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Articles 31 - 45 of 45
Full-Text Articles in Law
Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles
Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
In his concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for holding that the Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial” statements but leaving for “another day” any effort to define sufficiently what “testimonial” means. Prosecutors and defendants, he said, “should not be left in the dark in this manner.” Over the next two years, both sides grappled with the meaning of testimonial, each gleaning import from sections of Crawford that seemingly proved their test was the right one. When the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereinafter Davis), hopes were high that …
Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller
Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
I begin with a question of effectiveness: does the new Confrontation Clause doctrine effectively protect defendants with respect to the most im-portant types of problematic out-of-court statements? Although they leave much room for the introduction of hearsay in the immediate aftermath of crime generally, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (together hereinafter Davis) are better opinions from that broad perspective than I had feared. The new doctrine now covers and provides substantial procedural protection for a very important class of problematic hearsay—statements made to government agents investigating past crime.
Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine
Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Clarification of the Supreme Court’s newly minted interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was desperately needed, and Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana promised to provide it. Two terms earlier, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause analysis by overruling Ohio v. Roberts and severing the link between hearsay jurisprudence and the Clause. Crawford was hailed by the criminal defense bar, since it seemed to presage a sharp reduction in the frequency of so-called “victimless” trials by holding that “testimonial” hearsay, no matter how reliable, was constitutionally inadmissible in the absence of …
Evidence—Sixth Amendment And The Confrontation Clause—Testimonial Trumps Reliable: The United States Supreme Court Reconsiders Its Approach To The Confrontation Clause. Crawford V. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)., Kristen Sluyter
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
No abstract provided.
Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony - A Prosecutor's Perspective, Lynn Helland
Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony - A Prosecutor's Perspective, Lynn Helland
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Although the Supreme Court has declined, for now, to endorse the Judicial Conference proposal to add a Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit live video testimony under limited circumstances, I agree with Professor Friedman that the matter is far from over. This is both because the potential benefits to be realized from the use of remote video testimony are too large to ignore and because, on closer inspection, any Confrontation Clause concerns that might underlie the Court's hesitation to adopt the proposal are not warranted. My purpose in writing is to summarize some of the …
The Confrontation Clause: Statements Against Penal Interest As A Firmly Rooted Hearsay Exception, Amy N. Loth
The Confrontation Clause: Statements Against Penal Interest As A Firmly Rooted Hearsay Exception, Amy N. Loth
Cleveland State Law Review
This Article will explore why these types of confessions, called self-inculpatory statements, should be admissible under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Part IIA of this Article will discuss the two-part test set forth in Ohio v. Roberts. Part IIB will address Lilly v. Virginia, the Supreme Court's first attempt to resolve whether statements against penal interest are sufficiently reliable to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause. Part IIB will also explore the distinction between self-inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory statements, what constitutes a "firmnly rooted" hearsay exception, and also the policy concerns behind creating a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception. Part …
Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda
Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda
Michigan Law Review
Modem American law is, in a sense, a system of compartments. For understandable curricular reasons, legal education sharply distinguishes the law of evidence from both constitutional law and criminal procedure. In fact, the lines of demarcation between these three subjects extend well beyond law school to the organization of the leading treatises and case headnotes to which practicing lawyers routinely refer in their trade. Many of the most interesting questions in the law, however, do not rest squarely within a single compartment; instead, they concern the content and legitimacy of the lines of demarcation themselves. This article explores a significant, …
Text, Texts, Or Ad Hoc Determinations: Interpretation Of The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Randolph N. Jonakait
Text, Texts, Or Ad Hoc Determinations: Interpretation Of The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Randolph N. Jonakait
Indiana Law Journal
No abstract provided.
The Admission Of Hearsay Evidence Where Defedant Misconduct Causes The Unavailability Of A Prosecution Witness, Paul T. Markland
The Admission Of Hearsay Evidence Where Defedant Misconduct Causes The Unavailability Of A Prosecution Witness, Paul T. Markland
American University Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Supreme Court Rules On Statements Against Interest, Michael M. Martin
The Supreme Court Rules On Statements Against Interest, Michael M. Martin
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Beyond Maryland V. Craig: Can And Should Adult Rape Victims Be Permitted To Testify By Closed-Circuit Television?, Lisa Hamilton Thielmeyer
Beyond Maryland V. Craig: Can And Should Adult Rape Victims Be Permitted To Testify By Closed-Circuit Television?, Lisa Hamilton Thielmeyer
Indiana Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Constitutional Constraints On The Admissibility Of Grand Jury Testimony: The Unavailable Witness, Confrontation, And Due Process, Barbara L. Strack
Constitutional Constraints On The Admissibility Of Grand Jury Testimony: The Unavailable Witness, Confrontation, And Due Process, Barbara L. Strack
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Defendants, however, have raised serious constitutional objections to the introduction of grand jury testimony when the witness is unavailable to testify at trial. These claims have focused on the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment and the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Defendants have contended that the introduction of testimony from a grand jury proceeding which cannot be subjected to cross-examination fatally compromises the defendant's right to a fair trial. Lower courts are split over admitting grand jury testimony in these circumstances, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue. As a result, …
The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen
The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen
Michigan Law Review
The Supreme Court seems to be setting the stage for a long-awaited examination of the confrontation clause. It has been ten years since the Court endeavored in Dutton v. Evans to reconcile the evidentiary rules of hearsay with the constitutional commands of confrontation. Dutton came at the tail end of a string of confrontation cases that the Court had resolved without apparent difficulty. Not surprisingly, the Court approached Dutton in the evident belief that it could resolve the constitutional problems of hearsay once and for all. Instead, after oral argument in 1969 and a rehearing in 1970, the Court found …
Constitutional Restraints On The Exclusion Of Evidence In The Defendant's Favor: The Implications Of Davis V. Alaska, Michigan Law Review
Constitutional Restraints On The Exclusion Of Evidence In The Defendant's Favor: The Implications Of Davis V. Alaska, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note, first, examines the Davis methodology for determining whether a foreclosed line of cross-examination warrants protection by the confrontation clause, and suggests a test employable by reviewing courts for making that determination. Then, the Note sketches the contours of the clash, prefigured by Davis, between the right of confrontation and the limitations on cross-examination that result from both the assertion of testimonial privileges and trial court relevance rulings.
The Confrontation Clause And The Scope Of The Unavailability Requirement, Jerry J. Phillips
The Confrontation Clause And The Scope Of The Unavailability Requirement, Jerry J. Phillips
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The confrontation clause is that language of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution which provides, "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right… to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Despite the seemingly absolute language of the confrontation clause, which would suggest that no hearsay evidence may be admitted against an accused in a criminal proceeding, its guarantee has been subject to exception. For example, when either a witness to an event or his testimony is shown to be unavailable, others will be allowed to testify as to the information which the declarant-witness has related …