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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Back To The 1930s? The Shaky Case For Exempting Dividends, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Back To The 1930s? The Shaky Case For Exempting Dividends, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Articles
This article is based in part on the author’s U.S. Branch Report for Subject I of the 2003 Annual Congress of the International Fiscal Association, to be held next year in Sydney, Australia (forthcoming in Cahiers de droit fiscal international, 2003). He would like to thank Emil Sunley for his helpful comments on that earlier version, and Steve Bank, Michael Barr, David Bradford, Michael Graetz, and David Hasen for comments on this version. Special thanks are due to Yoram Keinan for his meticulous work on the EU regimes (see Appendix). All errors are the author’s. In this report, Prof. Avi-Yonah …
Internalizing Outsider Trading, Ian Ayres, Stephen Choi
Internalizing Outsider Trading, Ian Ayres, Stephen Choi
Michigan Law Review
Investing in the United States has become a hobby for many. Individual ownership of equity, moreover, has increased over the past decade due in part to the introduction of internet-based trading. While providing the possibility for greater returns compared with bank savings accounts, among other investment alternatives, the public capital markets also pose greater risks for investors. Many individual investors lack both the resources and the incentive to analyze the value of any particular security in the market. Such investors thus trade at a systematic disadvantage relative to more informed parties. In response, regulators have asserted that certain informational disparities …
Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton
Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton
Michigan Law Review
When stock indices drop precipitously, when the startup companies fizzle out, and when it stops raining money on places like Wall Street and Silicon Valley, attention turns to downside contracting. Law and business lawyers, sitting in the back seat as mere facilitators on the upside, move up to the front and sometimes even take the wheel. The job is the same on both the upside and downside: to maximize the value of going concern assets. But what comes easily on the upside can be dirty work on the down, where assets need to be separated from dysfunctional teams of business …
Who Cares?, Adam C. Pritchard
Who Cares?, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
Jim Cox and Randall Thomas have identified an interesting phenomenon in their contribution to this symposium: institutional investors seem to be systematically "leaving money on the table" in securities fraud class actions. For someone who approaches legal questions from an economic perspective, the initial response to this claim is disbelief. As the joke goes, economists do not bend over to pick up twenty-dollar bills on the street. The economist knows that the twenty dollars must be an illusion. In a world of rational actors, someone else already would have picked up that twenty-dollar bill, so the effort spent bending over …
Statutes With Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value Of Ambiguity In Statutory Design And Interpretation, Joseph A. Grundfest, Adam C. Pritchard
Statutes With Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value Of Ambiguity In Statutory Design And Interpretation, Joseph A. Grundfest, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
Ambiguity serves a legislative purpose. When legislators perceive a need to compromise they can, among other strategies, "obscur[e] the particular meaning of a statute, allowing different legislators to read the obscured provisions the way they wish." Legislative ambiguity reaches its peak when a statute is so elegantly crafted that it credibly supports multiple inconsistent interpretations by legislators and judges. Legislators with opposing views can then claim that they have prevailed in the legislative arena, and, as long as courts continue to issue conflicting interpretations, these competing claims of legislative victory remain credible. Formal legal doctrine, in contrast, frames legislative ambiguity …