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2003

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Articles 31 - 60 of 98

Full-Text Articles in Law

Bring On 'Da Noise: The Sec's Proposals Concerning Professional Conduct For Attorneys Under Sarbanes-Oxley, Marilyn Blumberg Cane, Sarah Smith Kelleher Jan 2003

Bring On 'Da Noise: The Sec's Proposals Concerning Professional Conduct For Attorneys Under Sarbanes-Oxley, Marilyn Blumberg Cane, Sarah Smith Kelleher

Faculty Scholarship

In the wake of Enron's and numerous other corporate scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) to establish rules of professional conduct for attorneys who appear before it. In November 2002, the Commission released a proposal where attorneys would be required to report perceived violations of corporate governance and Commission rules up-the-ladder. Additionally, if the company failed to make an appropriate response, the attorney would be required to make a noisy withdrawal. After an onslaught of comments against the proposal, the Commission issued an alternative proposal for comment.

Under the alternative rule, …


Making Sense Of Successor Liability, Marie T. Reilly Jan 2003

Making Sense Of Successor Liability, Marie T. Reilly

Journal Articles

A firm that buys assets from another firm ordinarily does not acquire liability to the seller's creditors simply by buying its assets. This ordinary rule is subject to important exceptions. The buyer's consent triggers an exception. If a buyer agrees to assume the seller's liability to third parties, it is for that reason liable. This article considers a more controversial exception - successor liability. When a court decides that an asset acquirer should be treated as a "successor" to the transferor, it is liable for the transferor's debts as though it were the transferor.


After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse In Corporate Law, Lyman P.Q. Johnson Jan 2003

After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse In Corporate Law, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

The demise of monetary damages as a remedy for breach of the corporate director duty of due care means that only a breach of the duty of loyalty or good faith affords the possibility of holding corporate directors personally liable for wrongdoing. The author argues that the fiduciary duty of loyalty contains both a widely appreciated, but rather minimal, "non-betrayal" aspect and a less appreciated, but more affirmative, "devotion" dimension. The affirmative. thrust of loyalty, grounded in widely-shared cultural norms and finding expression in myriad literary and religious stories, offers a doctrinal avenue for addressing a potentially broader range of …


A Flaw In The Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity In The Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, Steven A. Ramirez Jan 2003

A Flaw In The Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity In The Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, Steven A. Ramirez

Faculty Publications & Other Works

No abstract provided.


The George A. Leet Business Law Symposium: The Role Of Lawyers In Strategic Alliances - Introduction, George W. Dent Jan 2003

The George A. Leet Business Law Symposium: The Role Of Lawyers In Strategic Alliances - Introduction, George W. Dent

Faculty Publications

Introducation to The George A. Leet Business Law Symposium: The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, Cleveland, Ohio.


Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese Jan 2003

Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


The Role Of Lawyers In Strategic Alliances, George W. Dent Jan 2003

The Role Of Lawyers In Strategic Alliances, George W. Dent

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


On The Proper Motives Of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want To Invite Homo Economicus To Join Your Board), Lynn A. Stout Jan 2003

On The Proper Motives Of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want To Invite Homo Economicus To Join Your Board), Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

One of the most important questions in corporate governance is how directors of public corporations can be motivated to serve the interests of the firm. Directors frequently hold only small stakes in the companies they manage. Moreover, a variety of legal rules and contractual arrangements insulate them from liability for business failures. Why then should we expect them to do a good job?

Conventional corporate scholarship has great difficulty wrestling with this question, in large part because conventional scholarship usually adopts the economist's assumption that directors are rational actors motivated purely by self-interest. This homo economicus model of behavior may …


Price Theory, Competition, And The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese Jan 2003

Price Theory, Competition, And The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Challenging traditional antitrust jurisprudence, Professor Alan J. Meese argues that the present structure of Rule of Reason analysis, applied pursuant to Standard Oil v. United States, has become outdated. The Rule of Reason as currently applied by the courts rests upon neoclassical price theory, an economic paradigm that assumes that legitimate competition consists of unbridled technological rivalry, unconstrained by nonstandard contracts. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to apply a competing paradigm- Transaction Cost Economics-when determining whether a contract is unreasonable "per se" or instead deserving of Rule of Reason scrutiny. Professor Meese argues that Transaction Cost Economics more …


