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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, Sheri Johnson, John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, Valerie P. Hans, Martin T. Wells Dec 2014

The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, Sheri Johnson, John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, Valerie P. Hans, Martin T. Wells

Sheri Lynn Johnson

For the last five years, we have conducted an empirical study of the “modern era” of capital punishment in Delaware. By “modern era,” we refer to the time period after the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v.Georgia, which invalidated all then-existing state death penalty regimes. Some readers might ask, “Why Delaware?” They might observe that it is a small state and is not a significant national player in terms of death sentences imposed or death row inmates executed. While both are true, several features of Delaware’s capital punishment system intrigue us. First, Delaware has a high death sentencing rate. …


Unconscious Racism And The Criminal Law, Sheri Johnson Dec 2014

Unconscious Racism And The Criminal Law, Sheri Johnson

Sheri Lynn Johnson

No abstract provided.


Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality Of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, P G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns, Sheri Lynn Johnson Dec 2014

Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality Of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, P G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns, Sheri Lynn Johnson

Sheri Lynn Johnson

Researchers previously have investigated the role of race in capital sentencing, and in particular, whether the race of the defendant or victim influences the likelihood of a death sentence. In the present study, we examined whether the likelihood of being sentenced to death is influenced by the degree to which a Black defendant is perceived to have a stereotypically Black appearance. Controlling for a wide array of factors, we found that in cases involving a White victim, the more stereotypically Black a defendant is perceived to be, the more likely that person is to be sentenced to death.


Race And The Decision To Detain A Suspect, Sheri Johnson Dec 2014

Race And The Decision To Detain A Suspect, Sheri Johnson

Sheri Lynn Johnson

No abstract provided.


Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie Dec 2014

Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie

Sheri Lynn Johnson

Race matters in the criminal justice system. Black defendants appear to fare worse than similarly situated white defendants. Why? Implicit bias is one possibility. Researchers, using a well-known measure called the implicit association test, have found that most white Americans harbor implicit bias toward Black Americans. Do judges, who are professionally committed to egalitarian norms, hold these same implicit biases? And if so, do these biases account for racially disparate outcomes in the criminal justice system? We explored these two research questions in a multi-part study involving a large sample of trial judges drawn from around the country. Our results …


The Langugage And Culture (Not To Say Race) Of Peremptory Challenges, Sheri Lynn Johnson Dec 2014

The Langugage And Culture (Not To Say Race) Of Peremptory Challenges, Sheri Lynn Johnson

Sheri Lynn Johnson

No abstract provided.


The Color Of Truth: Race And The Assessment Of Credibility, Sheri Lynn Johnson Dec 2014

The Color Of Truth: Race And The Assessment Of Credibility, Sheri Lynn Johnson

Sheri Lynn Johnson

No abstract provided.


The Fourth Circuit's "Double-Edged Sword": Eviscerating The Right To Present Mitigating Evidence And Beheading The Right To The Assistance Of Counsel, John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson Dec 2014

The Fourth Circuit's "Double-Edged Sword": Eviscerating The Right To Present Mitigating Evidence And Beheading The Right To The Assistance Of Counsel, John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson

Sheri Lynn Johnson

Even before the sea change of Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court recognized not only an indigent’s right to the assistance of counsel in capital cases, but also his right to the effective assistance of counsel in capital cases. Since those auspicious beginnings, the Court has dramatically broadened the right to present mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial, thereby increasing the need for the guiding hand of counsel in capital sentencing. Thus, it is particularly tragic that the Fourth Circuit’s swiftly evolving approach to the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard precludes capital …


Back To A Future: Reversing Keith Simpson's Death Sentence And Making Peace With The Victim's Family Through Post-Conviction Investigation, John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson Dec 2014

Back To A Future: Reversing Keith Simpson's Death Sentence And Making Peace With The Victim's Family Through Post-Conviction Investigation, John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson

Sheri Lynn Johnson

In 1993, Keith Simpson was arrested for the murder of Joe Harrison; in 2006, he was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole in 2022. Between those two events, Simpson was sentenced to death, had his death sentence vacated by the post-conviction relief court, reached a plea agreement with the victim's family and the new Solicitor, saw the agreement invalidated when the Attorney General's office overrode the family and the Solicitor by appealing the post-conviction court's decision, lost the lower court's decision to an appellate reversal, and won a cross-appeal for a new trial. You just never know. You …


Racism, Unreasonable Belief, And Bernhard Goetz, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

Racism, Unreasonable Belief, And Bernhard Goetz, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

