Law Commons^™

Groups And Rights In Institutional Reform Litigation, David Marcus

Notre Dame Law Review

Lawsuits pursue institutional reform when plaintiffs ask courts to issue broad, systemic remedies to improve the performance of malfunctioning government programs. Once thought in decline, this litigation persists. Plaintiffs continue to seek judicial protection from dysfunctional prisons, immigration enforcement regimes, foster care systems, and other institutions. But an important aspect of the substantive law that institutional reform litigation involves has gone overlooked. This substantive law often vests rights in groups. An institutional reform lawsuit does not always—or even often—bundle large numbers of individual rights violations. Rather, a group of incarcerated people or children in foster care sues to vindicate a …

Substantive Remedies, Hanoch Dagan, Avihay Dorfman

Notre Dame Law Review

Often, private law remedies enforce or vindicate infringed underlying rights. Substantive remedies are different. Substantive remedies do not aim at restoring these rights; nor do they seek to change them. Instead, substantive remedies adjust the remedial response for a right violation so as to ensure post-wrong justice. They require the law of remedies not merely to look back, but rather to take a second look at the parties’ post-wrong situation. At times, such a second look affects the type of remedy awarded (damages in lieu of injunctive relief); in other cases—for instance, the tort doctrine of crushing liability—it imposes a …

Class Action Squared: Multistate Actions And Agency Dilemmas, Elysa M. Dishman

Notre Dame Law Review

As the Supreme Court continues to restrict the reach of private class actions, numerous commentators have championed public enforcement actions by state attorneys general (AGs) as a superior alternative to hold corporations accountable for misconduct. While AG actions fill some of the void left by the forced retreat of the private class action, few scholars have seriously considered whether the agency problems that exist in private class actions also occur in AG actions. And, until now, no scholar has recognized the unique agency problems that arise when AGs act together in multistate actions.

Multistate actions are made up of two …

The Remand Power And The Supreme Court's Role, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Notre Dame Law Review

“Reversed and remanded.” Or “vacated and remanded.” These familiar words, often found at the end of an appellate decision, emphasize that an appellate court’s conclusion that the lower court erred generally does not end the litigation. The power to remand for further proceedings rather than wrap up a case is useful for appellate courts because they may lack the institutional competence to bring the case to a final resolution (as when new factual findings are necessary) or lack an interest in the fact-specific work of applying a newly announced legal standard to the particular circumstances at hand. The modern Supreme …

Does Docket Size Matter? Revisiting Empirical Accounts Of The Supreme Court's Incredibly Shrinking Docket, Michael Heise, Martin T. Wells, Dawn M. Chutkow

Notre Dame Law Review

Drawing on data from every Supreme Court Term between 1940 and 2017, this Article revisits, updates, and expands prior empirical work by Ryan Owens and David Simon (2012) finding that ideological, contextual, and institutional factors contributed to the Court’s declining docket. This Article advances Owens and Simon’s work in three ways: broadening the scope of the study by including nine additional Court Terms (through 2017), adding alternative ideological and nonideological variables into the model, and considering alternative model specifications. What emerges from this update and expansion, however, is less clarity and more granularity and complexity. While Owens and Simon emphasized …

Prior Art In The District Court, Stephen Yelderman

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article is an empirical study of the evidence district courts rely upon when invalidating patents. To construct our dataset, we collected every district court ruling, verdict form, and opinion (whether reported or unreported) invalidating a patent claim over a six-and-a-half-year period. We then coded individual invalidity rulings based on the prior art supporting the court’s decision, observing 3320 invalidation events relying on 817 distinct prior art references.