Corporate Policy And The Coherence Of Delaware Takeover Law, Richard E. Kihlstrom, Michael L. Wachter Jan 2003

Corporate Policy And The Coherence Of Delaware Takeover Law, Richard E. Kihlstrom, Michael L. Wachter

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article presents a model that can be used to explain key elements of Delaware takeover law. By incorporating corporate policy as a key variable in the model, Delaware law’s management discretion rule can be shown to be best suited for maximizing the value of the corporation and the shareholders’ interest under a set of reasonable assumptions. By allowing for occasional market mispricing and the agency costs associated with managing to the market, we demonstrate that a shareholder choice regime would likely lead to suboptimal investment decisions. In our model, managers are assumed to have better information regarding alternative corporate …


Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions As Pre-Commitment, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock Jan 2003

Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions As Pre-Commitment, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

Constitutions constitute a polity and create and entrench power. A corporate constitution - the governance choices incorporated in state law and the certificate of incorporation - resembles a political constitution. Delaware law allows parties to create corporations, to endow them with perpetual life, to assign rights and duties to "citizens" (directors and shareholders), to adopt a great variety of governance structures, and to entrench those choices. In this Article, we argue that the decision to endow directors with significant power over decisions whether and how to sell the company is a constitutional choice of governance structure. We then argue that …


Self-Regulation And Securities Markets, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2003

Self-Regulation And Securities Markets, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Enron, Arthur Andersen, Tyco, ImClone, WorldCom, Adelphia - as American investors reel from accounting scandals and self-dealing by corporate insiders, the question of trust in the securities markets has taken on a new urgency. Securities markets cannot operate without trust. Markets known for fraud, insider trading, and manipulation risk a downward spiral as investors depart in search of safer investments. Today, many investors are rethinking the wisdom of entrusting their financial futures to the stock market. Absent trust in the integrity of the securities markets, individuals will hoard their money under the proverbial mattress.


Litigator's Thumbnail Guide To The Warn Act, David A. Santacroce Jan 2003

Litigator's Thumbnail Guide To The Warn Act, David A. Santacroce

Articles

When large companies choose to lay off workers or close down plants without prior notice, they can be subject to extensive liability under the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), including 60 days backpay to all affected workers, daily fines to local government, and attorney fees generated during the suit. In the following article, the author presents the bare bones basics of WARN in order for employees and their advocates to understand how and when WARN applies.


The Case For Retaining The Corporate Amt, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah Jan 2003

The Case For Retaining The Corporate Amt, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Articles

PROFESSORS Chorvat and Knoll present us with a strong argument for repealing the corporate alternative minimum tax (AMT). In 2001, repeal was recommended by the Joint Committee on Taxation as part of their simplification study, endorsed by the ABA/AICPA/TEI tax simplification project, and included in a bill passed by the House of Representatives. Since this issue is likely to arise again, it seems worthwhile to review the arguments raised by Chorvat and Knoll. Upon review, none of these arguments seem particularly persuasive; at best, they make a case for reforming the corporate AMT, not for repealing it. On the other …


Why We Need The Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, And Ethics Of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, Jill R. Horwitz Jan 2003

Why We Need The Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, And Ethics Of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, Jill R. Horwitz

Articles

Among the major forms of corporate ownership, the not-for-profit ownership form is distinct in its behavior, legal constraints, and moral obligations. A new empirical analysis of the American hospital industry, using eleven years of data for all urban general hospitals in the country, shows that corporate form accounts for large differences in the provision of specific medical services. Not-for-profit hospitals systematically provide both private and public goods that are in the public interest, and that other forms fail to provide. Two hypotheses are proposed to account for the findings, one legal and one moral. While no causal claims are made, …


National Regulation Of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay On Comity, Extraterritoriality, And Harmonization, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah Jan 2003

