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The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer Jan 2013

The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

This Article provides the first look at patent litigation hazards for public firms during the 1980s and 1990s. Litigation is more likely when prospective plaintiffs acquire more patents, when firms are larger and technologically close and when prospective defendants spend more on research and development ("R&D"). The latter suggests inadvertent infringement may be more important than piracy. Public firms face dramatically increased hazards of litigation as plaintiffs and even more rapidly increasing hazards as defendants, especially for small public firms. The increase cannot be explained by patenting rates, R&D, firm value or industry composition. Legal changes are the most likely …


Recent Developments In Third-Party Funding, Victoria Sahani Jan 2013

Recent Developments In Third-Party Funding, Victoria Sahani

Faculty Scholarship

This article addresses recent developments in third-party funding that occurred during late 2012 and early 2013 in the three leading jurisdictions: Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The most important developments are the following. On 22 April 2013, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) issued regulatory guidelines clarifying the status of funders with respect to ASIC’s regulations and detailing how funders should manage conflicts of interest and handle certain provisions of their funding arrangements. In the United Kingdom, the Jackson Reforms took effect on 1 April 2013, bringing sweeping changes to the allowable fee agreements, discovery rules …


The Litigation Finance Contract, Maya Steinitz Nov 2012

The Litigation Finance Contract, Maya Steinitz

Faculty Scholarship

Litigation funding-for-profit, nonrecourse funding of a litigation by a nonparty-is a new and rapidly developing industry. It has been described as one of the "biggest and most influential trends in civil justice" today by RAND, the New York Times, and others. Despite the importance and growth of the industry, there is a complete absence of information about or discussion of litigation finance contracting, even though all the promises and pitfalls of litigation funding stem from the relationships those contracts establish and organize. Further, the literature and case law pertaining to litigation funding have evolved from an analogy between litigation funding …


The Private Costs Of Patent Litigation, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer Oct 2012

The Private Costs Of Patent Litigation, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

This paper estimates the total cost of patent litigation to alleged infringers. We use a large sample of stock market event studies around the date of lawsuit filings for US public firms from 1984-99. We find that the total costs of litigation are much greater than legal fees and costs are large even for lawsuits that settle. Lawsuits cost alleged infringers about $28.7 million ($92) in the mean and $2.9 million in the median. Moreover, infringement risk rose sharply during the late 1990s to over 14% of R&D spending. Small firms have lower risk relative to R&D.


The Economics Of Third-Party Financed Litigation, Keith N. Hylton Apr 2012

The Economics Of Third-Party Financed Litigation, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines the law and economics of third-party financed litigation. I explore the conditions under which a system of third-party financiers and litigators can enhance social welfare, and the conditions under which it is likely to reduce social welfare. Among the applications I consider are the sale of legal rights (such as contingent tort claims) to insurers, to patent trolls, and to financiers generally


Trial Selection Theory And Evidence, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin Mar 2012

Trial Selection Theory And Evidence, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter presents a review of trial selection theory. We use the term “trial selection theory” to refer to models that attempt to explain or predict the characteristics that distinguish cases that are litigated to judgment from those that settle, and the implications of those characteristics for the development of legal doctrine and for important trial outcome parameters, such as the plaintiff win rate. Using this definition, trial selection theory can be said to have started with Priest and Klein (1984).


Clarity And Clarification: Grable Federal Questions In The Eyes Of Their Beholders, Elizabeth Mccuskey Jan 2012

Clarity And Clarification: Grable Federal Questions In The Eyes Of Their Beholders, Elizabeth Mccuskey

Faculty Scholarship

Jurists and commentators have repeated for centuries the refrain that jurisdictional rules should be clear.' Behind this mantra is the idea that clearly designed jurisdictional rules should enable trial courts to apply the law more easily and therefore allow litigants to predict more accurately how trial courts will rule.2 The mantra's ultimate goal is efficiency-that trial courts not labor too long on jurisdiction and, most important, that litigants can accurately predict the correct forum and choose to spend their money litigating the merits of their claim, rather than where it will be heard. Jurisdictional clarity largely is devoted …


