Law Commons^™

Understanding The Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance And Industrial Organization, Ronald J. Gilson, Mark J. Roe

Faculty Scholarship

We aim here for a better understanding of the Japanese keiretsu. Our essential claim is that to understand the Japanese system – banks with extensive investment in industry and industry with extensive cross-ownership – we must understand the problems of industrial organization, not just the problems of corporate governance. The Japanese system, we assert, functions not only to harmonize the relationships among the corporation, its shareholders, and its senior managers, but also to facilitate productive efficiency.

Untenable Status Of Corporate Governance Listing Standards Under The Securities Exchange Act, Douglas C. Michael

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

United States securities markets operate under a system of supervised self-regulation created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). That system includes substantive regulation of the traders and the issuers of securities traded in those markets through the use of listing standards.

These listing standards have a unique status. They are part of a self-regulatory system, but are not classic self-regulation. The markets do not govern the traders of which it consists; rather, it governs outsiders—the issuers. The markets and the Securities and Exchange Commissions have sought to control issuers in ways not clearly related to trading in …

Corporate Law: What Is The Impact Of New Ali Proposals On Shareholder Litigation, John C. Coffee Jr., Michael P. Dooley

Faculty Scholarship

When the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project meets this month, one of the most hotly debated agenda items is likely to be its new rules governing shareholder litigation, which are now up for final approval.

The proposed change means that corporate boards will now have to prove in court that a decision to dismiss a shareholder claim alleging self-dealing was in the corporation's best interest. In addition, the requirement for a formal "demand" on the board by shareholders will be uniform, rather than subject to excuse, as it is under Delaware law and in the majority of states.

Drafters …

Reinventing The Outside Director: An Agenda For Institutional Investors, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

Managerialist rhetoric puts the institutional investor between a rock and a hard place. The institutional investor is depicted as a paper colossus, alternatively greedy and mindless, but in all events a less important corporate constituency than that other kind of investor, the "real" shareholder. The unspoken corollary is that, regardless of the institution's investment strategy, its interests may appropriately be ignored.

An institution that trades stock frequently is considered a short-term shareholder without a stake in the future of the corporation. According to the familiar argument, the short-term shareholder has no more legitimate claim on management's attention than does a …

Changing Perceptions Into Reality: Fiduciary Standards To Match The American Directors’ Monitoring Function, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

This paper describes the historical fiduciary obligations of the American outside director and contrasts those obligations with prevailing obligations in today’s environment of the monitoring director. Special attention is devoted to the role of outside directors when their firm is the target of a takeover. In no other context are the demands on the outside director greater and more strain placed on the monitoring model than in the context of a corporate takeover. The final section of this paper examines the relief modern statutory provisions provide to the director and the monitoring function

The Mandatory/Enabling Balance In Corporate Law: An Essay On The Judicial Role, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

A half-filled glass of water can be described as either half full or half empty. The structure of American corporate law – partly enabling, partly mandatory in character – can be viewed in much the same way. Some commentators see American corporate law as primarily composed of mandatory rules that the shareholders themselves cannot waive or modify, In their view, this mandatory component compensates both for the absence of true bargaining among the parties and for the inevitable divergence of interests between the principals (the shareholders) and their agents (the managers and directors). Conversely, other commentators, to whom this Article …

Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As A Multi-Player Game, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

This is an article written in honor of Professor Donald Schwartz, a leading figure in academic corporate law for over two decades, but also a man nearly unique in his willingness to move beyond corporate law to the general study of corporate behavior. In this light, this article will not explore the latest wrinkle in the law – the most recent case, latest SEC ruling, or newest takeover defense tactic – but will instead ask if there are new ways in which we should try to talk about corporate law and corporate behavior. These were questions that Don Schwartz repeatedly …

The Role Of The Market Model In Corporate Law Analysis: A Comment On Weiss And White, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

In a recent article, Elliott Weiss and Lawrence J. White sought to establish that seven decisions of the Delaware courts concerning corporation law had little value in predicting the future conduct of courts and corporations under the Delaware Corporations Law. Weiss and White relied, in part, on a statistical analysis of changes in the prices of publicly traded shares in Delaware corporations to show that the seven studied decisions had no statistically significant market impact.

