Law Commons^™

Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, Elizabeth Pollman

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Why is a corporation a “person” for purposes of the Constitution? This old question has become new again with public outrage over Citizens United, the recent campaign finance case which expanded corporate constitutional speech rights. This Article traces the historical and jurisprudential developments of corporate personhood and concludes that the doctrine’s origins had the limited purview of protecting individuals’ property and contract interests. Over time, the Supreme Court expanded the doctrine without a coherent explanation or consistent approach. The Court has relied on the older cases that were decided in different contexts and on various flawed conceptions of the corporation. …

Plenary No Longer: How The Fourteenth Amendment "Amended" Congressional Jurisdiction-Stripping Power, Maggie Blackhawk

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This Note proposes a solution to the long-standing debate among federal courts scholars as to where to draw the limits of congressional power to strip appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court and to strip original jurisdiction from the lower federal courts. Although the Supreme Court has rarely addressed the possibility of limitations on congressional jurisdiction-stripping power, the few determinative cases to go before the Court reveal an acceptance of the orthodox view of plenary power. Proponents of the orthodox view maintain that state courts, bound to hear constitutional claims by their general jurisdictional grant and to enforce the Constitution by …

Resale Price Maintenance: Consignment Agreements, Copyrighted Or Patented Products And The First Sale Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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The rule of reason adopted for resale price maintenance in the Supreme Court’s Leegin decision, which upset the century old Dr. Miles rule of per se illegality, requires some reconsideration of a number of issues about antitrust treatment of RPM. Under the old per se rule, bona fide “consignment” agreements were not covered by Section 1 of the Sherman Act at all because there was said to be no qualifying “agreement” between the supplier and the dealer. Rather the dealer was simply said to be acting as an agent of the seller. However, insofar as RPM produces competitive dangers, such …

American Needle And The Boundaries Of The Firm In Antitrust Law, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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In American Needle the Supreme Court unanimously held that for the practice at issue the NFL should be treated as a “combination” of its teams rather than a single entity. However, the arrangement must be assessed under the rule of reason. The opinion, written by Justice Stevens, was almost certainly his last opinion for the Court in an antitrust case; Justice Stevens had been a dissenter in the Supreme Court’s Copperweld decision 25 years earlier, which held that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary constituted a single “firm” for antitrust purposes. The Sherman Act speaks to this issue …

American Needle: The Sherman Act, Conspiracy, And Exclusion, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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This essay, part of a colloquium in the CPI Antitrust Journal, explores the meaning and significance of the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle v. NFL. The Supreme Court held that for purposes of the dispute at hand the NFL should be treated as a collaboration of its member teams rather than a single entity. The factors that the Supreme Court considered most important were, first, that the NFL’s member teams are individually owned profit making entities who compete with each other in at least some economic markets, such as that for the sale of apparel bearing NFL symbols. …

The Pleading Problem In Antitrust Cases And Beyond, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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In its Twombly decision the Supreme Court held that an antitrust complaint failed because its allegations did not include enough “factual matter” to justify proceeding to discovery. Two years later the Court extended this new pleading standard to federal complaints generally. Twombly’s broad language has led to a broad rewriting of federal pleading doctrine.

Naked market division conspiracies such as the one pled in Twombly must be kept secret because antitrust enforcers will prosecute them when they are detected. This inherent secrecy, which the Supreme Court did not discuss, has dire consequences for pleading if too much factual specificity …

Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott V. Harris And The Perils Of Cognitive Illiberalism, Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, Donald Braman

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This paper accepts the unusual invitation to see for yourself issued by the Supreme Court in Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007). Scott held that a police officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he deliberately rammed his car into that of a fleeing motorist who refused to pull over for speeding and instead attempted to evade the police in a high-speed chase. The majority did not attempt to rebut the arguments of the single Justice who disagreed with its conclusion that no reasonable juror could find the fleeing driver did not pose a deadly risk …

Citizens Not United: The Lack Of Stockholder Voluntariness In Corporatepolitical Speech, Elizabeth Pollman