Tdm Special Issue: Contingent Fees And Third Party Funding In Investment Arbitration Disputes, Joseph Matthews, Maya Steinitz Jan 2011

Tdm Special Issue: Contingent Fees And Third Party Funding In Investment Arbitration Disputes, Joseph Matthews, Maya Steinitz

Faculty Scholarship

In this Special Mini-Edition of the Transnational Dispute Management Journal, co-editors Prof. Maya Steinitz and Joe Matthews have collected, edited and TDM now publishes original works by four authors who advance the critical analysis of issues raised by the increased presence of contingent fees and third party funding in connection with international investment disputes. TDM is also pleased to re-publish with permission an article authored by Prof. Steinitz in the Minnesota Law Review in January of this year entitled "Whose Claim is This Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding."


Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding, Maya Steinitz Jan 2011

Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding, Maya Steinitz

Faculty Scholarship

Third party litigation funding, or litigation finance, is a new industry composed of institutional investors who invest in litigation by providing finance in return for an ownership stake in a legal claim and a contingency in the recovery. Its emergence has been recognized as one of the most significant developments in civil litigation today. It will transform access to justice, and affect numerous areas of the law including corporate law, torts, intellectual property, environmental law, employment law and international law. Hailing from the U.K. and Australia, the practice is de facto prohibited in the U.S., largely through ethical rules disallowing …


The Economics Of Public Nuisance Law And The New Enforcement Actions, Keith N. Hylton Jan 2010

The Economics Of Public Nuisance Law And The New Enforcement Actions, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

In contrast to the traditional legal commentary, I find nuisance law to be a coherent body of rules that serves an explainable function. Nuisance optimally regulates activity levels. Nuisance law induces actors to choose socially optimal activity levels by imposing liability when externalized costs are far in excess of externalized benefits or far in excess of background external costs. The new enforcement actions for lead paint abatement or gun control purposes have an arguable theoretical basis in nuisance law. However, as currently framed, the lawsuits are inconsistent with significant parts of the doctrine and the theory.


Balancing Of Markets, Litigation And Regulation, Keith N. Hylton, Larry E. Ribstein, Paul H. Rubin, Todd J. Zywicki Jan 2010

Balancing Of Markets, Litigation And Regulation, Keith N. Hylton, Larry E. Ribstein, Paul H. Rubin, Todd J. Zywicki

Faculty Scholarship

In addition to judicial education programs that the Law and Economics Center conducts, we also have a division that focuses on public policy research, known as the Searle Civil Justice Institute. In November, we held a public policy roundtable where we commissioned a variety of research and brought together a group of experts, both academic and practitioner experts, to discuss the issue of balancing the appropriate roles of markets, litigation, and regulation. And the notion there is that each one - markets, litigation, and regulation - can and probably should play a role in addressing various consumer harms.


Analysis Of Videotape Evidence In Police Misconduct Cases, Martin A. Schwartz, Jessica Silbey, Jack Ryan, Gail Donoghue Jan 2009

Analysis Of Videotape Evidence In Police Misconduct Cases, Martin A. Schwartz, Jessica Silbey, Jack Ryan, Gail Donoghue

Faculty Scholarship

Many evidentiary issues arise with respect to the admission of videotape evidence and computer generated simulations at trial, and the authors of this Article address these issues as they arise in police misconduct cases. Professor Schwartz provides insight into and analysis of the evidentiary principles that govern the use of video and computer simulation evidence at trial in cases where police misconduct is at issue. His discussion first addresses the issues that concern the admissibility of videotape evidence, then discusses the role of a videotape on summary judgment, and lastly, analyzes evidentiary issues with respect to computer generated simulations.


