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Articles 31 - 34 of 34
Full-Text Articles in Law
The U.S. As Reluctant Shareholder: Government, Business And The Law, Barbara Black
The U.S. As Reluctant Shareholder: Government, Business And The Law, Barbara Black
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
Despite the likelihood of future bailouts, the government articulated a consistent policy to deal with private enterprise failure, and there is no rule book for how the government should act This is not surprising; the philosophy of free market capitalism, so deeply engrained in the U.S. economic system, is difficult to reconcile with government's rescue of businesses that fail in that system. Unlike some other countries, the U.S. government does not invest surplus funds or engage in entrepreneurial activities for economic gain. The phrase "nationalizing private business" conveys serious negative connotations.
Accordingly, how the government behaves when it is a …
Renegotiation Of Cash Flow Rights In The Sale Of Vc-Backed Firms, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried
Renegotiation Of Cash Flow Rights In The Sale Of Vc-Backed Firms, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried
Articles by Maurer Faculty
Incomplete contracting theory suggests that VC cash flow rights - including liquidation preferences - may be subject to renegotiation. Using a hand-collected dataset of sales of Silicon Valley firms, we find common shareholders do sometimes receive payment before VCs' liquidation preferences are satisfied. However, such deviations tend to be small. We also find that renegotiation is more likely when governance arrangements, including the firm's choice of corporate law, give common shareholders power to impede the sale. Our study provides support for incomplete contracting theory, improves understanding of VC exits, and suggests that choice of corporate law matters in private firms.
Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards For Sustainable Corporate Governance, Robert Sprague
Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards For Sustainable Corporate Governance, Robert Sprague
Robert Sprague
This paper explores whether the modern corporate governance model is sustainable. For many, particularly large, corporations, there is a separation between ownership and management, with an emphasis by management on short-term gains at the expense of long-term sustainability. This paper explores the role of corporate directors, particularly vis-à-vis shareholders, from an interdisciplinary perspective, analyzing legal case law as well as legal, management, and finance literature. This paper then explores emerging trends in expanding notions of corporate governance that incorporate concerns beyond just shareholders, recognizing the interrelationship between business and society. It is suggested that in order to remain viable and …
Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle
Shareholder Primacy And The Business Judgment Rule: Arguments For Expanded Corporate Democracy, Robert Sprague, Aaron Lyttle
Robert Sprague
There is a fundamental flaw in the law’s approach to corporate governance. While shareholder primacy is a well-established norm within U.S. corporate law, the business judgment rule essentially holds directors blameless when they fail to maximize shareholder wealth. During the past century, control of the corporation has passed from shareholders to managers. As a result, shareholders have little practical say in who runs the corporation, even though they cannot usually hold managers legally liable when those managers destroy shareholder wealth through incompetence. Despite a number of arguments asserting that shareholders do not deserve any additional management powers, this article concludes …