent In The Context Of Statutory Interpretation, Hillel Y. Levin
Justice Gorsuch's Views On Precedent In The Context Of Statutory Interpretation, Hillel Y. Levin
Scholarly Works
The doctrine of precedent, in its stare decisis form, presents a challenge to any originalist. This doctrine provides that a court should (at least sometimes) be bound by its own precedent, even if that precedent was wrongly decided in the first place. Yet if the original meaning of the text at issue is a judge’s focus, why should an intervening decision of the court—and a mistaken one at that— matter at all? Despite this tension, every originalist also at least purports to care about precedent.
This Essay focuses on Justice Gorsuch’s apparent views on precedent in the context of statutory …
Atomizing The Clean Water Act: Ignoring The Whole Statute And Asking The Wrong Questions, Robert W. Adler, Brian House
Atomizing The Clean Water Act: Ignoring The Whole Statute And Asking The Wrong Questions, Robert W. Adler, Brian House
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship
When attempting to resolve difficult issues of statutory construction involving complex statutes, courts sometimes focus on individual words and phrases without evaluating how they fit within the text and structure of the whole statute. We call this “atomization” of the statutory text. Judges have fallen into this trap in construing the Clean Water Act (CWA) and other lengthy, complex federal environmental statutes. That tendency contributes to ongoing confusion about the scope and coverage of the CWA. During the 2019-2020 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court will resolve a circuit split in the most recent line of cases exhibiting this tendency. Courts …
Mens Rea Reform And Its Discontents, Benjamin Levin
Mens Rea Reform And Its Discontents, Benjamin Levin
Publications
This Article examines the debates over recent proposals for “mens rea reform.” The substantive criminal law has expanded dramatically, and legislators have criminalized a great deal of common conduct. Often, new criminal laws do not require that defendants know they are acting unlawfully. Mens rea reform proposals seek to address the problems of overcriminalization and unintentional offending by increasing the burden on prosecutors to prove a defendant’s culpable mental state. These proposals have been a staple of conservative-backed bills on criminal justice reform. Many on the left remain skeptical of mens rea reform and view it as a deregulatory vehicle …
Technical Standards Meet Administrative Law: A Teaching Guide On Incorporation By Reference, Emily S. Bremer
Technical Standards Meet Administrative Law: A Teaching Guide On Incorporation By Reference, Emily S. Bremer
Journal Articles
When an agency incorporates by reference, it promulgates a rule that identifies—but does not reprint—material already published elsewhere. The incorporated materials thus become binding law without actually being printed in the agency's regulations. Sometimes the incorporated materials are privately developed technical standards, which are often copyrighted and available only for a fee. This restriction on access undermines transparency and public participation in the rulemaking process. Finding a solution is challenging because the problem is multidimensional, implicating public policy in the areas of administrative law, federal standards law and policy, and copyright.
This teaching guide is part of module that offers …
The Enacted Purposes Canon, Kevin M. Stack
The Enacted Purposes Canon, Kevin M. Stack
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article argues that the principle relied upon in King v. Burwell that courts "cannot interpret statutes to negate their stated purposes"-the enacted purposes canon-is and should be viewed as a bedrock element of statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court has relied upon this principle for decades, but it has done so in ways that do not call attention to this interpretive choice. As a result, the scope and patterns of the Court's reliance are easy to miss. After reconstructing the Court's practice, this Article defends this principle of interpretation on analytic, normative, and pragmatic grounds. Building on jurisprudence showing that …