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Articles 31 - 34 of 34
Full-Text Articles in Law
Investor-Driven Financial Innovation, Kathryn Judge
Investor-Driven Financial Innovation, Kathryn Judge
Faculty Scholarship
Financial regulations often encourage or require market participants to hold particular types of financial assets. One unintended consequence of this form of regulation is that it can spur innovation to increase the effective supply of favored assets. This Article examines when and how changes in the law prompt the spread of “investor-driven financial innovations.” Weaving together theory, recent empirical findings, and illustrations, this Article provides an overview of why investors prefer certain types of financial assets to others, how markets respond, and how the spread of investor-driven innovations can transform the structure of the financial system. This examination suggests that …
Principal Costs: A New Theory For Corporate Law And Governance, Zohar Goshen, Richard Squire
Principal Costs: A New Theory For Corporate Law And Governance, Zohar Goshen, Richard Squire
Faculty Scholarship
The problem of managerial agency costs dominates debates in corporate law. Many leading scholars advocate reforms that would reduce agency costs by forcing firms to allocate more control to shareholders. Such proposals disregard the costs that shareholders avoid by delegating control to managers and voluntarily restricting their own control rights. This Essay introduces principal-cost theory, which posits that each firm’s optimal governance structure minimizes the sum of principal costs, produced when investors exercise control, and agent costs, produced when managers exercise control. Both principal costs and agent costs can arise from honest mistakes (which generate competence costs) and …
The Importance Of "Money", Kathryn Judge
The Importance Of "Money", Kathryn Judge
Faculty Scholarship
In a provocative new book, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation, Professor Morgan Ricks argues that the government should reclaim control over money creation. Money, Ricks argues, is not just the cash in your pocket or the balance in your checking account. Instead, at least for purposes of financial stability policy, money is best equated with short-term debt. For most of the twentieth century, such debt was issued primarily by regulated commercial banks and insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), resulting in a fairly stable financial system. As a result of financial innovation, however, much of today's short-term …
Information Gaps And Shadow Banking, Kathryn Judge
Information Gaps And Shadow Banking, Kathryn Judge
Faculty Scholarship
This Article argues that information gaps – pockets of information that are pertinent and knowable but not currently known – are a byproduct of shadow banking and a meaningful source of systemic risk. It lays the foundation for this claim by juxtaposing the regulatory regime governing the shadow banking system with the incentives of the market participants who populate that system. Like banks, shadow banks rely heavily on short-term debt claims designed to obviate the need for the holder to engage in any meaningful information gathering or analysis. The securities laws that prevail in the capital markets, however, both presume …