National Regulation Of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay On Comity, Extraterritoriality, And Harmonization, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Articles

Despite the economic importance of multinational enterprises ("MNEs"), there is a surprising paucity of law governing foreign direct investment ("FDI"), especially in comparison with the abundance of law governing trade. There is no multilateral legal arrangement governing FDI that is similar to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), no organization similar to the World Trade Organization, and almost no courses in law schools on FDI law. The goal of this Article is to begin to remedy this state of affairs by proposing a conceptual model for analyzing the application of the national laws of home and host countries …


Competition, Corporate Responsibility, And The China Question, Jospeh Vining Jan 2003

Competition, Corporate Responsibility, And The China Question, Jospeh Vining

Other Publications

"Corporate responsibility" is not a peripheral matter. It is at the core of all decision-making on behalf of business corporations under American law. This paper examines the effort to add an exemption for "business" in corporate form to the exemptions from ordinary responsibility that are seen in other areas of activity - e.g., for the military, for lawyers in adversarial litigation, or for investigators in scientific research. It looks at a number of well known cases and points to the often neglected relevance of both the criminal law applicable to corporations as such, and the evolving professional responsibility of corporate …


A Taxing Settlement, Hanoch Dagan, James J. White Jan 2003

A Taxing Settlement, Hanoch Dagan, James J. White

Articles

The following essay is based on the talk "Government, Citizens, and Injurious Industries: A Case Study of the Tobacco Litigation," delivered by Hanoch Dagan last May to the Detroit Chapter of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, and on the article "Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries," by Dagan and James J. White, '62, which appeared in 75.2 New York University Law Review 254-428 (May 2000). The authors hold conflicting view on the underlying issue of this topic: tobacco company product liability. Professor Dagan holds the position that tobacco companies are liable for harm done by their products; Professor …


Foreword: Revisiting Gilson And Kraakman’S Efficiency Story, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2003

Foreword: Revisiting Gilson And Kraakman’S Efficiency Story, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Gilson and Kraakman's ‘Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’ is part of the canon of modem corporate law scholarship, one of a handful of articles that has profoundly influenced the way we think about the field. It is also enigmatic, warranting a fresh look by those who think they know what it says from some long-ago reading or second-hand references by other authors.


Too Busy To Mind The Business? Monitoring By Directors With Multiple Board Appointments, Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2003

Too Busy To Mind The Business? Monitoring By Directors With Multiple Board Appointments, Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual.


Questions To Ask Before You Join A Club, Laura N. Beny, Paul S. Bird, Franci J. Blassberg, Michael P. Harrell Jan 2003

Questions To Ask Before You Join A Club, Laura N. Beny, Paul S. Bird, Franci J. Blassberg, Michael P. Harrell

Articles

Despite the recent flurry of large transactions in which a consortium of private equity firms have teamed up to make joint bids and acquisitions, “club deals” themselves are not breaking news. In fact, they have been a staple of small- and middle-sized private equity M&A transactions for years. Recently, however, there has been a growing trend toward large club deals with enterprise values over $1 billion.1 Due to their size, complexity and, often, international dimension, these transactions have generated considerable attention in the business press and have prompted much discussion among private equity professionals and the limited partners whose money …


Not Our Grandparents' Partnership Statute, Mark Anderson Jan 2003

Not Our Grandparents' Partnership Statute, Mark Anderson

Articles

No abstract provided.


Proportionate Liability Under The Cbca In The Context Of Recent Corporate Governance Reform: Canadian Auditors In The Wrong Place At The Wrong Time?, Poonam Puri, Stephanie Ben-Ishai Jan 2003

Proportionate Liability Under The Cbca In The Context Of Recent Corporate Governance Reform: Canadian Auditors In The Wrong Place At The Wrong Time?, Poonam Puri, Stephanie Ben-Ishai

