Law Commons^™

The Story Of Hewlett-Packard, Barbara Black

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

With the development of the modern corporation, corporate boards have been the locus of corporate authority, and particularly since the 1980s, boards and their performance have been under intense scrutiny. Nevertheless, corporate law has not developed a consistent theory for what boards are supposed to do; instead, it sends mixed messages about the functions and expectations of boards and the appropriate people to sit on them. The HP saga illustrates some of the dilemmas faced by directors confronted by these competing pressures.

Unconscious Bias And The Limits Of Director Independence, Antony Page

Faculty Publications

Corporate directors make difficult decisions: How much should we pay our CEO? Should we permit a lawsuit against a fellow director? Should we sell the company? Directors are legally obligated to decide in good faith based on the business merits of the issue rather than extraneous considerations and influences. Naturally, some directors may have preferences, or even biases: Our CEO, my colleague and friend, deserves a lot; The company should not sue my fellow board member; We should not sell, because after all, I would like to remain a board member. But the courts presume that independent directors either do …

An Overview Of Brazilian Corporate Governance, Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson De Carvalho, Érica Gorga

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

We provide the first detailed picture of firm-level corporate governance practices in an emerging market. We report on the corporate governance practices of Brazilian public companies, based primarily on an extensive 2005 survey of 116 companies. Most firms have a controlling shareholder or group. Board independence is an area of weakness. The boards of most Brazilian private firms are comprised entirely or almost entirely of insiders or representatives of the controlling family or group. Many firms have no independent directors. Financial disclosure is a second area of weakness. Only a minority of firms provide a statement of cash flows or …

The Fetishization Of Independence, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

According to conventional wisdom, a supermajority independent board of directors is the ideal corporate governance structure. Debate nevertheless continues: empirical evidence suggests that independent boards do not improve firm performance. Independence proponents respond that past studies reflect a flawed definition of independence.

Remarkably, neither side in the independence debate has looked to Delaware, the preeminent state source for corporate law. Comparing Delaware's notions of independence with those of Sarbanes-Oxley and its attendant reforms reveals two fundamentally different conceptions of independence. Sarbanes-Oxley equates independence with outsider status. An independent director is one who lacks financial ties to the corporation and is …

Director Compliance With Elusive Fiduciary Duties In A Climate Of Corporate Governance Reform, Nadelle Grossman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

The Duty To Creditors Reconsidered - Filling A Much Needed Gap In Corporation Law, Richard A. Booth

Faculty Scholarship

The most fundamental question of corporation law is to whom does the board of directors of a corporation owe its fiduciary duty. Recently, the question has tended to be whether and under what circumstances the board of directors has the duty to maximize stockholder wealth. But if a corporation is insolvent (or close to it), business decisions designed to maximize stockholder wealth may result in a reduction of creditor wealth. Although the conventional wisdom is that creditors must protect themselves by contractual means, there is a substantial body of case law that says that creditors can assert claims sounding in …

Disney Examined: A Case Study In Corporate Governance And Ceo Succession, Lawrence Lederman

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Compensation Representatives: A Prudent Solution To Excessive Ceo Pay, Lawton W. Hawkins

ExpressO

Currently, CEO pay is determined by a company’s board of directors, subject to limited shareholder approval in certain circumstances. However, as Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have demonstrated, boards of directors and CEOs do not necessarily engage in real arms length bargaining over CEO pay. Instead, CEOs may exert managerial power to extract economic rents above and beyond what they could have obtained in an arms length negotiation. To address the problem, Bebchuk and Fried have proposed that large shareholders be allowed to nominate candidates for the board, and that companies be required to pay the expenses for any proxy …

Slides: Community Forest Project: Grand Lake Stream, Maine, Steve Keith

Community-Owned Forests: Possibilities, Experiences, and Lessons Learned (June 16-19)

Presenter: Steve Keith, Farm Cove Community Forest, Downeast, ME

62 slides

Keynote Address, Susan S. Bies, Alan Rechtschaffen

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Dual Identities And Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence In Corporate Representation, Susanna K. Ripken

Susanna K. Ripken

Under the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, lawyers for corporate entities must regard the organization itself as the client. Because the corporate client can act only through its authorized constituents, including officers, directors, and employees, the lawyer for the corporation typically looks to the authorized managers of the corporation to speak on behalf of the client. When the interests of the managers and the corporations diverge, however, the lawyer must seek out the highest authority in the organization to provide the appropriate guidance. As a general matter, the board of directors acts as the highest authority within the corporation. One …

Larger Board Size And Decreasing Firm Value In Small Firms, Theodore Eisenberg, Stefan Sundgren, Martin T. Wells

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Several studies hypothesize a relation between board size and financial performance. Empirical tests of the relation exist in only a few studies of large U.S. firms. We find a significant negative correlation between board size and profitability in a sample of small and midsize Finnish firms. Finding a board-size effect for a new and different class of firms affects the range of explanations for the board-size effect.