When Should A Case Be Dismissed? The Economics Of Pleading And Summary Judgment Standards, Keith N. Hylton Jan 2008

When Should A Case Be Dismissed? The Economics Of Pleading And Summary Judgment Standards, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper applies a simple economic framework to the choice between pleading and summary judgment as points at which a claim can be dismissed. It concludes generally that pleading standards should vary with the evidentiary demands of the associated legal standards and the social costs of litigation. The common law's imposition of higher pleading standards for fraud claims is consistent with this proposition. The theory implies that the rigorous summary judgment standards that have been developed by antitrust courts should lead to a correspondingly rigorous assessment at the pleading stage.


Information, Litigation, And Common Law Evolution, Keith N. Hylton Apr 2006

Information, Litigation, And Common Law Evolution, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

It is common in the legal academy to describe judicial decision trends leading to new common law rules as resulting from conscious judicial effort. Evolutionary models of litigation, in contrast, treat common law as resulting from pressure applied by litigants. One apparent difficulty in the theory of litigation is explaining how trends in judicial decisions favoring one litigant, and biasing the legal standard, could occur. This article presents a model in which an apparent bias in the legal standard can occur in the absence of any effort toward this end on the part of judges. Trends can develop favoring the …


Lessons For Patent Policy From Empirical Research On Patent Litigation, Michael J. Meurer, James Bessen Apr 2005

Lessons For Patent Policy From Empirical Research On Patent Litigation, Michael J. Meurer, James Bessen

Faculty Scholarship

This Article reviews empirical patent litigation research to reveal patent policy lessons. First, the Article presents facts about patent litigation. Next, it analyzes the patent premium. Patent litigation research reveals little about the magnitude of the patent premium, but the research reveals the strategies firms use to capture the patent premium and the patent policy instruments that determine the patent premium. Next, the Article evaluates the patent prosecution process and notes that making efforts to refine a patent application can affect the value of the patent. The Article then identifies reforms for improving PTO performance. Finally, the Article discusses policy …


Common Law Disclosure Duties And The Sin Of Omission: Testing The Meta-Theories, Kimberly Krawiec, Kathryn Zeiler Jan 2005

Common Law Disclosure Duties And The Sin Of Omission: Testing The Meta-Theories, Kimberly Krawiec, Kathryn Zeiler

Faculty Scholarship

Since ancient times, legal scholars have explored the vexing question of when and what a contracting party must disclose to her counterparty, even in the absence of explicit misleading statements. This fascination has culminated in a set of claims regarding which factors drive courts to impose disclosure duties on informed parties. Most of these claims are based on analysis of a small number of non-randomly selected cases and have not been tested systematically. This article represents the first attempt to systematically test a number of these claims using data coded from 466 case decisions spanning over a wide array of …


Why Do Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties Under Section 1983, Jack M. Beermann Nov 2004

Why Do Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties Under Section 1983, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The subject of this article is why people make federal cases, under section 1983,' out of claims they have against private parties. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against "any person" who, while acting "under color of' state law, subjects or causes the plaintiff to be subjected to a violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. The requirement that the defendant act under color of law means that the typical section 1983 claim is brought against state and local government officials or entities, not against private individuals or entities. However, there are situations in which a private party (i.e. …


How Like A Winter? The Plight Of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate Representation, Susan P. Koniak Oct 2004

How Like A Winter? The Plight Of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate Representation, Susan P. Koniak

Faculty Scholarship

Class actions assume absent class members. 2 Notices in class actions tell class members that they need not show up in the courthouse, although they may if they choose.3 Class members are told that class counsel and the named class representatives will look out for them, although if they choose to hire their own lawyer, she may appear on their behalf.4 They are also routinely told that once the decision in the class action becomes final they will be bound by it, losing any and all right to protest the resolution of their claims by the class action …


The Economics Of Litigation And Arbitration: An Application To Franchise Contracts, Keith N. Hylton, Christopher R. Drahozal Jun 2003

The Economics Of Litigation And Arbitration: An Application To Franchise Contracts, Keith N. Hylton, Christopher R. Drahozal