In this Comment, Professor Fox takes issue with the explanation Weiss and White give for their data. Although the absence of an observed market impact …

Corporate Takeovers: Who Wins; Who Loses; Who Should Regulate, John C. Coffee Jr., Joseph A. Grundfest, Roberta Romano, Murray L. Weidenbaum

Faculty Scholarship

On December 3, 1987, during its 11th Annual Policy Conference in Washington, DC, the American Enterprise Institute convened a panel discussion on "Corporate Takeovers and Insider Trading: Who Should Regulate?" The panelists were John C. Coffee, Jr., professor of law at Columbia University; Joseph A. Grundfest, commissioner at the Securities and Exchange Commission; Roberta Romano, professor of law at Yale Law School; and Murray L. Weidenbaum, Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and director of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University. The panel was moderated by Christopher C. DeMuth, president of AEI. The following discussion is drawn …

How Should We Talk About Corporations? The Languages Of Economics And Of Citizenship, James Boyd White

Articles

My immediate subject in this Comment is section 2.01 of the American Law Institute's proposed Principles of Corporate Governance (Tentative Draft No. 2), which defines in general terms the proper objectives and conduct of a business corporation. My larger subject has to do with the adequacy and inadequacy of various languages in which corporate pur­poses and limits might be expressed, and especially with the limits of the economic language used in the ALI Draft.

The Business Judgement Rule, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Symposium: Current Issues in Corporate Governance: Conference Panel Discussion

Prof. Kozyris: Our discussion today will focus on the so-called "business judgment rule," a judicially developed law concept that the business decisions of corporate management should not be second-guessed by the courts. The courts will not interfere with such decisions as they are being made and carried out, nor will they impose liability on management if it turns out that the decisions were wrong.

Regulating The Market For Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment Of The Tender Offer's Role In Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Better answers often await better questions. In the wake of a recent series of provocative articles dealing with contested tender offers, several questions have been vigorously debated:

(1) Should management of the target company be allowed to resist a hostile tender offer in order to remain an independent company? Which, if any, of the various "shark repellent" measures by which a potential target can make itself unattractive to a bidder are justified?;

(2) If defensive tactics were generally forbidden, should the target company's management still be permitted to encourage competing bids thereby creating an auction?; and

(3) Do hostile takeovers …

The Survival Of The Derivative Suit: An Evaluation And A Proposal For Legislative Reform, John C. Coffee Jr., Donald E. Schwartz

Faculty Scholarship

The shareholder derivative suit today faces extinction. Long considered the "chief regulator of corporate management," and a recognized form of litigation in American courts at least since 1855, it now confronts the second great challenge of its history. Thirty-odd years ago, commentators foresaw the derivative suit's demise when state legislatures began adopting security-for-expenses statutes to curb the abuses of "strike suit" litigation. These reports of its death proved exaggerated, however, as plaintiffs discovered various tactics by which to outflank these statutes. As a result, by the late 1960's, the crisis was past, and a revival in the action's popularity was …

Beyond The Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward A Theoretical View Of Corporate Misconduct And An Effective Legal Response, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Like hard cases, festering scandals make bad law. As public perceptions shift so that conduct once tolerated becomes seen as illicit, political pressures develop that can result in hastily improvised responses by the legal system to fill the newly perceived vacuum. This generalization is advanced to question neither the inalienable right of the public to be scandalized, nor the need for corporate reform, but to approach a highly problematic dilemma: hurried, moralistic responses to a perceived evil often prove not only ineffective, but even counterproductive. The serious student of complex organizations may recognize this assertion as a slightly altered variant …

Corporations And Express Trusts As Business Organizations, Horace Lafayette Wilgus

Articles

PRESIDENT BUTLER of Columbia University is reported to have said in an address before the New York Chamber of Commerce in 1911, that "the limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modem times, whether you judge it by its social, by its ethical, by its industrial, or, in the long run--after we understand it and know how to use it,--by its political, effects." 1

Right Of Joint Adventurers Holding All The Stock Of A Corporation To A Dissolution And Accounting In Equity, Horace Lafayette Wilgus

Articles

The case of Jackson v. Hooper, in the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, decided February 28, 1910, by Judge DILL, (42 N. Y. Law Journal, March 8, 1910), overruling Vice Chancellor HOWELL, of the Court of Chancery (74 AtL. 130) presents interesting and unusual points in corporation and partnership law, and the jurisdiction of courts of equity over corporate affairs.