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Articles 151 - 177 of 177
Full-Text Articles in Law
Corporate Governance Changes As A Signal: Contextualizing The Performance Link, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson, Darius Palia
Corporate Governance Changes As A Signal: Contextualizing The Performance Link, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson, Darius Palia
Faculty Scholarship
Promoting “good” corporate governance has become an important concern. One result has been the creation of indexes that purport to measure the quality of a firm’s corporate governance structure. Prior scholarship reports a positive relationship between firms with good corporate governance index ratings and stock-price-based measures of a firm’s ability to create share value, such as Tobin’s Q. Little work, however, explores why we observe this relationship.
We hypothesize one reason for the relationship is that a rating-altering change in corporate governance structure can be a signal concerning the quality of a firm’s management. Changes in governance structures that result …
Bringing International Tax Policy Into The 21st Century, Michael J. Graetz
Bringing International Tax Policy Into The 21st Century, Michael J. Graetz
Faculty Scholarship
Michael J. Graetz delivered the following remarks at the Tax Policy Center's "A Corporate Tax for the 21st Century" conference on July 14 in Washington. These remarks are substantially taken from his April 2015 Ross Parsons Lecture at the University of Sydney Law School.
The Development And Evolution Of The U.S. Law Of Corporate Criminal Liability And The Yates Memo, Sara Sun Beale
The Development And Evolution Of The U.S. Law Of Corporate Criminal Liability And The Yates Memo, Sara Sun Beale
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Quieting The Sharholders' Voice: Empirical Evidence Of Pervasive Bundling In Proxy Solicitations, James D. Cox, Fabrizio Ferri, Colleen Honigsberg, Randall S. Thomas
Quieting The Sharholders' Voice: Empirical Evidence Of Pervasive Bundling In Proxy Solicitations, James D. Cox, Fabrizio Ferri, Colleen Honigsberg, Randall S. Thomas
Faculty Scholarship
The integrity of shareholder voting is critical to the legitimacy of corporate law. One threat to this process is proxy “bundling,” or the joinder of more than one separate item into a single proxy proposal. Bundling deprives shareholders of the right to convey their views on each separate matter being put to a vote and forces them to either reject the entire proposal or approve items they might not otherwise want implemented.
In this Paper, we provide the first comprehensive evaluation of the anti-bundling rules adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in 1992. While we find that the …
Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers In A World With Weak Shareholder Litigation, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers In A World With Weak Shareholder Litigation, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Faculty Scholarship
Because representative shareholder litigation has been constrained by numerous legal developments, the corporate governance system has developed new mechanisms as alternative means to address managerial agency costs. We posit that recent significant governance developments in the corporate world are the natural consequence of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of shareholder suits to address certain genre of managerial agency costs. We thus argue that corporate governance responses evolve to fill voids caused by the inability of shareholder suits to monitor and discipline corporate managers.
We further claim that these new governance responses are themselves becoming stronger due in part to the rising …
Agency Costs In Law-Firm Selection: Are Companies Under-Spending On Counsel?, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Agency Costs In Law-Firm Selection: Are Companies Under-Spending On Counsel?, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Faculty Scholarship
A growing body of literature examines whether corporate clients derive sufficient value from the law firms that they engage. Yet little attention has been paid to whether clients optimally select among law firms in the first place. One entry-point is to identify discrepancies in the quality of counsel selected by different corporate clients for the very same work. Using a large sample of loans, this Article finds that major U.S. public companies select lower-ranked law firms for their financing transactions than do private equity-owned companies, controlling for various deal characteristics. While some of this discrepancy can be attributed to value-maximizing …
The Social Boundaries Of Corporate Taxation, Sloan G. Speck
The Social Boundaries Of Corporate Taxation, Sloan G. Speck
Publications
Historically, the tax law distinction between corporate and conduit treatment drew primarily on doctrinal understandings, treating state-law corporations as corporate for tax purposes and classifying unincorporated legal entities based on their resemblance to conventional state-law corporations. More recently, commentators and Treasury have abandoned these doctrinal touchstones in favor of efficiency, broadly construed, as the guiding principle in determining an entity’s tax classification. This Article argues that, while important, efficiency considerations should not function as the sole arbiter of the boundary between corporate and conduit tax treatment. First, classical corporate taxation is, in many ways, deeply embedded within a larger network …
Investment Accelerators, Brad Bernthal
Investment Accelerators, Brad Bernthal
Publications
