Law Commons^™

The President's Enforcement Power, Kate Andrias

Faculty Scholarship

Enforcement of law is at the core of the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care” that the laws are faithfully executed, and it is a primary mechanism for effecting national regulatory policy. Yet questions about how presidents oversee agency enforcement activity have received surprisingly little scholarly attention. This Article provides a positive account of the President’s role in administrative enforcement, explores why presidential enforcement has taken the shape it has, and examines the bounds of the President’s enforcement power. It demonstrates that presidential involvement in agency enforcement, though extensive, has been ad hoc, crisis-driven, and frequently opaque. The Article thus …

"By Some Other Means": Considering The Executive Role In Fostering Subnational Human Rights Compliance, Risa E. Kaufman

Human Rights Institute

The broad realization of human rights domestically requires strong partnership among all levels of government. Indeed, international and domestic law support an important role for state and local governments in implementing the United States’ human rights treaty commitments, with the federal government retaining ultimate responsibility. While the federal government’s responsibility is clear, its options for fostering and facilitating subnational compliance have not been fully explicated. United States’ human rights treaty ratification practices and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence primarily constrain the Executive’s ability to compel state and local compliance without congressional authorization. In the absence of such congressional action, the Executive …

To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Two very different visions of the national government underpin the ongoing battle over the Affordable Care Act (ACA). President Obama and supporters of the ACA believe in the power of government to protect individuals through regulation and collective action. By contrast, the ACA's Republican and Tea Party opponents see expanded government as a fundamental threat to individual liberty and view the requirement that individuals purchase minimum health insurance (the so-called "individual mandate") as the conscription of the healthy to subsidize the sick. This conflict over the federal government's proper role is, of course, not new; it has played out repeatedly …

On The Difficulties Of Generalization – Pcaob In The Footsteps Of Myers, Humphrey’S Executor, Morrison And Freytag, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

In considering what to write for this welcome occasion, I was struck by a certain resonance among Paul's scholarship – at least that of which I was first aware, and which I have often used to impress on students the problems of due process analysis – the important post he now holds, and a story our joint mentor, Walter Gellhorn, liked to tell on himself. In the wake of the Supreme Court's paradigm-shifting opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly, with its confident pronouncement of eight procedural elements that, it reasoned, minimal due process must always require of administrative procedures, Paul made …

The Role Of The Chief Executive In Domestic Administration, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Written for an international working paper conference on administrative law, this paper sets the Supreme Court's decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in the context of general American concerns about the place of the President in domestic administration, a recurring theme in my writings.

Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, Jedediah S. Purdy

Faculty Scholarship

This Article adds a new dimension to the most important and influential strand of recent constitutional theory: popular or democratic constitutionalism, the investigation into how the U.S. Constitution is interpreted (1) as a set of defining national commitments and practices, not necessarily anchored in the text of the document, and (2) by citizens and elected politicians outside the judiciary. Wide-ranging and ground-breaking scholarship in this area has neglected the role of the President as a popular constitutional interpreter, articulating and revising normative accounts of the nation that interact dynamically with citizens' constitutional understandings. This Article sets out a "grammar" of …

Our Twenty-First Century Constitution, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Accommodating our Eighteenth Century Constitution to the government that Congress has shaped in the intervening two and a quarter centuries, Professor Strauss argues, requires accepting the difference between the President’s role as “Commander in Chief” of the Nation’s military, and his right to seek written opinions from those Congress has empowered to administer domestic laws under his oversight. Thus, the question for today is not whether the PCAOB offends Eighteenth Century ideas about government structure, but the question asked by Professors Bruff, Lawson, and Pildes – whether the relationships between PCAOB and SEC, SEC and President meet the constitutional necessity …

Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

A Constitution that strongly separates legislative from executive activity makes it difficult to reconcile executive adoption of regulations (that is, departmentally adopted texts resembling statutes and having the force of law, if valid) with the proposition that the President is not ‘to be a lawmaker’. Such activity is, of course, an essential of government in the era of the regulatory state. United States courts readily accept the delegation to responsible agencies of authority to engage in it, what we call ‘rulemaking’, so long as it occurs in a framework that permits them to assess the legality of any particular exercise. …

Political Control Of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back And Looking Forward, Daniel C. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay explores the mechanisms of control over federal criminal enforcement that the administration and Congress used or failed to use during George W. Bush's presidency. It gives particular attention to Congress, not because legislators played a dominant role, but because they generally chose to play such a subordinate role. My fear is that the media focus on management inadequacies or abuses within the Justice Department during the Bush administration might lead policymakers and observers to overlook the hard questions that remain about how the federal criminal bureaucracy should be structured and guided during a period of rapidly shifting priorities …

Free Enterprise Fund V. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals, Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) under the aegis of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), with President Bush’s support. Its purpose was to replace deficient accounting industry self-regulation with effective external regulation. The choices it made in doing so engendered passionate arguments about constitutionally necessary presidential authority and separation of powers. These divided the D.C. Circuit 2-1 and will be rehearsed before the Supreme Court in the coming weeks. President Bush’s administration defended those choices; Judge Rogers, writing for the majority, found no valid constitutional objection …