The nature of the prior art relied upon to invalidate patents is relevant to two distinct sets of policy questions. First, this data sheds light on the value of district court litigation …

State Standing And National Injunctions, Bradford Mank, Michael E. Solimine

Notre Dame Law Review

Most of the growing literature on national injunctions makes only passing mention, if at all, of states being plaintiffs or of the appropriateness of state standing and how it might bear on the geographic scope of an injunction. This Essay undertakes to fill that gap in a more extended way. Part I of the Essay addresses the issue of state standing in suits against the federal government, and argues that such standing is well grounded in the traditional parens patriae powers of states and should be permitted to protect the health, welfare, and natural resources of their citizens. That is, …

The Private Rights Of Public Governments, Seth Davis

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay charts the analytical and doctrinal confusion arising from the category of “proprietary” interests in state standing law. This category might be taken literally to include only the ownership of property and interests that stem from it. It might refer to interests that are analogous to those that a private corporation might litigate, or instead to any type of financial injury a state might suffer. Other possibilities would limit “proprietary” interests to those interests recognized under the common law, or only those interests recognized under private law. Perhaps the most that can be said is that “proprietary” interests should …

Quasi-Sovereign Standing, F. Andrew Hessick

Notre Dame Law Review

Judges have concluded that states do not have standing based on their quasi-sovereign interests to sue the United States for not obeying the law. Two different reasons have been given. First, because a state can assert quasi-sovereign interests only in its capacity of representing its residents, a state has standing to press those interests only if it can demonstrate that its residents have suffered an injury in fact. On this view, states do not have general standing to sue the federal government for disobeying the law; they have standing only if they can show that the disobedience injured a resident. …

Reining In State Standing, Ann Woolhandler, Michael G. Collins

Notre Dame Law Review

In upholding standing in Massachusetts v. EPA, Justice Stevens said that states “are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.” While one might agree that the states are not normal litigants, that abnormality might well suggest that states should get standing less easily than private parties.

As a historical matter, states were limited in the kinds of cases they could bring in the federal courts. States typically could not litigate their sovereignty interests (their powers to govern to the exclusion of other governments), nor could they litigate their parens patriae interests (the interests of their citizens) …

State Standing For Nationwide Injunctions Against The Federal Government, Jonathan R. Nash

Notre Dame Law Review

Recent years have seen a substantial increase of cases in which states seek, and indeed obtain, nationwide injunctions against the federal government. These cases implicate two complicated questions: first, when a state has standing to sue the federal government, and second, when a nationwide injunction is a proper form of relief. For their part, scholars have mostly addressed these questions separately. In this Essay, I analyze the two questions together. Along the way, I identify drawbacks and benefits of nationwide injunctions, as well as settings where nationwide injunctions may be desirable and undesirable. I present arguments that, although I do …

Standing For Nothing, Robert A. Mikos

Notre Dame Law Review

A growing number of courts and commentators have suggested that states have Article III standing to protect state law. Proponents of such “protective” standing argue that states must be given access to federal court whenever their laws are threatened. Absent such access, they claim, many state laws might prove toothless, thereby undermining the value of the states in our federal system. Furthermore, proponents insist that this form of special solicitude is very limited—that it opens the doors to the federal courthouses a crack but does not swing them wide open. This Essay, however, contests both of these claims, and thus, …

An Organizational Account Of State Standing, Katherine M. Crocker

Notre Dame Law Review

Again and again in regard to recent high-profile disputes, the legal community has tied itself in knots over questions about when state plaintiffs should have standing to sue in federal court, especially in cases where they seek to sue federal-government defendants. Lawsuits challenging everything from the Bush administration’s environmental policies to the Obama administration’s immigration actions to the Trump administration’s travel bans have become mired in tricky and technical questions about whether state plaintiffs belonged in federal court.

Should state standing cause so much controversy and confusion? This Essay argues that state plaintiffs are far more like at least one …

State Standing's Uncertain Stakes, Aziz Z. Huq

Notre Dame Law Review

I offer a quite modest contribution to debates on state standing. I do not offer “right answers.” Rather, I posit that it is useful to understand the “stakes” of state standing. By “stakes,” I mean the practical consequences of resolving, one way or another, the unsettled doctrinal choices respecting the ability of states to initiate a matter in federal courts. Why, that is, does state standing matter? An inquiry into stakes can usefully proceed stepwise. A first task is to identify the subset of state standing cases that presently elicit division among the Justices. A second task is to articulate …