This Article documents and explains the legal and extralegal dimensions of Investment Accelerator (IA) systems. Accelerators are a new class of institution that supports entrepreneurs and early stage startups. Investment Accelerators take an ownership stake in companies that participate in an intensive, time-limited program. Interviews reveal the surprising extent to which parties in many Investment Accelerators exchange economic value in the absence of formal agreement. Startups share proprietary information with highly accomplished mentors who, in turn, contribute their time and connections without direct compensation. This under-contracted and informal arrangement raises concerns about opportunism. Data from an original investigation presents a …
Lead Plaintiffs And Lead Counsel In Deal Litigation, David H. Webber
Lead Plaintiffs And Lead Counsel In Deal Litigation, David H. Webber
Faculty Scholarship
The shareholder lawsuit is the primary vehicle for enforcing corporate law. While closely related fields like securities regulation rely on private shareholder lawsuits to supplement the enforcement work of public regulators like the Securities Exchange Commission, corporate law enforcement depends largely on private rights of action brought by aggrieved investors and their lawyers. The purpose of these lawsuits is straightforward: to induce corporate fiduciaries like boards and managers to abide by the duties of loyalty and care in overseeing the corporation. There are many situations that implicate these fiduciary duties, but none that are as fraught with conflict and temptation …
Impact Investing As A Form Of Lobbying And Its Corporate-Governance Effects, Andrzej Rapaczynski
Impact Investing As A Form Of Lobbying And Its Corporate-Governance Effects, Andrzej Rapaczynski
Faculty Scholarship
Impact investment is attractive to many because it seems to combine support for progressive causes with an apparent commitment to the principles of a market economy. In fact, however, a rational impact investor is not simply creating demand for certain types of corporate actions; he/she is attempting to use corporate governance mechanisms to influence fiduciary decisions of the management. The cost of this tactic for the health of the capitalist economy is potentially very considerable. The American capitalist system relies heavily on a relatively fragile corporate governance arrangement in which the agency problems of a modern corporation are minimized by …
Follow The Money: Essays On International Taxation – Introduction, Michael J. Graetz
Follow The Money: Essays On International Taxation – Introduction, Michael J. Graetz
Faculty Scholarship
Publicity about tax avoidance techniques of multinational corporations and wealthy individuals has moved discussion of international income taxation from the backrooms of law and accounting firms to the front pages of news organizations around the world. In the words of a top Australian tax official, international tax law has now become a topic of barbeque conversations. Public anger has, in turn, brought previously arcane issues of international taxation onto the agenda of heads of government around the world.
Despite all the attention, however, issues of international income taxation are often not well understood. This Introduction outlines a collection of essays, …
Integration Of Corporate And Shareholder Taxes, Michael J. Graetz, Alvin C. Warren
Integration Of Corporate And Shareholder Taxes, Michael J. Graetz, Alvin C. Warren
Faculty Scholarship
Integration of the corporate and individual income taxes can be achieved by providing shareholders a credit for corporate taxes paid with respect to corporate earnings distributed as dividends. When such integration was previously considered in the U.S., proponents emphasized that it could reduce or eliminate many of the familiar distortions of a classical corporate income tax. Integration would also provide a framework for addressing current concerns for tax incentives for U.S. companies to shift income to foreign affiliates in lower-taxed countries or to expatriate in "inversion" transactions. A recent Congressional proposal for a corporate dividend deduction coupled with withholding on …
The Wolf At The Door: The Impact Of Hedge Fund Activism On Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr., Darius Palia
The Wolf At The Door: The Impact Of Hedge Fund Activism On Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr., Darius Palia
Faculty Scholarship
Hedge fund activism has recently spiked, almost hyperbolically. No one disputes this, and most view it as a significant change. But, their reasons differ. Some see activist hedge funds as the natural champions of dispersed and diversified shareholders, who are less capable of collective action in their own interest. A key fact about activist hedge funds is that they are undiversified and typically hold significant stakes in the companies that comprise their portfolios. Given their larger stakes and focused holdings, they are less subject to the “rational apathy” that characterizes more diversified and even indexed investors, such as pension and …
The New Public, Sarah Seo
The New Public, Sarah Seo
Faculty Scholarship
By exploring the intertwined histories of the automobile, policing, criminal procedure, and the administrative state in the twentieth-century United States, this Essay argues that the growth of the police’s discretionary authority had its roots in the governance of an automotive society. To tell this history and the proliferation of procedural rights that developed as a solution to abuses of police discretion, this Essay examines the life and oeuvre of Charles Reich, an administrative-law expert in the 1960s who wrote about his own encounters with the police, particularly in his car. The Essay concludes that, in light of this regulatory history …
