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Full-Text Articles in Law

Fighting Cybercrime After United States V. Jones, David C. Gray, Danielle Keats Citron, Liz Clark Rinehart Aug 2013

Fighting Cybercrime After United States V. Jones, David C. Gray, Danielle Keats Citron, Liz Clark Rinehart

David C. Gray

In a landmark non-decision last term, five Justices of the United States Supreme Court would have held that citizens possess a Fourth Amendment right to expect that certain quantities of information about them will remain private, even if they have no such expectations with respect to any of the information or data constituting that whole. This quantitative approach to evaluating and protecting Fourth Amendment rights is certainly novel and raises serious conceptual, doctrinal, and practical challenges. In other works, we have met these challenges by engaging in a careful analysis of this “mosaic theory” and by proposing that courts focus …


The Right To Quantitative Privacy, David Gray, Danielle Citron Dec 2012

The Right To Quantitative Privacy, David Gray, Danielle Citron

David C. Gray

We are at the cusp of a historic shift in our conceptions of the Fourth Amendment driven by dramatic advances in surveillance technology. Governments and their private sector agents continue to invest billions of dollars in massive data-mining projects, advanced analytics, fusion centers, and aerial drones, all without serious consideration of the constitutional issues that these technologies raise. In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court signaled an end to its silent acquiescence in this expanding surveillance state. In that case, five justices signed concurring opinions defending a revolutionary proposition: that citizens have Fourth Amendment interests in substantial quantities of …


In Defense Of Specialized Theft Statutes, David Gray Dec 2012

In Defense Of Specialized Theft Statutes, David Gray

David C. Gray

This essay is an invited contribution to a symposium hosted by the New England Law Review in celebration of Stuart Green’s important book 13 Ways to Steal a Bicycle. As we note, Professor Green’s argument is so reasonable and executed in such elegant prose, there is little call for anything other than praise. Nevertheless, in the spirit of academic exchange, we challenge Professor Green’s skepticism of specialized theft statutes. Relying on retributivist theories of criminal punishment, we argue that specialized theft statutes have an important role to play in contemporary criminal law by educating the public about the necessary commitments …


Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray Feb 2011

Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray

David C. Gray

How central should hedonic adaptation be to the establishment of sentencing policy? In earlier work, Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur (BBM) drew some normative significance from the psychological studies of adaptability for punishment policy. In particular, they argued that retributivists and utilitarians alike are obliged on pain of inconsistency to take account of the fact that most prisoners, most of the time, adapt to imprisonment in fairly short order, and therefore suffer much less than most of us would expect. They also argued that ex-prisoners don't adapt well upon re-entry to society and that social planners should consider their post-release …


Retributivism For Progressives: A Response To Professor Flanders, David C. Gray, Jonathan Huber Feb 2011

Retributivism For Progressives: A Response To Professor Flanders, David C. Gray, Jonathan Huber

David C. Gray

In his engaging article "Retributivism and Reform," published in the Maryland Law Review, Chad Flanders engages two claims he ascribes to James Q. Whitman: 1) that American criminal justice is too "harsh," and 2) that Americans’ reliance on retributivist theories of criminal punishment is implicated in that harshness. In this invited response, to which Flanders subsequently replied, we first ask what "harsh" might mean in the context of a critique of criminal justice and punishment. We conclude that the most likely candidate is something along the lines of "disproportionate or otherwise unjustified." With this working definition in hand, we measure …


A Modest Appeal For Decent Respect, Jessica Olive, David C. Gray Sep 2010

A Modest Appeal For Decent Respect, Jessica Olive, David C. Gray

David C. Gray

In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release for nonhomicide crimes if the perpetrator was under the age of eighteen at the time of his offense. In so holding, Justice Kennedy cited foreign and international law to confirm the Court’s independent judgment. In his dissent, Justice Thomas recited now-familiar objections to the Court’s reliance on these sources. Those objections are grounded in his originalist jurisprudence. In this short invited essay, which expands on prior work, we argue that Justice Thomas should abandon these …


Punishment As Suffering, David Gray Dec 2009

Punishment As Suffering, David Gray

David C. Gray

In a series of recent high-profile articles, a group of contemporary scholars argue that the criminal law is a grand machine for the administration of suffering. The machine requires calibration, of course. The main standard we use for ours is objective proportionality. We generally punish more serious crimes more severely and aim to inflict the same punishment on similarly situated offenders who commit similar crimes. In the views of these authors, this focus on objective proportionality makes ours a rather crude machine. In particular, it ignores the fact that 1) different offenders may suffer to a different degree when subjected …