Articles & Book Chapters

In the recent Canada Business Corporations Act amendments implementing a proportionate liability scheme, auditors appear to be winners. This is consistent with the trend in the past several years as a result of which Canadian auditors have been successful in narrowing the scope of their liability both through legislation and through common law. Going forward, however, it is fair to say that auditors will be losers unless the accounting profession re-evaluates its role and responsibilities to its stakeholders. Given the accounting and corporate governance scandals North America has witnessed in the past few years, as well as the actual and …


When Clients Do Bad Things: The Lawyer's Response To Corporate Wrongdoing, Craig M. Bradley Jan 2003

When Clients Do Bad Things: The Lawyer's Response To Corporate Wrongdoing, Craig M. Bradley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The high profile meltdowns of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Global Crossing and other well-known companies have focused attention on the responsibilities of corporate gatekeepers, including attorneys, to deter or expose fraudulent conduct by their clients and associated persons. Attorneys have been the subject of investigation and criticism by Congress' and federal regulators for failing to adequately respond to their clients' fraudulent (and, possibly, criminal) conduct. The lawyer who learns that his or her client or persons acting on its behalf are engaged in a course of fraudulent or criminal conduct which threatens economic losses to non-client third parties faces both …


A Jurisdictional Approach To Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, Peter B. Oh Jan 2003

A Jurisdictional Approach To Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, Peter B. Oh

Articles

This article challenges our persistent path dependence on defunct distinctions between corporations and certain limited unincorporated associations. Recent federal tax regulations have inspired proposals for consolidated treatment of all limited business organizations through uniformly based or universally applicable statutes. I contend these proposals are preoccupied with how hybrid organizations such as the limited liability company and the limited liability partnership amalgamate, and thus implicitly preserve, traditional dichotomies between corporations and partnership categorizations as well as entities and aggregate theories. The continued use of these schemes compromises the legal basis for such proposals.

By critically examining certain jurisdictional principles, this article …


Keeping The Wheels On The Wagon: Observations On Issues Of Legal Ethics For Lawyers Representing Business Organizations, Irma S. Russell Jan 2003

Keeping The Wheels On The Wagon: Observations On Issues Of Legal Ethics For Lawyers Representing Business Organizations, Irma S. Russell

Faculty Works

No abstract provided.


Gprady, William K. Black Jan 2003

Gprady, William K. Black

Faculty Works

No abstract provided.


Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, Randall Thomas Jan 2003

Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, Randall Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This paper examines internal pay disparities in American public corporations and argues that wide gaps between the top and bottom of the pay scale can, in certain circumstances, directly and adversely affect firm value, that corporate boards should be informed about these effects, and that they should, in some cases, reduce internal pay differentials to address them. In support of this thesis, it analyzes numerous empirical studies that have shown that wide disparities in corporate pay scales can adversely affect firm value. These studies demonstrate that, at many types of organizations, as internal pay differentials grow, employees and lower level …


Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved For Business Organizers In The Nineteenth Century, Margaret M. Blair Jan 2003

Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved For Business Organizers In The Nineteenth Century, Margaret M. Blair

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that corporate status became popular in the nineteenth century as a way to organize production because of the unique manner in which incorporation permitted organizers to lock in financial capital. Unlike participants in a partnership, shareholders in an incorporated enterprise could not extract capital from the firm without explicit approval of a board of directors charged with representing the interests of the incorporated entity, even when that interest might sometimes conflict with the interests of individual shareholders. While this ability to lock in capital has occasionally led to abuses, the ability to commit capital generally helped promote …


Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism And The Employee Interview, Sarah Helene Duggin Jan 2003

Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism And The Employee Interview, Sarah Helene Duggin

Scholarly Articles

This article addresses key ethical issues pertaining to the conduct of employee interviews in the course of internal corporate investigations. The discussion focuses on business corporations, but it is equally applicable to other for-profit and not-for-profit organizations." Part II provides background information on developments in organizational criminal liability over the past two decades, the importance of the United States Sentencing Commission's Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, and the concomitant emergence of the internal investigation as an integral part of modern corporate legal practice. Part III examines law enforcement authorities' growing insistence on corporate "cooperation" as a prerequisite to participation in voluntary disclosure …