Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Trade secrets (6)
- Copyright (5)
- Intellectual property (5)
- Copyright law (4)
- First Amendment (3)
-
- Internet (3)
- Patent law (3)
- Trademark (3)
- Defend trade secrets act (2)
- Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) (2)
- Disclosure (2)
- Dtsa (2)
- Economics (2)
- Information (2)
- Lanham Act (2)
- Letters (2)
- Matal v. Tam (2)
- Misappropriation (2)
- Patents (2)
- Privacy (2)
- Technology (2)
- Trade Secrets (2)
- Trade secret (2)
- Trademark law (2)
- UTSA (2)
- Uniform Trade Secrets Act (2)
- " by saddling them with high debt levels. The higher rate of refiling that resulted was nevertheless efficient because refiling costs were low. In this essay we respond that the Ayotte-Skeel model is based on the assumption of a selection effect for which there is neither a shred of empirical evidence nor even a variable proposed for measurement. We demonstrate that it is mathematically impossible for the cost savings from Delaware's shorter bankruptcies to offset the cost of so many second bankruptcies. We also note that the Ayotte-Skeel model leads to several predictions in conflict with the empirical evidence. We argue that refailure is costly and propose an empirical approach to quantify those costs. We praise Ayotte and Skeel's discovery that the EBITDA of firms emerging from Delaware bankruptcy was not significantly different from the EBITDA of firms emerging from bankruptcy in other courts during the period of ascendency. We agree that their findings suggest leverage played a greater role in the failure of the Delaware companies than we had previously thought. Lastly (1)
- 73 University of Chicago Law Review 425 (2006) (1)
- AI (1)
- Allocative (1)
Articles 31 - 31 of 31
Full-Text Articles in Law
Monopolization, Innovation, And Consumer Welfare, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
Monopolization, Innovation, And Consumer Welfare, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page
UF Law Faculty Publications
While most commentators and the enforcement agencies voice support for the consumer welfare standard, substantial disagreement exists over when economic theory justifies a presumption of consumer injury. Virtually all would subscribe to the theoretical prediction that an effective cartel will likely inflict consumer injury by reducing output and thus increasing prices. But the academic and judicial consensus disappears when the theory at issue predicts that a practice -- a merger or a predatory pricing campaign, for example -- will harm consumers in the future through some complex sequence of events.
In our view, the desire to protect innovation is legitimate, …