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As the Supreme Court reconsiders prior decisions upholding limits on corporate electioneering from general funds, this Essay suggests that the longstanding concern about the lack of stockholder assent to corporate political speech is more compelling than ever. Patterns of U.S. stockholding have significantly changed in the past several decades so as to heighten the concern and caution against a broad overruling of precedents. Stockholders' ability to sell their securities or pursue a derivative action, and other means of "corporate democracy," do not alleviate the concern. A broad decision in favor of Citizens United could leave even stockholders who carefully screen …

Unilateral Refusals To Deal, Vertical Integration, And The Essential Facility Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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Where it applies, the essential facility doctrine requires a monopolist to share its "essential facility." Since the only qualifying exclusionary practice is the refusal to share the facility itself, the doctrine comes about as close as antitrust ever does to condemning "no fault" monopolization. There is no independent justification for an essential facility doctrine separate and apart from general Section 2 doctrine governing the vertically integrated monopolist's refusal to deal. In its Trinko decision the Supreme Court placed that doctrine about where it should be. The Court did not categorically reject all unilateral refusal to deal claims, but it placed …

The Revolution That Wasn't, Elizabeth Magill

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A principal legacy of the Rehnquist Court is its revitalization of doctrines associated with federalism. That jurisprudence has many critics and many defenders. They disagree about how to describe what has happened, the importance of what has happened, and the wisdom of what has happened. But they all agree that something has happened. There has been genuine innovation in this area of constitutional law.

Not so with separation of powers doctrine. Commentators do not perceive important shifts in the doctrine. Nor should they-the reasoning and results in the Rehnquist Court cases are of a piece with what came before. Lack …

Arbitration, Consent And Contractual Theory: The Implications Of Eeoc V.Waffle House, Jaime L. Dodge, Elizabeth Pollman

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Consent has long been the foundation of arbitration, giving the process legitimacy and informing decisions about its nature and structure. The Supreme Court has consistently required consent as a precondition for compelling arbitration. However, it remains unclear what actions constitute consent. In First Options v. Kaplan,1 the Supreme Court held that courts should apply state contract law to determine whether an arbitral clause exists, but “added an important qualification” that “[c]ourts should not assume that the parties have agreed to arbitrate unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so.”2 In the wake of First Options, the courts …

The Real Separation In Separation Of Powers Law, Elizabeth Magill

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This Article argues that contemporary separation of powers commentary is misconceived. Despite the disagreement that dominates the commentary, a closer look at that debate reveals a surprise: commentators subscribe to a consensus about separation of powers. Once exposed, however, that consensus turns out to be underdeveloped, confused, and possibly incoherent. This Article, first, identifies the latent consensus about separation of powers, and, second, critically examines the consensus. The Article argues that the present consensus must be abandoned or refashioned in some as-yet-undeveloped way.

Separation of powers commentary is conventionally thought to be dominated by a contest between adherents of "formalist" …

The Futures Problem, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.

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Perhaps the most difficult problem in addressing mass torts is that of future claimants. "Futures" are those who do not now have claims, because injury has not been sufficiently manifested, but who may well have claims in the future. The Supreme Court's decisions in Amchem and Ortiz appear to have foredoomed any procedural mechanism by which to resolve future claims. This, in turn, will leave defendants in mass tort cases with greatly reduced incentives to participate in mass settlement. That implication makes the possibility of reforms in substantive law perhaps more attractive. In addition, these decisions invite further questions about …

Judicial Restraint And Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez And Seminole Tribe Decisions, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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The Senate hearings considering Elena Kagan’s Supreme Court nomination called new attention to the Constitution's Commerce Clause. That concern might seem odd, given the typical lack of strong grassroots concern over the commerce power. But the 2010 election year is different. One characteristic of the largely conservative "Tea Party" movement is a wish to roll back Constitutional time to the regime envisioned by its founders. As the New York Times reported in early July, 2010, members of the movement believe that the “commerce clause in particular has been pushed beyond recognition.” Members of the movement imagine that Congressional power over …

Removal And The Eleventh Amendment: The Case For District Court Remand Discretion To Avoid A Bifurcated Suit, Mitchell N. Berman

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No abstract provided.