Line Drawing In Corporate Rights Determinations, Elizabeth Pollman
Line Drawing In Corporate Rights Determinations, Elizabeth Pollman
All Faculty Scholarship
This essay was written for the 21st Annual Clifford Symposium: The Supreme Court, Business, and Civil Justice. The essay argues that existing lines drawn between corporations may be a useful starting place for analyzing the rights of corporations, but caution must be used because the lines drawn in other areas were done for various policy reasons in different contexts that may not map onto the corporate rights determination. Attention should be paid to the specific characteristics of corporations that are relevant to the right at stake and the basis for extending protection. The key contribution of this essay is to …
Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, Elizabeth Pollman
Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, Elizabeth Pollman
All Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court has recently decided some of the most important and controversial cases involving the federal rights of corporations in over two hundred years of jurisprudence. In rulings ranging from corporate political spending to religious liberty rights, the Court has dramatically expanded the zone in which corporations can act free from regulation. This Article argues these decisions represent a doctrinal shift, even from previous cases granting rights to corporations. The modern corporate rights doctrine has put unprecedented weight on state corporate law to act as a mechanism for resolving disputes among corporate participants regarding the expressive and religious activity …
Governmental Intervention In An Economic Crisis, Robert K. Rasmussen, David A. Skeel Jr.
Governmental Intervention In An Economic Crisis, Robert K. Rasmussen, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper articulates a framework both for assessing the various government bailouts that took place at the onset of Great Recession and for guiding future rescue efforts when they become necessary. The goals for those engineering a bailout should be to be as transparent as possible, to articulate clearly the reason for the intervention, to respect existing priorities among investors, to exercise control only at the top level where such efforts can be seen by the public, and to exit as soon as possible. By these metrics, some of the recent bailouts should be applauded, while others fell short. We …
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them.
The study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and deployed, the sequential response of issuers and investors, and the central role played by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional …
Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
Directors have traditionally been elected by a plurality of the votes cast. This means that in uncontested elections, a candidate who receives even a single vote is elected. Proponents of “shareholder democracy” have advocated a shift to a majority voting rule in which a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast to be elected. Over the past decade, they have been successful, and the shift to majority voting has been one of the most popular and successful governance reforms.
Yet critics are sceptical as to whether majority voting improves board accountability. Tellingly, directors of companies with majority voting …
A Model Company Act And A Model Company Court, Ronald J. Gilson
A Model Company Act And A Model Company Court, Ronald J. Gilson
Faculty Scholarship
This paper is a contribution to a symposium on the European Model Company Act ("EMCA ") in which I argue that a model company court powerfully complements the EMCA. A particular characteristic of company law complicates the intermediating role of a model act in a federal system. Because complex corporate transactions inevitably are associated with significant uncertainty, especially when they present conflicts of interest, transaction designers and legislative drafters tend to frame applicable contractual and legal rules as standards, such as fairness and equal treatment, rather than as rules. In turn, the effectiveness of a standard in the face of …
Reinterpreting The Status-Contract Divide: The Case Of Fiduciaries, Hanoch Dagan, Elizabeth S. Scott
Reinterpreting The Status-Contract Divide: The Case Of Fiduciaries, Hanoch Dagan, Elizabeth S. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
The distinction between status and contract permeates legal analyses of categories of cooperative interpersonal interactions in which one party has particular obligations to the other. But the current binary understanding of the distinction has facilitated its use as a foil and thus undermined its conceptual and normative significance. This predicament is understandable given that the innate, comprehensive, and inalienable status as well as the wholly open-ended contract anticipated by commentators are corner — rather than core — alternatives in a liberal polity. Hence, to clarify these normative debates we introduce two further, intermediate conceptions: office and contract type. Like the …
Wait, Wait, Don’T Tell Me: Accountability, Plausible Deniability, Model Rule 1.13, And The Role Of Corporate Counsel In An Age Of Enhanced Monitoring, Irma S. Russell
Wait, Wait, Don’T Tell Me: Accountability, Plausible Deniability, Model Rule 1.13, And The Role Of Corporate Counsel In An Age Of Enhanced Monitoring, Irma S. Russell
Faculty Works
No abstract provided.
