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Full-Text Articles in Law

Supreme Court Monitoring Of The United States Courts Of Appeals En Banc, Tracey E. George, Michael E. Solimine Jan 2001

Supreme Court Monitoring Of The United States Courts Of Appeals En Banc, Tracey E. George, Michael E. Solimine

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This article considers systematically whether the Supreme Court is more likely to review an en banc court of appeals decision than a panel decision. First, we consider Supreme Court review of en banc cases during the Rehnquist Court. Then, in a multivariate empirical analysis of a three-circuit subset of those cases, we control for other variables found to influence the Court's certiorari decision, such as Solicitor General or amicus curiae support for the certiorari petition, a dissent from the court of appeal's opinion, an outcome contrary to the Court's ideological composition, and an intercircuit conflict. The discussion is situated in …


All Or Nothing: Explaining The Size Of Supreme Court Majorities, Paul H. Edelman, Suzanna Sherry Jan 2000

All Or Nothing: Explaining The Size Of Supreme Court Majorities, Paul H. Edelman, Suzanna Sherry

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this Article, Professors Edelman and Sherry use a probabilistic model to explore the process of coalition formation on the United States Supreme Court. They identify coalition formation as a Markov process with absorbing states and examine voting patterns from twelve Court Terms. On the basis of their data, they conclude that Justices are reluctant to remain in small minorities. Surprisingly, however, they also find that a three-Justice minority coalition is less likely to suffer defections than a four-Justice minority coalition. This counterintuitive result suggests that while in general it is minority Justices rather than majority Justices who drive the …


Does The Solicitor General Advantage Thwart The Rule Of Law In The Administrative State?, Jim Rossi Jan 2000

Does The Solicitor General Advantage Thwart The Rule Of Law In The Administrative State?, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer's study, "The Government Litigant Advantage," sheds important light on how the Solicitor General's litigation behavior may impact the Supreme Court's decision making agenda and outcomes for regulatory and administrative law cases. By emphasizing how the Solicitor General affects cases that the Supreme Court decides, Cohen and Spitzer's findings confirm that administrative law's emphasis on lower appellate court decisions is not misplaced. Some say that D.C. Circuit cases carry equal-if not more-precedential weight than Supreme Court decisions in resolving administrative law issues. Cohen and Spitzer use positive political theory to provide a novel explanation for some …


"Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts About The Supremes As The Sultans Of Swing, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen Jan 1996

"Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts About The Supremes As The Sultans Of Swing, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

We respond to Professor Lynn A. Baker's criticisms of our article, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics. Professor Baker fundamentally misunderstands our measure of Supreme Court voting power. Moreover, she erroneously presumes that the "median Justice" wields the bulk of the Court's power. Even if there were a median Justice, it is far from clear whether he would be the Most Dangerous Justice. We conclude with a clarification of the median voter theorem and its implications for the distribution of voting power within the Supreme Court.


The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court At The Bar Of Mathematics, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen Jan 1996

The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court At The Bar Of Mathematics, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

We analyze the relative voting power of the Justices based upon Supreme Court decisions during October Term 1994 and October Term 1995. We take two approaches, both based on ideas derived from cooperative game theory. One of the measures we use has been used in connection with voting rights cases. After naming the Most Dangerous Justice, we conclude by identifying and explaining the inverse relationship between seniority and voting power.


The Practice Of Dissent In The Supreme Court, Kevin M. Stack Jan 1996

The Practice Of Dissent In The Supreme Court, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The United States Supreme Court's connection to the ideal of the rule of law is often taken to be the principal basis of the Court's political legitimacy. In the Supreme Court's practices, however, the ideal of the rule of law and the Court's political legitimacy do not always coincide. This Note argues that the ideal of the rule of law and the Court's legitimacy part company with respect to the Court's practice of dissent. Specifically, this Note aims to demonstrate that the practice of dissent-the tradition of Justices publishing their differences with the judgment or the reasoning of their peers--cannot …


Having It Both Ways: Proof That The U.S. Supreme Court Is "Unfairly" Prosecution-Oriented, Christopher Slobogin Jan 1996

Having It Both Ways: Proof That The U.S. Supreme Court Is "Unfairly" Prosecution-Oriented, Christopher Slobogin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

If the assertions that this essay makes about the Court's "unfair" prosecution-orientation withstand scrutiny," two further conclusions might follow. First, the highest court in the country is so fixated on ensuring that a particular side wins that it is willing with some frequency to sacrifice the most basic attribute of any court worthy of the name-the appearance of fairness. This conclusion is a much more fundamental challenge to the Court's integrity than is the simple acknowledgement that a majority of the Justices are biased in favor of the government. Second, to the extent the Court's unfairness becomes common knowledge, its …