Law Commons^™

Skirting The Fourth Amendment: How Law Enforcement Agencies Abuse Technology And Constitutional Exceptions To Surveille The Public, Matthew Lloyd

Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice

Existing Fourth Amendment law does not protect against law enforcement use of data gathered through the internet either by private companies who actively search their customer’s data and submit evidence of misconduct to law enforcement or from private companies who acquire the data on behalf of law enforcement. In an effort to pursue criminals, courts have permitted Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to develop in a manner that permits sweeping invasions of privacy without any probable cause through the private search doctrine or without any procedural protections through the third-party doctrine. It will require substantial judicial or legislative action to return the …

Limited Privacy In “Pings:” Why Law Enforcement’S Use Of Cell-Site Simulators Does Not Categorically Violate The Fourth Amendment, Lara M. Mcmahon

Washington and Lee Law Review

This Note proposes four factors courts should consider when asked to determine whether law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search. The first asks courts to consider whether the cell-site simulator surveillance infringed on a constitutionally protected area, such as the home. The second asks courts to consider the duration of the cell-site simulator surveillance. The third asks courts to consider whether the cell-site simulator surveillance was conducted actively or passively. The fourth asks courts to focus on the nature and depth of the information obtained as a result of the cell-site simulator surveillance. If, after …

Riley And Abandonment: Expanding Fourth Amendment Protection Of Cell Phones, Abigail Hoverman

Northwestern University Law Review

In light of the privacy concerns inherent to personal technological devices, the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous decision in 2014 recognizing the need for categorical heightened protection of cell phones during searches incident to arrest in Riley v. California. This Note argues for expansion of heightened protections for cell phones in the context of abandoned evidence because the same privacy concerns apply. This argument matters because state and federal courts have not provided the needed protection to abandoned cell phones pre- or post-Riley.

Content Analysis Of Pre- And Post-Jones Federal Appellate Cases: Implications Of Jones For Fourth Amendment Search Law, James A. Purdon

Master of Science in Criminal Justice Theses & (Pre-2016) Policy Research Projects

This study examines the state of Fourth Amendment search law in relationship to the decision in the recent, landmark case of United States v. Jones. This study focused on the effects of the Jones decision, trespass doctrine, relative to the former precedent of Katz v. United States, reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine, and the rates of searches being found under these two tests (or a combination of both). This study used a qualitative content analysis of federal appellate cases which cited Jones and/or Katz to answer the following questions: Which tests were being used in federal appellate cases …

Back To The Future: The Constitution Requires Reasonableness And Particularity—Introducing The “Seize But Don’T Search” Doctrine, Adam Lamparello, Charles E. Maclean

Adam Lamparello

Issuing one-hundred or fewer opinions per year, the United States Supreme Court cannot keep pace with opinions that match technological advancement. As a result, in Riley v. California and United States v. Wurie, the Court needs to announce a broader principle that protects privacy in the digital age. That principle, what we call “seize but don’t search,” recognizes that the constitutional touchstone for all searches is reasonableness.

When do present-day circumstances—the evolution in the Government’s surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship between the NSA and telecom companies—become so thoroughly unlike those considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years …

Riley V. California: The New Katz Or Chimel?, Adam Lamparello, Charles Maclean

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.

Has Skinner Killed The Katz? Are Society's Expectations Of Privacy Reasonable In Today's Techological World?, Jason Forcier

Jason Forcier

The right to privacy has and will remain a hotly contested debate about American liberties. In 2012, a 3-0 decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Melvin Skinner, the court held that there is no “reasonable expectation of privacy in the data given off by. . . cellphone[s].” Given today’s explosion of cellular technology and use of smart phones, is it unreasonable to believe a person should remain secure in their "person" and “effects," as guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, from unreasonable searches and seizures? Furthermore, with police requiring only a subpoena to a obtain …

Brady, Trust, And Error, Samuel R. Wiseman

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Preventing A Modern Panopticon: Law Enforcement Acquisition Of Real-Time Cellular Tracking Data, Steven B. Toeniskoetter

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Nineteenth Century philosopher Jeremy Bentham designed a prison system known as the Panopticon which was arranged in such a way that a single guard could, at any given time, view the activities and whereabouts of any particular prisoner. Bentham designed the prison in such a way that the prisoners could never tell whether they were being watched. Twentieth Century French philosopher Michel Foucault further considered use of the Panopticon as a means of societal control through fear in his seminal book Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.

The Liberal Assault On The Fourth Amendment, Christopher Slobogin

ExpressO

The Liberal Assault on the Fourth Amendment Christopher Slobogin As construed by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement regulates overt, non-regulatory government searches of homes, cars, and personal effects–-and virtually nothing else. This essay is primarily about how we got to this point. It is fashionable to place much of the blame for today’s law on the Warren Court’s adoption of the malleable expectation of privacy concept as the core value protected by the Fourth Amendment. But this diagnosis fails to explain why even the more liberal justices have often gone along with many of the privacy-diminishing holdings …

Rethinking Canine Sniffs: The Impact Of Kyllo V. United States, Amanda S. Froh

Seattle University Law Review

The argument develops as follows. Part II provides a general background on how the court has determined whether an investigative technique or device is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the implications for finding that something is a search. This section focuses primarily on Katz v. United States, the pivotal case in which the Supreme Court departed from previous Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by recognizing that the Fourth Amendment's core value is the protection of individual privacy, not the protection of places. In light of this background, Part III provides examples of how the Supreme Court has …

Political Surveillance And The Fourth Amendment, Alan Meisel

Articles

The United States District Court case has left the scope of the warrant protection of the fourth amendment considerably clearer and broader. The door left ajar in Katz has been firmly fastened shut by the Court leaving only the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement, which are based upon practical necessity, and the still unconfronted question of the power of the executive to conduct warrantless surveillances of foreign agents in national security cases." It is also clear that courts are no less competent to evaluate the appropriateness of a search and seizure in an internal security case than in a …