Why We Bother: A Primer In How Activism Enhances Returns, Jon Lukomnik

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Authority Of The President Over Corporate Litigation: A Study In Inherent Agency, The , Roger J. Goebel

Faculty Scholarship

It is a traditional rule of corporate law that the board of directors exercises plenary power over corporate management. In fact, however, the twentieth century has witnessed a decided shift of the functional center of authority to the corporate officers. Although a basic residuum of authority remains in the board of directors, the officers, especially the president, in the majority of corporations exercise the day-to-day control of corporate affairs; In practice the modern corporation is occasionally directed by a general manager, but more often by the president (or perhaps, to use a mode currently in vogue for large public- issue …

Corporations - Officers And Directors - Acquistion Of Corporate Opportunity After Rejection By Board Of Directors, James M. Tobin

Michigan Law Review

Defendant Odlum, president and director of Airfleets, Inc., was privately offered the opportunity to buy patents for a self-locking nut and the stock of the company which held an exclusive license to manufacture it. The board of directors, when offered the opportunity by Odlum, approved purchase of the stock but rejected the patent rights. Odlum then purchased these rights for himself and a minority stockholder brought a derivative suit for an accounting. Held, a director is absolutely disqualified from purchasing a corporate opportunity for himself, even after the opportunity has been rejected by a disinterested majority of the board …

Corporations-Stockholder's Suit To Compel Declaration Of Dividends- Necessity Of Directors As Parties, Daniel A. Isaacson S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff, a citizen of New York and the owner of some preferred stock in the defendant Delaware corporation, brought a class action against the corporation in a federal district court in Pennsylvania to compel the declaration and payment of dividends on the preferred stock, alleging that the directors had acted in had faith in violation of their duties as fiduciaries. Defendant's articles of incorporation provided that the preferred stock was entitled to receive dividends "when and as declared by the Board of Directors"; the by-laws permitted a majority of the hoard to constitute a quorum for purposes of transacting business. …

Corporations-Application Of Statutes Requiring That Corporate Business Be Managed By Board Of Directors, Bernard L. Trott

Michigan Law Review

In 1942, X corporation and its stockholders entered into an agreement whereby it was stipulated that the management of all theatres leased or operated by the X corporation, or any subsidiary thereof, would be placed in the hands of Y corporation, a large stockholder. This power of management was to include supervising and directing the buying and booking of all attractions, designating and changing the entertainment policy, hiring and discharging employees, and carrying out "such policies or projects as the Board of Directors of the Tenant or its subsidiaries may approve." This agreement was to be effective for a period …

Corporations--Amendment Of By-Laws By Custom, Cornelia Groefsema S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

In an application for a preliminary injunction to prevent stockholders from exercising their rights of ownership until there had been a determination whether such stock should be cancelled because issued without corporate authorization, the success of the petitioner depended upon whether a quorum of the directors was present at the meeting authorizing its issuance. This in turn depended upon whether the by-law requiring a board of directors of ten members had been amended by custom to require only seven. For the four years preceeding the meeting at which the stock was authorized, during which time, however, there were neither directors' …

Corporations-Sale Of All Or Substantially All Of Corporate Assets-Effect Of Modern Statutes, P. F. Westbrook, Jr. S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Modern general corporation acts commonly provide that a sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a corporation organized thereunder may be authorized by the affirmative vote of a specified proportion of the outstanding shares and made upon such terms as the board of directors shall deem expedient and for the best interests of the corporation. Since this sale provision usually stands apart from the dissolution or winding-up process authorized in the same acts, a legislative intent to govern all voluntary sales, not actually incident to dissolution by the terms of the statute would seem to be clear. …

Corporations-The Executive Committee In Corporate Organization-Scope Of Powers, Dickson M. Saunders

Michigan Law Review

From the very beginning of the use of the corporate structure as a device for carrying on the businesses and activities of man, it has been apparent that the nominal brain, the board of directors, could not feasibly run the affairs of the inanimate entity unless certain powers could be delegated to officers and agents. The early case of Hoyt v. Thompson's Executor illustrates the judicial recognition of delegated powers. The charter authorized all business of ordinary nature to be transacted by a board of directors of twenty-three.

Corporations - Voting Rights - Effect Of Sale Of Stock While Books Closed, Louis C. Andrews Jr.

Michigan Law Review

In a statutory action brought by a stockholder to determine the validity of an election of directors, it appeared that proxy votes of 6,856 shares had been accepted by the inspectors although these proxies were given by former owners who had sold the shares since the giving of the proxies and during the twenty days immediately preceding the election. During that twenty-day period, stock transfers registered with the corporation would have had the effect of disfranchising the stock, but none of the 6,856 shares had been offered for registration. By using these proxy votes the shareholders opposing the management were …

Corporations - Restraints On Alienation Of Stock Stipulated In The Charter, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

The charter of the defendant corporation provided that the board of directors had authority to purchase its common stock at any time when the holder thereof was not an employee, or the holder had not received his common stock by conversion of the preferred. In accordance with the authority granted by this provision, the directors of the defendant corporation adopted a resolution to purchase the common stock owned by the plaintiff, who was not an employee and had not received his common stock by conversion of preferred shares. Plaintiff asked that an injunction be issued restraining defendant from proceeding further. …

Corporations - Fiduciary Relation Of Directors - Purchase Of Stock For Company

Michigan Law Review

A company needed a block of stock offered to it in order to acquire certain patent rights. The finances of the company were insufficient to effect the purchase. The board of directors accepted the offer for the company with the understanding that the directors would acquire the stock individually and turn over to the company the needed patent rights. After bankruptcy, the trustee of the company sued to recover profits realized by the directors from a sale of the stock. Held, the inability of the company to purchase the stock itself does not relieve the directors from liability for …