Faculty Scholarship

If we define the deterrence benefits from contract enforcement as avoided harms net of avoidance costs, we should expect contracting parties to choose the dispute resolution forum that provides the greatest difference between deterrence benefits and dispute resolution costs for every type of dispute. We apply this general framework to franchise contracts and conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of arbitration agreements among franchising parties. Although it is obvious that contracting parties have an incentive to choose arbitration in order to reduce dispute-resolution costs, there have been no studies of the importance of deterrence concerns. We examine the deterrence …


Controlling Opportunistic And Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, Michael J. Meurer Jan 2003

Controlling Opportunistic And Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

It is useful to think of intellectual property (IP) law both as a system of property rights that promotes the production of valuable information and as a system of government regulation that unintentionally promotes socially harmful rent-seeking. This Article analyzes methods of controlling rent-seeking costs associated with opportunistic and anti-competitive IP lawsuits. My thinking is guided to some extent by the analysis of procedural measures for controlling frivolous litigation, and analysis of antitrust reforms designed to control strategic abuse of antitrust law. These analogies lead me to focus on pre-trial and post-trial control measures that reduce the credibility of weak …


Secret Settlements And Practice Restrictions Aid Lawyer Cartels And Cause Other Harms, Susan P. Koniak, David Dana Jan 2003

Secret Settlements And Practice Restrictions Aid Lawyer Cartels And Cause Other Harms, Susan P. Koniak, David Dana

Faculty Scholarship

In this article, the authors argue that the use of secrecy agreements and practice restrictions in settlement contracts should be prohibited not only by the ethics rules, but also by criminal and civil law. The authors begin by discrediting four arguments that are traditionally employed to support the use of secrecy agreements and practice restrictions. They then argue that the use of secrecy agreements and practice restrictions generate substantial costs, but do not secure any legitimate benefits that could not be attained by other, less costly means. The authors also explain how the problems caused by secrecy agreements and practice …


An Asymmetric Information Model Of Litigation, Keith N. Hylton Aug 2002

An Asymmetric Information Model Of Litigation, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents a cradle-to-grave model of tort liability, incorporating the decision to comply with the due-care standard, the decision to file suit, and the decision to settle. I use the model primarily to examine settlement rates, plaintiff win rates, and compliance with the due-care standard. The key results of the model are as follows: (1) litigation to judgment occurs only when some but not all actors comply with the due-care standard, and (2) if defendants have the information advantage at trial, plaintiff win rates generally will be less than 50 percent. I apply the model and its simulation results …


Welfare Implications Of Costly Litigation Under Strict Liability, Keith N. Hylton Apr 2002

Welfare Implications Of Costly Litigation Under Strict Liability, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines a model of strict liability with costly litigation and presents conditions under which (1) potential injurers take optimal precautions, (2) increasing the cost of litigation enhances precaution and social welfare, (3) the optimal level of liability exceeds the compensatory level, and (4) increasing the rate of settlement enhances social welfare. The results have implications for controversies surrounding fee shifting, optimal damage awards (e.g., punitive damages), and the social desirability of settlement. The most striking implication is that fee shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs is socially desirable in low-transaction-cost settings.


Symposium: Regulatory And Liability Considerations, Michael S. Baram, Ellen Flannery, Patricia Davis, Gary Marchant Jan 2000

Symposium: Regulatory And Liability Considerations, Michael S. Baram, Ellen Flannery, Patricia Davis, Gary Marchant

Faculty Scholarship

You can tell from remarks by prior speakers that regulatory approvals and liability prevention are of critical importance to progress in biomaterials. Gene therapy trials and the tragic outcomes of some of those trials have raised the specter of government suspension of clinical studies, termination of funding, and potential liability for personal injury under malpractice or products liability doctrines. Regulatory requirements and the terms of research grants and contracts have to be very carefully addressed by organizations testing, developing, making, selling and using biomaterials, biotechnology, and medical devices. However, many regulatory requirements are incomplete, ambiguous and confusing because the agencies …