State Standing And Cooperative Federalism, Ernest A. Young

Notre Dame Law Review

State lawsuits challenging federal policy generally encounter arguments that the states lack standing to sue, either under Article III’s “case or controversy” clause or under various prudential standing doctrines. These arguments have often taken novel forms—such as claims that states’ injuries are “self-inflicted” or offset by other benefits of federal policies—that have few precedents or analogs in the standing jurisprudence governing suits by private individuals. The United States has taken the position, in other words, that states should have special disabilities in filing lawsuits that would not apply to ordinary litigants. Likewise, prominent academics have argued that uniquely narrow standing …

Foreword: Some Puzzles Of State Standing, Tara L. Grove

Notre Dame Law Review

When should states have standing? In recent years, there has been an explosion in literature on that question. Yet, even today, there seem to be as many questions as answers. In this Foreword to the Notre Dame Law Review's 2019 Federal Courts, Practice, and Procedure Symposium on state standing, I discuss a few such puzzles. First, should states have “special” standing when they sue the federal government—that is, greater access to federal court than private parties? Second, and conversely, should states have at least “equal” access to federal court, or should they face more barriers than private parties? These …

The Demise Of § 1983 Malicious Prosecution: Separating Tort Law From The Fourth Amendment, Erin E. Mcmannon

Notre Dame Law Review

The common-law tort of malicious prosecution originally developed to provide a remedy for plaintiffs who were unjustly prosecuted in a criminal proceeding. Today, malicious prosecution actions can be brought to redress wrongful civil actions as well. The “central thrust” of an action for malicious prosecution is a right not to be involved in an unjustified litigation.

This Note suggests that the confusion in this area of law derives from the use of the language of malicious prosecution tort law to describe what really amounts to a Fourth Amendment seizure claim under § 1983. There is no constitutional right to be …

The Discrimination Presumption, Joseph A. Seiner

Notre Dame Law Review

Employment discrimination is a fact in our society. Scientific studies continue to show that employer misconduct in the workplace is pervasive. This social science research is further supported by governmental data and litigation statistics. Even in the face of this evidence, however, it has never been more difficult to successfully bring a claim of employment discrimination. After the Supreme Court’s controversial decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, all civil litigants must sufficiently plead enough facts to give rise to a plausible claim. Empirical studies show that this plausibility test has been rigidly applied in …

The New Oral Argument: Justices As Advocates, Tonja Jacobi, Matthew Sag

Notre Dame Law Review

No abstract provided.

Evidence Without Rules, Bennett Capers

Notre Dame Law Review

Much of what we tell ourselves about the Rules of Evidence—that they serve as an all-seeing gatekeeper, checking evidence for relevance and trustworthiness, screening it for unfair prejudice—is simply wrong. In courtrooms every day, fact finders rely on “evidence”—for example, a style of dress, the presence of family members in the gallery, and of course race—that rarely passes as evidence in the formal sense, and thus breezes past evidentiary gatekeepers unseen and unchecked. This Article calls much needed attention to this other evidence and demonstrates that such unregulated evidence matters. Jurors use this other evidence to decide whether to find …

Aggregation As Disempowerment: Red Flags In Class Action Settlements, Howard M. Erichson

Notre Dame Law Review

Class action critics and proponents cling to the conventional wisdom that class actions empower claimants. Critics complain that class actions over-empower claimants and put defendants at a disadvantage, while proponents defend class actions as essential to consumer protection and rights enforcement. This Article explores how class action settlements sometimes do the opposite. Aggregation empowers claimants’ lawyers by consolidating power in the lawyers’ hands. Consolidation of power allows defendants to strike deals that benefit themselves and claimants’ lawyers while disadvantaging claimants. This Article considers the phenomenon of aggregation as disempowerment by looking at specific settlement features that benefit plaintiffs’ counsel and …

Compensation's Role In Deterrence, Russell M. Gold

Notre Dame Law Review

There are plenty of noneconomic reasons to care whether victims are compensated in class actions. The traditional law-and-economics view, however, is that when individual claim values are small, there is no reason to care whether victims are compensated. Rather than compensation deterring wrongdoing is tort law’s primary economic objective. And on this score, law-and-economics scholars contend that only the aggregate amount of money that a defendant expects to pay affects deterrence. They say that it does not matter for deterrence purposes how that money is split between victims, lawyers, and charities. This Article challenges that claim about achieving tort law’s …

