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Full-Text Articles in Law
Confrontation And The Definition Of Chutzpa, Richard D. Friedman
Confrontation And The Definition Of Chutzpa, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
You may know the standard illustration of chutzpa - the man who kills both his parents and then begs the sentencing court to have mercy on an orphan. In this article, I discuss a case of chutzpa that is nearly as outlandish - the criminal defendant who, having rendered his victim unavailable to testify, contends that evidence of the victim's statement should not be admitted against him because to do so would violate his right to confront her. I contend that in a case like this the defendant should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation right. On the same …
Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow
Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow
Michigan Law Review
In Part I of this article, we examine the global puzzle of the Self-Incrimination Clause and the local confusion or perversion lurking behind virtually every key word and phrase in the clause as now construed. In Part II we elaborate our reading of the clause and show how it clears up the local problems and solves the overall puzzle.
Reply: Self-Incrimination And The Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder To Professor Kamisar, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow
Reply: Self-Incrimination And The Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder To Professor Kamisar, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow
Michigan Law Review
A Reply to Yale Kamisar's Response to the "Fifth Amendment Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause"
On The 'Fruits' Of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, And Compelled Testimony, Yale Kamisar
On The 'Fruits' Of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, And Compelled Testimony, Yale Kamisar
Articles
Professor Akhil Reed Amar and Ms. Renee B. Lettow have written a lively, provocative article that will keep many of us who teach constitutional-criminal procedure busy for years to come. They present a reconception of the "first principles" of the Fifth Amendment, and they suggest a dramatic reconstruction of criminal procedure. As a part of that reconstruction, they propose, inter alia, that at a pretrial hearing presided over by a judicial officer, the government should be empowered to compel a suspect, under penalty of contempt, to provide links in the chain of evidence needed to convict him.
Prior Statements Of A Witness: A Nettlesome Corner Of The Hearsay Thicket, Richard D. Friedman
Prior Statements Of A Witness: A Nettlesome Corner Of The Hearsay Thicket, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In Tome v United States, for the fifth time in eight years, the Supreme Court decided a case presenting the problem of how a child's allegations of sexual abuse should be presented in court. Often the child who charges that an adult abused her is unable to testify at trial, or at least unable to testify effectively under standard procedures. These cases therefore raise intriguing and difficult questions related to the rule against hearsay and to an accused's right under the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against him. One would hardly guess that, however, from the rather arid debate …
The Admissibility Of Prior Silence To Impeach The Testimony Of Criminal Defendants, Rex A. Sharp
The Admissibility Of Prior Silence To Impeach The Testimony Of Criminal Defendants, Rex A. Sharp
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Note focuses on whether a defendant who was called as a witness at the prior, severed trial of a codefendant and refused to testify by invoking the fifth amendment can subsequently be impeached by this silence at his own trial. In addition to the obvious implications this issue has for severed criminal trials, the factors considered when deciding whether impeachment by silence should be allowed generally are in sharpest focus in this factual setting. Thus, the analysis of the constitutional and evidentiary questions this Note enlists to argue that impeachment by silence in this context is permissible applies as …
Constitutional Constraints On The Admissibility Of Grand Jury Testimony: The Unavailable Witness, Confrontation, And Due Process, Barbara L. Strack
Constitutional Constraints On The Admissibility Of Grand Jury Testimony: The Unavailable Witness, Confrontation, And Due Process, Barbara L. Strack
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Defendants, however, have raised serious constitutional objections to the introduction of grand jury testimony when the witness is unavailable to testify at trial. These claims have focused on the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment and the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Defendants have contended that the introduction of testimony from a grand jury proceeding which cannot be subjected to cross-examination fatally compromises the defendant's right to a fair trial. Lower courts are split over admitting grand jury testimony in these circumstances, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue. As a result, …
A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar
A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar
Book Chapters
If the several conferences and workshops (and many lunch conversations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I have participated this past summer are any indication, Miranda v. Arizona has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions do not escape attention.