How should the law respond when one person (D) kills another person (V), who is black, because D believes that V is about to kill him, but D would not have so believed if V had been white? Should D be exonerated on grounds of self-defense? The canonical case raising this question is People v. Goetz. Some commentators argue that norms of equal treatment and anti-discrimination require that D’s claim of self-defense be rejected. I argue that denying D’s claim of self-defense would be at odds with the principle that criminal liability should only be imposed on an actor if …


Restorative Justice, Punishment, And Atonement, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

Restorative Justice, Punishment, And Atonement, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

Restorative justice is a way of responding to crime, and according to its proponents, it's a much better way of responding than the way they believe we now respond: through punishment imposed in the name of retributive justice. According to its proponents, restorative justice is better than retributive justice because it restores, or at least tries to restore, the victim; retribution's only aim is to punish the offender. According to restorativists, retribution ignores the victim. I argue here for two claims. First, I argue in Part II that restorative justice cannot have it both ways: it cannot achieve the restoration …


The Moral Emotions Of The Criminal Law, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

The Moral Emotions Of The Criminal Law, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

Imagine you have committed a crime. You might experience any number of emotional responses to what you've done, ranging from self-satisfaction to self-disgust. But however you do feel, how should you feel? The question seems especially appropriate for a conference honoring Professor Herbert Morris and celebrating his work, for no one has shed light more on the moral emotions of the criminal law. The line of thought that follows owes Professor Morris a large and obvious debt. So, once again, how should you feel when you have committed a criminal wrong? "Guilty" comes immediately to mind. But guilt is not …


Is It Wrong To Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement, And Mercy, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

Is It Wrong To Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement, And Mercy, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

Is it a morally permissible exercise of mercy for a governor to commute the death sentences of everyone on a state's death row, as Governor Ryan recently did in Illinois? I distinguish three different theories of mercy. The first two theories locate mercy within a theory of punishment as retribution. The first theory treats mercy as a means by which to achieve equity. As such, this theory is not really a theory of mercy; it is instead a theory of justice. The second theory treats mercy as a genuine virtue independent of justice. In particular, mercy is understood as an …


Correcting Deadly Confusion: Responding To Jury Inquiries In Capital Cases, Stephen P. Garvey, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Paul Marcus Dec 2014

Correcting Deadly Confusion: Responding To Jury Inquiries In Capital Cases, Stephen P. Garvey, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Paul Marcus

Stephen P. Garvey

In Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000), the members of the capital sentencing jury asked for clarification of the jury instructions on the essential question of whether they were required to sentence Weeks to death upon the finding of certain aggravating factors. The judge merely informed the jurors to reread the instruction. The jurors returned with a death penalty sentence. The Supreme Court held that these jurors likely understood the instructions and at most Weeks had shown a slight possibility that the jurors believed they were precluded from considering mitigating evidence. However, the results of a mock jury study …


When Should A Mistake Of Fact Excuse?, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

When Should A Mistake Of Fact Excuse?, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

This symposium contribution advances two claims. First, a mistake (or ignorance) of fact should matter in the criminal law only insofar as it causes an actor to be ignorant of the law. Mistakes of fact should have exculpatory force if and only if they cause ignorance of the law, which ignorance ought to be an excuse to criminal liability. Second, an actor who should otherwise be excused because he is ignorant of the law, which ignorance is in turn the result of some mistake of fact, should not lose that excuse just because the underlying mistake of fact can in …


Expert Testimony In Capital Sentencing: Juror Responses, John H. Montgomery, J. Richard Ciccone, Stephen P. Garvey, Theodore Eisenberg Dec 2014

Expert Testimony In Capital Sentencing: Juror Responses, John H. Montgomery, J. Richard Ciccone, Stephen P. Garvey, Theodore Eisenberg

Stephen P. Garvey

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia (1972), held that the death penalty is constitutional only when applied on an individualized basis. The resultant changes in the laws in death penalty states fostered the involvement of psychiatric and psychologic expert witnesses at the sentencing phase of the trial, to testify on two major issues: (1) the mitigating factor of a defendant’s abnormal mental state and (2) the aggravating factor of a defendant’s potential for future violence. This study was an exploration of the responses of capital jurors to psychiatric/psychologic expert testimony during capital sentencing. The Capital Jury Project is …


The Emotional Economy Of Capital Sentencing, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

The Emotional Economy Of Capital Sentencing, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

You often hear that one reason capital jurors condemn capital defendants is that jurors don't empathize with defendants. And one reason they don't empathize is that the process of capital sentencing is rigged against empathy. Using data from the South Carolina segment of the Capital Jury Project, I try to examine the role emotion plays in capital sentencing. Without entering here all the important and necessary caveats, I find that the self-reported emotional responses jurors have toward capital defendants run the gamut from sympathy and pity at one extreme, to disgust, anger, and fear at the other. What causes these …


Introduction To The Symposium: Religion's Role In The Administration Of The Death Penalty, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

Introduction To The Symposium: Religion's Role In The Administration Of The Death Penalty, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

No abstract provided.