The Coupon Quandry: Restructuring Incentives In Cafa Coupon Settlements, Michael Gallagher Ii

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a background of coupon settlements with special attention paid to the incentives of class counsel. Part II outlines CAFA’s relevant statutory provisions and examines them in light of the “Purposes” section in the statute and the Senate report accompanying the legislation—the most illuminating indicia of legislative intent. Part III examines the rationale supporting both cases in the circuit split and the implications behind both interpretive regimes. Part IV argues that the Seventh Circuit has the better legal argument for two reasons: (1) its strong textual argument; and (2) its support found …

The Runaway Wagon: How Past School Discrimination, Finance, And Adequacy Case Law Warrants A Political Question Approach To Education Reform Litigation, Anthony Bilan

Notre Dame Law Review

Courtroom battles surrounding school finance and adequacy claims are very much alive today, nearly forty years after their progenitor, Serrano v. Priest. In spawning a potential new chapter in this history, a trial court in California struck down its state’s battalion of teacher tenure and employment laws under a legal analysis based in the education quality that those laws provided. This “landmark” case, Vergara, is generating conversation that its results could be duplicated throughout the nation. In a format familiar to school finance litigation, the Vergara court found that the state’s tenure statutes so detrimentally affected teaching that …

The Big Data Jury, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson

Notre Dame Law Review

Big data technologies now exist to create algorithmically perfect jury pools matching the demographic realities of a community. Big data technologies also exist to provide litigants a wealth of personal information about potential jurors. The question remains whether these technological innovations benefit the jury system. This Article addresses the disruptive impact of big data on jury selection and the dilemma it presents to courts, lawyers, and citizens.

Is Expert Evidence Really Different?, Frederick Schauer, Barbara A. Spellman

Notre Dame Law Review

The problem with expert evidence is not the inappropriateness of the Daubert approach. The narrow focus on Daubert is misplaced. The real problem is with the more deeply entrenched view that expert evidence should be excluded under circumstances in which analogous non-expert evidence would be admitted. Daubert embodies the distinction between expert and non-expert evidence, but it is that very distinction, and not just Daubert, that is the problem. Daubert has indeed transformed modern evidence law, but perhaps it has awakened us to the need for a more profound transformation, one in which the very foundations of treating expert …

The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance To The Daubert Revolution, David E. Bernstein

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article reviews the history of the evolution of the rules for the admissibility of expert testimony since the 1980s, the revolutionary nature of what ultimately emerged, and the consistent efforts by recalcitrant judges to stop or roll back the changes, even after Rule 702 was amended to explicitly incorporate a strict interpretation of those changes.

Part I reviews the law of expert testimony through the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision. Critics had charged for decades that the adversarial system was a failure with regard to expert testimony. Parties to litigation, they argued, often presented expert testimony of dubious validity because …

Confusion Isn't Everything, William Mcgeveran, Mark P. Mckenna

Notre Dame Law Review

The typical shorthand justification for trademark rights centers on avoiding consumer confusion. But in truth, this encapsulation mistakes a method for a purpose: confusion merely serves as an indicator of the underlying problems that trademark law seeks to prevent. Other areas of law accept confusion or mistake of all kinds, intervening only when those errors lead to more serious harms. Likewise, every theory of trademark rights considers confusion troubling solely because it threatens more fundamental values such as fair competition or informative communication. In other words, when it comes to the deep purposes of trademark law, confusion isn’t everything.

Yet …

An Argument Against Open-File Discovery In Criminal Cases, Brian P. Fox

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note argues that, for the most part, open-file discovery proponents fail to recognize the added burden that defense counsel would face under a regime in which all items of the prosecution’s evidence are available for investigation by the defense. This is particularly true in the eighty to ninety percent of criminal cases where the defendant is indigent, and the court appointed defense counsel is operating under strict resource constraints.

This Note also argues that advocates of open-file discovery fail to recognize that in the majority of cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor’s intentional wrongdoing will be sufficient to overshadow …