Brewer V. Williams, Massiah And Miranda: What Is 'Interrogation'? When Does It Matter?, Yale Kamisar
Brewer V. Williams, Massiah And Miranda: What Is 'Interrogation'? When Does It Matter?, Yale Kamisar
Articles
On Christmas Eve, 1968, a ten-year-old girl, Pamela Powers, disappeared while with her family in Des Moines, Iowa.2 Defendant Williams, an escapee from a mental institution and a deeply religious person, 3 was suspected of murdering her, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.4 Williams telephoned a Des Moines lawyer, McKnight, and on his advice surrendered himself to the Davenport, Iowa, police.5 Captain Learning and another Des Moines police officer arranged to drive the 160 miles to Davenport, pick up Williams, and return him directly to Des Moines. 6 Both the trial court 7 and the federal district court8 …
Kauper's 'Judicial Examination Of The Accused' Forty Years Later—Some Comments On A Remarkable Article, Yale Kamisar
Kauper's 'Judicial Examination Of The Accused' Forty Years Later—Some Comments On A Remarkable Article, Yale Kamisar
Articles
For a long time before Professor Paul Kauper wrote "Judicial Examination of the Accused" in 1932, and for a long time thereafter, the "legal mind" shut out the de facto inquisitorial system that characterized American criminal procedure. Paul Kauper could not look away. He recognized the "naked, ugly facts" (p. 1224) and was determined to do something about them -more than thirty years before Escobedo v. Illinois' or Miranda v. Arizona.2
'Custodial Interrogation' Within The Meaning Of Miranda, Yale Kamisar
'Custodial Interrogation' Within The Meaning Of Miranda, Yale Kamisar
Book Chapters
The primary conceptual hurdle confronting the Miranda Court was the "legal reasoning" that any and all police interrogation is unaffected by the privilege against self-incrimination because such interrogation does not involve any kind of judicial process for the taking of testimony; inasmuch as police officers have no legal authority to compel statements of any kind, there is no legal obligation, ran the argument, to which a privilege can apply. See, e.g., the discussion and authorities collected in Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. …
The Citizen On Trial: The New Confession Rules, Yale Kamisar
The Citizen On Trial: The New Confession Rules, Yale Kamisar
Articles
Commenting on why it has taken the United States so long to apply "the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel to the proceedings in the stationhouse as well as to those in the courtroom" - as the Supreme Court did in Miranda v. Arizona - this author notes that, "To a large extent this is so because here, as elsewhere, there has been a wide gap between the principles to which we aspire and the practices we actually employ."
Constitutional Law - Search And Seizure - Admissibility In A Federal Court Of Evidence Illegally Obtained By State Officers, Robert J. Paley
Constitutional Law - Search And Seizure - Admissibility In A Federal Court Of Evidence Illegally Obtained By State Officers, Robert J. Paley
Michigan Law Review
In response to a call from a citizen whose suspicions had been aroused by the actions of the defendant and a companion, Maryland police unlawfully arrested the companion and searched the premises occupied by him and the defendant. & a result of this search, money was found which had been stolen in the District of Columbia. Although the search was illegal under Maryland law and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, this money was used as evidence to convict the defendant of housebreaking and larceny in the District of Columbia federal court. On appeal, held, conviction reversed and remanded …
Criminal Procedure - Searches And Seizures - Admissibility Of Evidence Obtained Through Unlawful Search And Seizure, Neil Flanagin S.Ed.
Criminal Procedure - Searches And Seizures - Admissibility Of Evidence Obtained Through Unlawful Search And Seizure, Neil Flanagin S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Defendants were prosecuted and convicted of conspiring to engage in horserace bookmaking and related offenses. The police had secured evidence of defendants' activities by concealing a listening device in premises occupied by them and also by unauthorized and forcible searches. The trial court admitted the evidence so obtained, notwithstanding the fact that the police action in securing it was clearly in violation of both federal and state constitutions and statutes. After conviction, the trial court denied defendants' motion for a new trial. On appeal, held, reversed, three justices dissenting. Evidence obtained in violation of the defendants' constitutional rights is …