Symposium: Patent Rights And Licensing, Michael S. Baram, Ashley Stevens, Thomas Meyers, Michael J. Meurer Jan 2000

Symposium: Patent Rights And Licensing, Michael S. Baram, Ashley Stevens, Thomas Meyers, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

This panel will discuss intellectual property - the patent incentive, patentability issues, licensing, and litigation-related matters. It will be moderated by Dr. Ashley Stevens, the Director of the Office of Technology Transfer at Boston University. Ashley has multiple degrees, including a doctorate in physical chemistry from Oxford University. He has worked in the biotech industry for a number of years, mostly with startup companies and academic research organizations such as the Dana Farber Cancer Institute, where he was also Director of Technology Transfer. Ashley was instrumental in the startup and operations of firms such as Biotechnica International, and started his …


Comments On Rooker-Feldman Or Let State Law Be Our Guide, Jack M. Beermann May 1999

Comments On Rooker-Feldman Or Let State Law Be Our Guide, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

I feel privileged to have been asked to be a commentator on the three principal papers in this symposium. These are three excellent papers, and although there has been some valuable commentary on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, there will be no need to go beyond these papers to gain a full appreciation of the doctrine, its applications, and its problems, which run as deep as the problems of any doctrine.


"Presumptions And Burdens Of Proof As Tools For Legal Stability And Change, Tamar Frankel Jul 1994

"Presumptions And Burdens Of Proof As Tools For Legal Stability And Change, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Presumptions and burdens of proof are used, among other purposes, to maintain legal stability and at the same time effect change. By imposing the burden of proof on the party asserting a certain outcome, courts can calibrate burdens of proof and substantive rules until experience points to rule retention or amendment. As agents of change, presumptions and burdens of proof are far more flexible and less brittle than rules.1

This Article tells the story of presumptions and burdens of proof in litigation between corporate shareholders and managements. This litigation is replete with volatile presumptions and innovative burdens of proof, …


The Use Of Risk Assessment Evidence To Prove Increased Risk And Alternative Causation In Toxic Tort Litigation, Michael S. Baram Oct 1990

The Use Of Risk Assessment Evidence To Prove Increased Risk And Alternative Causation In Toxic Tort Litigation, Michael S. Baram

Faculty Scholarship

Due to the difficulties of proving causation in most toxic tort suits, plaintiffs and defendants in toxic tort litigation have begun to develop and use scientifically sophisticated risk assessments as evidence in proving or disproving causation. This use has led to two new trends in tort liability. First, there is the trend in which risk assessment is used by plaintiffs to buttress claims for future injury or increased risk. Second, there is the trend in which risk assessment is used by defendants to establish that other factors caused, in whole or in part, plaintiffs’ injuries.

This article evaluates these two …


The Influence Of Litigation Costs On Deterrence Under Strict Liability And Under Negligence, Keith N. Hylton Jan 1990

The Influence Of Litigation Costs On Deterrence Under Strict Liability And Under Negligence, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines the influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under negligence. By deterrence, I refer to the effect of the threat of liability on the care exercised by potential injurers. More precisely, this paper takes litigation costs as given and examines the social desirability of the levels of care exercised under negligence and under strict liability.


Use Of Comparative Risk Methods In Regulatory And Common Law, Michael S. Baram Jan 1987

Use Of Comparative Risk Methods In Regulatory And Common Law, Michael S. Baram

Faculty Scholarship

Several persistent problems afflict risk decisionmaking. In the regulatory context, agencies confront the problems of how to prioritize risks for best use of their limited resources and how to determine "how safe is safe enough," or a risk limit, when action is to be taken on a particular risk.

In the trial courts hearing toxic tort actions, the jury must often determine whether an activity is "unreasonably dangerous" or a product is "defective" because of its risk attributes.

To resolve these problems, many have proposed the use of risk comparisons. Now that we can quantify risks, why not compare them …