Passion's Puzzle, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

Passion's Puzzle, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

The puzzle of the provocation defense, otherwise known as the "heat of passion" defense, is to figure out how, if at all, each of the basic elements of the doctrine can be explained in a coherent and normatively attractive fashion. None of the prevailing theories of provocation succeeds in solving this puzzle. These theories either fail to explain one or more of the basic elements of the doctrine, or else end up committing the state to a decidedly illiberal course of action: punishing citizens not only for what they do (for their actions), but for who they are (for their …


But Was He Sorry? The Role Of Remorse In Capital Sentencing, Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, Martin T. Wells Dec 2014

But Was He Sorry? The Role Of Remorse In Capital Sentencing, Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, Martin T. Wells

Stephen P. Garvey

What role does remorse really play in capital sentencing? We divide this basic question in two. First, what makes jurors come to believe a defendant is remorseful? Second, does a belief in the defendant's remorse affect the jury's final judgment of life or death? Here we present a systematic, empirical analysis that tries to answer these questions. What makes jurors think a defendant is remorseful? Among other things, we find that the more jurors think that the crime is coldblooded, calculated, and depraved and that the defendant is dangerous, the less likely they are to think the defendant is remorseful. …


Jury Responsibility In Capital Sentencing: An Empirical Study, Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, Martin T. Wells Dec 2014

Jury Responsibility In Capital Sentencing: An Empirical Study, Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, Martin T. Wells

Stephen P. Garvey

The law allows executioners to deny responsibility for what they have done by making it possible for them to believe they have not done it. The law treats members of capital sentencing juries quite differently. It seeks to ensure that they feel responsible for sentencing a defendant to death. This differential treatment rests on a presumed link between a capital sentencer's willingness to accept responsibility for the sentence she imposes and the accuracy and reliability of that sentence. Using interviews of 153 jurors who sat in South Carolina capital cases, this article examines empirically whether capital sentencing jurors assume responsibility …


Forecasting Life And Death: Juror Race, Religion, And Attitude Toward The Death Penalty, Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, Martin T. Wells Dec 2014

Forecasting Life And Death: Juror Race, Religion, And Attitude Toward The Death Penalty, Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, Martin T. Wells

Stephen P. Garvey

Determining whether race, sex, or other juror characteristics influence how capital case jurors vote is difficult. Jurors tend to vote for death in more egregious cases and for life in less egregious cases no matter what their own characteristics. And a juror's personal characteristics may get lost in the process of deliberation because the final verdict reflects the jury's will, not the individual juror's. Controlling for the facts likely to influence a juror's verdict helps to isolate the influence of a juror's personal characteristics. Examining each juror's first sentencing vote reveals her own judgment before the majority works its will. …


Death-Innocence And The Law Of Habeas Corpus, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

Death-Innocence And The Law Of Habeas Corpus, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

The legal space between a sentence of death and the execution chamber is occupied by an intricate network of procedural rules. On average, it currently takes between six and seven years to traverse this space, but this interval is expected to shrink. Federal habeas corpus, an important part of this space, is studded more and more with procedural obstacles that bar the federal courts from entertaining the merits of a defendant's claims. By design, these barriers foreclose federal review in order to protect the state's interests in the finality of its criminal convictions, as well as to display healthy respect …


Amici Curiae Brief Of New York Law School Professors In People V. Harris: Constitutionality Of The New York Death Penalty Statute Under The State Constitution's Cruel And Unusual Punishments And Antidiscrimination Clauses, Anthony G. Amsterdam, Ursula Bentele, Vivian Berger, John H. Blume, Peggy Davis, Deborah Denno, Markus Dubber, Stephen Ellmann, Deborah Fins, Eric M. Freedman, Stephen P. Garvey, Jack Greenberg, Randy Hertz, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Richard Klein, James Liebman, Peter Neufeld, Barry Scheck, Bryan Stevenson Dec 2014

