Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 31 - 44 of 44

Full-Text Articles in Law

Unilateral Refusals To Deal, Vertical Integration, And The Essential Facility Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jul 2008

Unilateral Refusals To Deal, Vertical Integration, And The Essential Facility Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Where it applies, the essential facility doctrine requires a monopolist to share its "essential facility." Since the only qualifying exclusionary practice is the refusal to share the facility itself, the doctrine comes about as close as antitrust ever does to condemning "no fault" monopolization. There is no independent justification for an essential facility doctrine separate and apart from general Section 2 doctrine governing the vertically integrated monopolist's refusal to deal. In its Trinko decision the Supreme Court placed that doctrine about where it should be. The Court did not categorically reject all unilateral refusal to deal claims, but it placed …


The Antitrust Standard For Unlawful Exclusionary Conduct, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jun 2008

The Antitrust Standard For Unlawful Exclusionary Conduct, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay considers the general definition of unlawful exclusionary practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act as acts that: (1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals; and (2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits claimed for them, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to any resulting benefits. An important purpose of this progression of queries is to permit the court to avoid balancing, although balancing certainly cannot be avoided in some close cases. The given definition is very …


Patent Deception In Standard Setting: The Case For Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp May 2008

Patent Deception In Standard Setting: The Case For Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Many patent applications are rejected upon initial submission, but they are almost never rejected with absolute finality. Further, subsequent to filing its original application a patent applicant might wish to write an application with broader or somewhat different claims, or perhaps add claims that were not made in the original application. Or it may wish to rewrite claims that had been rejected in the original application. A patent "continuation" is an application for additional claims made on a patent that was previously applied for.

Under generally accepted patent practices in the United States, when a subsequent continuation or divisional application …


Innovation And The Domain Of Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2008

Innovation And The Domain Of Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust policy and the IP laws are both concerned with practices that restrain competition unnecessarily by reducing the size of the public domain beyond that which the Constitution contemplates, or as Congress intended for them to be expanded. In fact, antitrust has a dual role as promoter of competition in IP intensive markets. It regulates both restraints on competition and restraints on innovation. The first line protector of the competitive process in innovation is the IP statutes themselves. The Constitutional Mandate to Congress to create intellectual property regimes in order to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts is …


Exclusionary Bundled Discounts And The Antitrust Modernization Commission, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2008

Exclusionary Bundled Discounts And The Antitrust Modernization Commission, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

A bundled discount occurs when a seller charges less for a bundle of goods than for its components when sold separately. A characteristic of such discounting is that a rival who makes only one of the products in the bundle may have to give a larger per item discount in order to compensate the buyer for the foregone discount on goods that the rival does not sell. For example, if I sell A and B and offer a 20% discount only to customers who purchase one A and one B together, a rival in the B market might be able …


Unilateral Refusals To License In The Us, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley Jun 2005

Unilateral Refusals To License In The Us, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley

All Faculty Scholarship

Most antitrust claims relating to intellectual property involve challenges to agreements, licensing practices or affirmative conduct involving the use or disposition of the intellectual property rights or the products they cover. But sometimes an antitrust claim centers on an intellectual property owner's refusal to use or license an intellectual property right, perhaps coupled with efforts to enforce the intellectual property right against infringers. The allegation may be that the intellectual property right is so essential to competition that it must be licensed across the board, or that a refusal to license it to one particular party was discriminatory, or that …


The Evolution Of United States Antitrust Law: The Past, Present, And (Possible) Future, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande Oct 1999

The Evolution Of United States Antitrust Law: The Past, Present, And (Possible) Future, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

As the world’s nations rapidly move from systems in which central planning and monopoly are replaced by free markets,2 it becomes increasingly valuable to consider the histories of competition policy experienced in different nations, on a comparative basis.3 In this article, we focus on the history of antitrust in the United States, the first nation to develop and fully-articulate a competition policy, drawing out themes that may be useful to other countries as they contemplate the shape and direction of their own competition regimes. We show that the American competition policy has reflected an underlying stability and bi-partisanship, but that …


Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards And Microsoft, Keith N. Hylton, Ronald A. Cass Jan 1999

Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards And Microsoft, Keith N. Hylton, Ronald A. Cass

Faculty Scholarship

In a recent symposium issue of the George Mason Law Review, Steven Salop and R. Craig Romaine use the Microsoft litigation as a focus for discussion of antitrust law. Salop and Romaine argue that each of the allegations against Microsoft could constitute evidence of a design by Microsoft to reduce competition and to preserve or extend monopoly power. They argue as well that the right legal standard to apply in monopolization cases is a "competitive effects" test that balances the benefits and harms of the monopolist's conduct. This article exposes problems with their approach, explains why it departs from current …


Measuring Market Power When The Firm Has Power In The Input And Output Markets, Keith N. Hylton, Mark Lasser Mar 1998

Measuring Market Power When The Firm Has Power In The Input And Output Markets, Keith N. Hylton, Mark Lasser

Faculty Scholarship

We examine the problem of measuring market power when the firm has monopoly power in the output market and monopsony power in the input market - a case we refer to as 'dual-market' power. We show how the Lerner index, which measures the mark-up over the marginal cost, can be modified to reflect the firm's ability to set price above the competitive level.


The Economics Of Copyright, Robert G. Bone, Wendy J. Gordon Jan 1996

The Economics Of Copyright, Robert G. Bone, Wendy J. Gordon

Scholarship Chronologically

Copyright law protects works of creative expression. At its relatively uncontroversial core lie songs, plays, novels, paintings, and other works of aesthetic value. But copyright is not confined solely to aesthetic subject matter; in many countries, it extends to works of fact, such as biographies, maps, and telephone directories, and to works with practical value. For example, one of the most controversial issues in copyright law today is whether and how much copyright should protect computer programs.


Agenda: Boundaries And Water: Allocation And Use Of A Shared Resource, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center Jun 1989

Agenda: Boundaries And Water: Allocation And Use Of A Shared Resource, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

Boundaries and Water: Allocation and Use of a Shared Resource (Summer Conference, June 5-7)

Conference organizers and/or faculty included University of Colorado School of Law professors David H. Getches, Lawrence J. MacDonnell and Charles F. Wilkinson.

Boundaries and Water: Allocation and Use of a Shared Resource is the topic of the Center's annual summer program on water this June. Most of the major rivers in the western United States are shared between two or more states. Often tribal governments play an important role in water allocation and use decisions. International considerations also may be involved in some cases. These interjurisdictional issues extend to groundwater as well as surface water.

This conference will provide the …


A Market-Based Approach To Water Rights: Evaluating Colorado’S System, Stephen F. Williams Oct 1985

A Market-Based Approach To Water Rights: Evaluating Colorado’S System, Stephen F. Williams

Colorado Water Issues and Options: The 90's and Beyond: Toward Maximum Beneficial Use of Colorado's Water Resources (October 8)

33 pages.

Contains footnotes.


Antitrust Policy After Chicago, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 1985

Antitrust Policy After Chicago, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This article, which was published in 1985, describes the development of a "Post-Chicago" antitrust policy. The Chicago School of antitrust analysis has made an important and lasting contribution to antitrust policy. The School has placed an emphasis on economic analysis in antitrust jurisprudence that will likely never disappear. At the same time, however, the Chicago School's approach to antitrust is defective for two important reasons. First of all, the notion that public policymaking should be guided exclusively by a notion of efficiency based on the neoclassical market efficiency model is naive. That notion both overstates the ability of the policymaker …


Oligopoly Power Under The Sherman And Clayton Acts -- From Economic Theory To Legal Policy, Joseph F. Brodley Jan 1967

Oligopoly Power Under The Sherman And Clayton Acts -- From Economic Theory To Legal Policy, Joseph F. Brodley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.