Legal Frameworks And Institutional Contexts For Public Consultation Regarding Administrative Action: The United States, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Written for a forthcoming book on e-governance and e-democracy, this essay summarizes the current state of play in electronic rulemaking in the United States. It thus focuses on a context in which the use of electronic consultation by “executive branch” actors engaged in policy-making has been developing for over a decade, and has reached a point of considerable, although not final maturity. Initially developed haphazardly, agency-by-agency, it is now (albeit with friction in the gears) moving towards a centralized regime. The practice is rarely consultative in the full sense the book as a whole will address; while the public is …

Mccain Vs. Obama On Environment, Energy, And Resources, Michael B. Gerrard

Faculty Scholarship

For the first time in living memory, the environment is receiving significant attention in a presidential election. Both Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) have given speeches and run television advertisements on the issue and (after a slow start) are being asked questions by the national press about where they stand on climate change and energy.

This article compares the actions and positions of the two candidates on environmental, energy, and resources issues. It begins by looking at their voting records, presents their endorsements and campaign contributions, and then discusses their positions as shown in their campaign …

The Presidential Signing Statements Controversy, Ronald A. Cass, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Presidential signing statements have come out of obscurity and into the headlines. Along with salutary attention to an interesting issue, the new public visibility of signing statements has generated much overblown commentary. The desire to make these little-known documents interesting to the public – and to score points in the inevitable political battles over any practice engaged in by a sitting President – has produced a lot of discussion that misleads the public and has tended to obscure the significant issues surrounding the use of signing statements. Reflection may help put the discussion in a more useful perspective. We offer …

Overseer, Or "The Decider"? The President In Administrative Law, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

All will agree that the Constitution creates a unitary chief executive officer, the President, at the head of the government Congress defines to do the work its statutes detail. Disagreement arises over what his function entails. Once Congress has defined some element of government and specified its responsibilities, we know that the constitutional roles of both Congress and the courts are those of oversight of the agency and its assigned work, not the actual performance of that work. But is it the same for the President? When Congress confers authority on the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate various forms of …

Bush V. Gore As An Equal Protection Case, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

In Bush v. Gore, the United States Supreme Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to the mechanics of state election administration. The Court invalidated the manual recount of the so-called undervote – that is, ballots that vote-counting machinery had found contained no indication of a vote for President – which the Florida Supreme Court had ordered to determine the winner of Florida's vote for presidential electors in the 2000 presidential election. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that the principles it had previously articulated in applying the Equal Protection Clause to the vote were violated by the Florida court's …

The Clinton Administration And War Powers, Lori Fisler Damrosch

Faculty Scholarship

The strongest of all governmental powers is the power to engage in war; and the strongest challenge for constitutionalism is to bring the war power of the state under meaningful control. The 1787 Constitution allocated some military powers to the Congress and others to the President as part of the scheme of constitutional checks and balances. To this day, however, the distribution of authority between the branches remains contested and uncertain.

The Clinton Administration has had substantial opportunity to contribute to the evolution of constitutional practice concerning war powers, by virtue of numerous occasions of combat deployments, cruise missile strikes, …

Of Prosecutors And Special Prosecutors: An Organizational Perspective, H. Geoffrey Moulton Jr., Daniel Richman

Faculty Scholarship

The Independent Counsel (IC) statute, designed to restore public trust in the impartial administration of criminal justice after Watergate, ultimately fueled rather than quieted the perception that partisan politics drives the investigation of high-ranking government officials. Congress, in an inspiring display of bipartisanship, bid it a muted farewell. The statute's fate was sealed by the enormous controversy surrounding the investigation conducted by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr.

Although Start did not bring criminal charges against President Clinton, his office went pretty far in that direction, committing considerable enforcement resources to that end, bringing criminal charges against people believed to have information …

The President And Choices Not To Enforce, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The executive branch is often called upon to assess how a particular statute it is charged to administer fits within the larger framework of the law. Professor Dawn Johnsen's thoughtful analysis addresses an important subset of these challenges: situations in which the President believes a particular statute is inconsistent with one or another provision of the Constitution and, therefore, should not be enforced. My purpose here is to explore the context of executive non-enforcement more broadly, in a way that may help in understanding the particular problem she addresses.

Issues of constitutional structure and function are among the most daunting …

Beyond The Independent Counsel: Evaluating The Options, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

The Independent Counsel Act expires on June 30, 1999. Should it be extended? Extended with modifications? Radically reformed? Or should it be allowed to sunset with nothing put in its place? To answer these questions, we need to address some more fundamental questions: (1) Do we truly need an independent office to investigate alleged wrongdoing by high-ranking officers of the executive branch? (2) If so, what are the options for the organizational structure of such an office? (3) By what criteria should the different institutional options be evaluated? (4) Under these criteria, which option represents the best, or perhaps more …