Amici Curiae Brief Of New York Law School Professors In People V. Harris: Constitutionality Of The New York Death Penalty Statute Under The State Constitution's Cruel And Unusual Punishments And Antidiscrimination Clauses, Anthony G. Amsterdam, Ursula Bentele, Vivian Berger, John H. Blume, Peggy Davis, Deborah Denno, Markus Dubber, Stephen Ellmann, Deborah Fins, Eric M. Freedman, Stephen P. Garvey, Jack Greenberg, Randy Hertz, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Richard Klein, James Liebman, Peter Neufeld, Barry Scheck, Bryan Stevenson

Stephen P. Garvey

Amici are teachers in New York law schools who have studied the operation of the death penalty for the purpose of teaching the subject, writing about it in scholarly journals, or representing persons accused or convicted of capital crimes. Most of us have worked in the field both as academics and as pro bono counsel for condemned inmates. Collectively, we have had first-hand experience in hundreds of death cases, in dozens of jurisdictions, extending over more than a third of a century. Our experience has convinced us that capital punishment cannot be administered with the fairness, reliability, and freedom from …


Two Kinds Of Criminal Wrongs, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

Two Kinds Of Criminal Wrongs, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

I distinguish two kinds of criminal wrongs. A wrongdoer who acts in defiance of his conscience is guilty of what I call a wicked wrong. A wrongdoer who does not act in defiance of his conscience is guilty of what I call a vicious wrong. The distinction is derived from a conception of immorality typically associated with the Christian tradition. The distinction is important because it determines the moral message a wrongdoer should try to send through the punishment or penance he must endure in order to atone for his wrongdoing.


Virginia's Capital Jurors, Stephen P. Garvey, Paul Marcus Dec 2014

Virginia's Capital Jurors, Stephen P. Garvey, Paul Marcus

Stephen P. Garvey

Next to Texas, no state has executed more capital defendants than Virginia. Moreover, the likelihood of a death sentence actually being carried out is greater in Virginia than it is elsewhere, while the length of time between the imposition of a death sentence and its actual execution is shorter. Virginia has thus earned a reputation among members of the defense bar as being among the worst of the death penalty states. Yet insofar as these facts about Virginia's death penalty relate primarily to the behavior of state and federal appellate courts, they suggest that what makes Virginia's death penalty unique …


Self-Defense And The Mistaken Racist, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

Self-Defense And The Mistaken Racist, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

How should the law respond when one person (D) kills another person (V), who is black, because D believes that V is about to kill him, but D would not have so believed if V had been white? Should D be exonerated on grounds of self-defense? Some commentators argue that D's claim of self-defense should be rejected. He should be convicted and punished. I argue, however, that denying D's claim of self-defense would be at odds with the principle that criminal liability and punishment should only be imposed on an actor if he chooses to cause or risk causing a …


Knockin' On Heaven's Door: Rethinking The Role Of Religion In Death Penalty Cases, Gary J. Simson, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

Knockin' On Heaven's Door: Rethinking The Role Of Religion In Death Penalty Cases, Gary J. Simson, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

Religion has played a prominent role at various points of capital trials. In jury selection, peremptory challenges have been exercised against prospective jurors on the basis of their religion. At the sentencing phase, defendants have offered as mitigating evidence proof of their religiosity, and the prosecution has introduced evidence of the victim's religiosity. In closing argument, quotations from the Bible and other appeals to religion have long been common. During deliberations, jurors have engaged in group prayer and tried to sway one another with quotes from scripture. Such practices have not gone unquestioned. Rather remarkably, however, the questions have almost …


The Merciful Capital Juror, Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

The Merciful Capital Juror, Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

We examine the role of mercy in capital sentencing along three dimensions. We first explain why mercy is a philosophically problematic virtue, and second, why it presently holds an ambiguous status within constitutional doctrine. Finally, we draw on interviews with jurors who served on capital cases in order better to understand how the behavior of merciful jurors compares to the behavior of their less merciful counterparts. Among other things, we find that merciful jurors tend to be better educated and to attend religious services regularly. We also find that merciful jurors are, as one might reasonably expect, more apt to …


Harmless Error In Federal Habeas Corpus After Brecht V. Abrahamson, John H. Blume, Stephen P. Garvey Dec 2014

Harmless Error In Federal Habeas Corpus After Brecht V. Abrahamson, John H. Blume, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

The law of habeas corpus has changed again. This time it was the law of harmless error. Before Brecht v. Abrahamson, the courts applied the same harmless error rule on direct appeal and in federal habeas corpus. Under that rule, embraced for constitutional errors in Chapman v. California, a conviction tainted by a constitutional error susceptible to harmless error analysis could be upheld only if the state demonstrated that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After Brecht, the venerable Chapman rule still applies to constitutional errors identified and reviewed on direct appeal, but an ostensibly "less onerous" standard …