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Articles 61 - 62 of 62
Full-Text Articles in Law
Legal Theory And The Obligation To Obey, Philip E. Soper
Legal Theory And The Obligation To Obey, Philip E. Soper
Articles
Contributions to this symposium will undoubtedly share, with other recent discussions of the issue, the assumption that one does not need to decide what law is before deciding whether there is an obligation to obey it. More precisely, the assumption seems to be that our ordinary, pre-analytic understanding of "law" provides a completely adequate base for discussions about law's moral authority. The more refined disputes about the nature of law that dominate analytical jurisprudence can thus be ignored.
A New Concept Of Consent And World Public Order, Stuart S. Malawer
A New Concept Of Consent And World Public Order, Stuart S. Malawer
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
There have been, however, many instances under traditional international legal theory when a state's consent has not been required. Professor Brierly, in a trenchant critique, has stated that consent as the basic concept of obligation under customary international law has involved no more than the use of a legal fiction. Moreover, the traditional notion of consent in treaty law has stated that any form of coercion on the state does not invalidate a treaty; freely given consent is not required. Furthermore consent by new states to existing rules of customary international law has been implied regardless of any actual consent. …