The Internal Relations Of Government: Cautionary Tales From Inside The Black Box, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Both the structure of the Constitution and elementary civics texts imagine an Executive Branch under the close, unitary control of an elected chief executive, the President. Doubtless from the start, and unmistakably in the administrative state, the reality has been quite different. Those to whom Congress has delegated authority to act, particularly in that domain that we have in mind when invoking a "government of laws," conduct their business within a web more aptly described as coordination than control. In regulatory matters, the coordinating impulses run through the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and, increasingly, the Office of Information and Regulatory …

Judicial Review Of Discount Rates Used In Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

Executive orders, statutes, and precedent increasingly require cost-benefit analysis of regulations. Presidential executive orders have long required executive agencies to submit regulatory impact analyses to the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") before issuing regulations, and recent federal legislation exhibits a trend toward mandatory cost-benefit analysis. For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, and the recent Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments require the Environmental Protection Agency to balance costs and benefits in regulating chemicals and pesticides. In 1995, Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates Act, requiring cost-benefit analysis of all significant federal regulations that …

Congressional Reviews Of Agency Regulations, Daniel Cohen, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

On March 29, 1996, President Clinton signed Public Law 104-121, the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996. Title II, the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 ("Act"), among other things, added a new chapter 8 to Title 5 of the United States Code. Chapter 8 requires congressional review of agency regulations. Beginning March 29, 1996, all federal agencies, including independent agencies, are required to submit each final and interim final rule for review by Congress and to the General Accounting Office (GAO) before the final or interim final rule can take effect (hereinafter final and interim final …

The Item Veto In State Courts, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

Contemporary debates about state constitutional law have concentrated on the role of state constitutions in the protection of individual rights and have paid less attention to the state constitutional law of government structure.This is ironic since the emergence of a state jurisprudence of individual rights has been hampered by the similarity of the texts of the state and federal constitutional provisions concerning individual rights, whereas many state constitutional provisions dealing with government structure have no federal analogues, and thus state jurisprudence in this area is free to develop outside the dominating shadow of the Federal Constitution and the federal courts. …

Judicial Deference To Executive Precedent, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

In 1984, the Supreme Court adopted a new framework for determining when courts should defer to interpretations of statutes by administrative agencies. Previous decisions had looked to multiple contextual factors in answering this question. Chevron U.S., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. appeared to reject this approach and require that federal courts defer to any reasonable interpretation by an agency charged with administration of a statute, provided Congress has not clearly specified a contrary answer. The Court justified this new general rule of deference by positing that Congress has implicitly delegated interpretative authority to all agencies charged with enforcing …

Ronald V. Dellums V. George Bush (D.D.C. 1990): Memorandum Amicus Curiae Of Law Professors, Bruce A. Ackerman, Abram Chayes, Lori Fisler Damrosch, John Hart Ely, Erwin N. Griswold, Gerald Gunther, Louis Henkin, Harold Hongju Koh, Philip B. Kurland, Laurence H. Tribe, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

This joint memorandum is submitted to the court hearing Dellums v. Bush. This amicus brief advocates that the President may not order American armed forces to make war without consultation with and approval by Congress. The brief also argues that the case is justiciable.

Independent Agencies - Independent From Whom?, Sally Katzen, Edward Markey, James Miller, Joseph Grundfest, R. Gaull Silberman, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Confirmation Process: Law Or Politics?, Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I argued (and still believe) that Judge Robert Bork possessed surpassing qualifications for an appointment to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, I became persuaded that my submission was incomplete. Additional argument was necessary to establish that my testimony, if accepted, imposed a constitutional duty on senators to vote for confirmation. To my surprise, further reflection convinces me that no such argument is possible.

Congress And The Executive: Who Calls The Shots For National Security? – Remarks By Lori Fisler Damrosch, Lori Fisler Damrosch

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Firmage's reaffirmation of the Framers' conception of a President who would wait for congressional instructions appeals to traditional values of democratic control and congressional primacy that have deep roots in our national consciousness. But this model of presidential passivity has some of the same strengths and weaknesses as the advocacy of chastity to solve today's problems of teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease. The basic values may be sound, but when one moves from the assertion of those values to the identification of policy prescriptions, then it becomes clear that contemporary problems are too complex to be solved by …

The Role Of The President And Omb In Informal Rulemaking, Peter L. Strauss, Cass R. Sunstein

Faculty Scholarship

Regulatory reform has been a subject of frequent discussion in the last decade, especially in the context of presidential efforts to assert control over the rulemaking process. Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan have all attempted to increase presidential authority over regulation. In particular, President Reagan has issued two executive orders that give the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) considerable power over the rulemaking activities of executive agencies.

In this article, we set forth our views on the role of presidential supervision in the regulatory process, with particular attention to the questions raised by the recent executive orders.

Presidential War-Making, Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

The Vietnam "war" has convinced many persons that the president of the United States claims apparently unlimited power to commit this country to war. Not surprisingly, therefore, considerable interest has focused on the powers that inhere in the presidency. And many critics of the war – those who in other times and in other contexts might have been sympathetic to a spacious conception of presidential power – have concluded that the Vietnam conflict is not only a tragic error, but is the direct result of unconstitutional conduct by the president. I cannot accept this view; at bottom, it seems to …