Full Circle? The Single Tax Principle, Beps, And The New Us Model, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Full Circle? The Single Tax Principle, Beps, And The New Us Model, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Articles
This paper will argue that while there is some innovation in BEPS, it is in fact more of a continuation that a sharp break with the past. Like Alexis de Tocqueville’s French Revolution, BEPS represents both continuity and change. In particular, the single tax principle has formed the theoretical basis of much of the international tax regime from the beginning. And it is in fact this continuity rather than any sharp change that gives the final BEPS package its promise to, as Secretary General Gurria also promised, “put an end to double non-taxation.”
A Machine Learning Classifier For Corporate Opportunity Waivers, Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Eric L. Talley
A Machine Learning Classifier For Corporate Opportunity Waivers, Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
Rauterberg & Talley (2017) develop a data set of “corporate opportunity waivers” (COWs) – significant contractual modifications of fiduciary duties – sampled from SEC filings. Part of their analysis utilizes a machine learning (ML) classifier to extend their data set beyond the hand-coded sample. Because the ML approach is likely unfamiliar to some readers, and in the light of its great potential across other areas of law and finance research, this note explains the basic components using a simple example, and it demonstrates strategies for calibrating and evaluating the classifier.
Corporate Control And Idiosyncratic Vision, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani
Corporate Control And Idiosyncratic Vision, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani
Faculty Scholarship
This Article offers a novel theory of corporate control. It does so by shedding new light on corporate-ownership structures and challenging the prevailing model of controlling shareholders as essentially opportunistic actors who seek to reap private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Our core claim is that entrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows them to pursue their vision (i.e., any business strategy that the entrepreneur genuinely believes will produce an above-market rate of return) in the manner they see fit. We call the subjective value an entrepreneur attaches to her vision the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic vision. Our framework identifies …
Harmonizing Multinational Parent Company Liability For Foreign Subsidiary Human Rights Violations, Vivian Grosswald Curran
Harmonizing Multinational Parent Company Liability For Foreign Subsidiary Human Rights Violations, Vivian Grosswald Curran
Articles
A notable development of recent years has been the simultaneous legal invisibility and ubiquity of the giant multinational corporation where its subsidiaries operate elsewhere under legal structures that preserve the parent company from liability for the subsidiary’s conduct. This article focuses on multinationals whose parent company is at home in a developed country and subsidiaries operate in a developing state, and specifically where the foreign subsidiary is alleged to have violated norms of universal human rights. It examines current legal theory, and offers a comparative perspective on legislative and judicial traditions and innovations in several home states of large multinational …
Llcs And The Private Ordering Of Dispute Resolution, Peter Molk, Verity Winship
Llcs And The Private Ordering Of Dispute Resolution, Peter Molk, Verity Winship
UF Law Faculty Publications
An emerging question in U.S. business law is how the organizational documents of a business entity set the rules for resolving internal disputes. This practice is routine in commercial contracts, which may specify where or how disputes must be resolved. Recent use of litigation provisions in corporation charters and bylaws have sparked controversy, ultimately leading to legislative action to preserve shareholder suits from contractual waiver. Yet despite accounting for the majority of business organizations and sharing features with corporations, non-corporate business entities and their internal dispute resolution process have been largely ignored. How do these non-corporate entities set ex ante …